Search results

Prior evidence suggests the existence of asymmetric timeliness in the reporting of good and bad news of firms that trade in the Athens Stock Exchange. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether these results are consistent with inferences related to persistence property of earnings for firms that trade in the Athens Stock Exchange.

The research design employs both level regression specification and change regression specification and it is based on pool cross‐sectional regressions. Empirical results after classifying observations are reported based on both the sign of prior period and current period firms' return, while a number of sensitivity tests are employed.

According to prior evidence, bad news is recorded more timely than good news but in an unbiased and non‐conservative way. This implies that earnings shocks of firms with bad news should present persistence. Results from an ex‐ante perspective verify these arguments while results from an ex‐post perspective do not.

In contrast to other studies that report results that, in bad news periods, firms' earnings tend to present lower persistence than firms' earnings in good news periods, because managers conservatively report bad news, this paper focuses on a sample of firms that seems to report bad news in a timely way.

Rapid change has been the keynote to survival and business success in the 1990s. Even highly successful organisations have had to communicate bad news at times. This paper is based on the premise that change will be smoother if the ‘bad news’ elements are properly communicated — both within the organisation and externally. It draws on the author's personal views, based on his experiences with Parcelforce, the UK's largest parcels carrier. The paper sets out a basis for communicating bad news, highlighting the importance of careful planning and discussing the role of the communications team in leading the process. It provides a range of practical examples front Parcelforce's experience over the last five years.

This paper reports the results of an investigation into the neutrality of the narrative discussion of financial performance and position, as evidenced in 179 annual reports of UK listed companies. Neutrality of narrative discussion was determined by comparing the average proportions of good and bad news contained in the narrative and statutory accounts sections of the annual reports. The results of a comparison of the proportion of good news in the two sections of the annual reports suggest that the narrative sections contained a significantly higher proportion of good news than the statutory accounts sections. Comparison of proportions of bad news, however, indicates that the narrative sections contained a significantly lower proportion of bad news compared to the statutory accounts sections. Finally, the results also suggest that the proportion of good news as compared to bad news in the narrative sections is significantly higher than the proportion of good news compared to bad news in the statutory accounts section. The results are consistent with the suggestion that company management highlights good news in narrative discussions. The implications of the findings for company management, users, auditors and regulators are discussed.

Notes that most business messages can be strategically categorized as either good news messages, bad news messages, or persuasive messages and that from perspectives of receivers of business messages, these messages are viewed as being either something they are pleased to hear (good news), something they are not pleased to hear (bad news), or something urging them to perform some action (persuasive). Points out that, since most business messages fall into three general categories, basic approaches have been developed for preparing each of these categories of messages, suggesting these approaches should be followed by business executives so that their messages will be as effective as possible. Presents and discusses these three basic approaches to effective business messages.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how changes in the firm's information disclosure practices impact the way investors process macroeconomic news. Specifically, the authors examine the role of derivative instruments and hedging activities disclosure, as required by SFAS 133, in shaping invertors response to good and bad interest rate news. In addition, the authors examine whether the effect of SFAS 133 on investors' response to good and bad interest rate news varies between firms with higher and lower earnings volatility.

This study uses data on all US public firms over the period from 1990 to 2019. The authors mainly apply multivariate regression and a difference-in-difference approach to test their hypotheses.

The results show a significant decrease in the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest rate news for users of interest rate derivatives following the adoption of SFAS 133. However, in contrast to this finding, the authors also find that the adoption of SFAS 133 has no impact on the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest rate news for nonusers of interest rate derivatives. Consistent with the ambiguity theory, the finding suggests that SFAS 133 indeed decreases investors’ uncertainty (ambiguity) about the cash flow implications of changes in the interest rate. The authors also find that the decrease in the asymmetry of response to good and bad interest rate news after the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for users of interest rate derivatives with higher than lower earnings volatility. This implies that derivatives and hedging activities disclosure, as required by SFAS 133, are more important for firms with higher than lower earnings volatility. The finding is consistent with the idea that investors demand more accounting information when underlying earnings volatility is higher. In a set of additional analyses, the authors find that the effect of SFAS 133 on investors' response to good and bad interest rate news varies depending on the level of analyst coverage and interest rate exposure. Specifically, the authors find that the decrease in the asymmetry of response to good and bad interest rate news after the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for users of interest rate derivatives with higher interest rate exposure and lower analyst coverage.

The findings of this study help market participants including regulators and standard setters to understand the impact of mandatory disclosure practices on investors' reaction to macroeconomic news. Moreover, the findings of the study help managers to understand the influence firm-specific characteristics (e.g. earnings volatility, analyst coverage and interest rates exposure) on the effectiveness of mandatory derivative instruments and hedging activities disclosure.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper to explore how firm-specific information environment affects the way investors process macroeconomic news. This study contributes to the literature by providing the empirical evidence that derivatives instruments and hedging activities, as required by SFAS 133, affect investors' response to good and bad interest rate news. In doing so, the results provide insights about how firm-specific information environment affects the way investors process macroeconomic news. This study shows that the cross-sectional variation in earnings volatility, analysts’ coverage and interest rate exposure affects the impact of SFAS 133 on investors' response to good and bad interest rate news. The findings are not only the notable addition to the existing literature on the topic but also can aid to market participants including policy makers, regulators, standard setters and managers to understand the influence of firm-specific characteristics on the effectiveness of mandatory derivative instruments and hedging activities disclosure. Finally, the findings contribute to the general debate about the effectiveness of SFAS 133 by showing that the adoption of SFAS 133 indeed decreases information ambiguity.

This study aims to test the effects of forecast specificity on the asymmetric short‐window share market response to management earnings forecasts (MEF).

The paper examines a large sample of hand‐checked Australian data over the period 1994 to 2001. Using an analyst news benchmark, it estimates a series of regressions to investigate whether the short‐term impact from bad news announcements is greater in magnitude than from good news announcements and whether this differs between routine and non‐routine MEFs. Additionally, it examines whether (after controlling for news content of MEF) there is a differential market impact conditional on specificity: minimum versus maximum versus range versus point.

The results indicate that an asymmetric response is evident for the overall sample and a sub‐set of non‐routine forecasts. Contrary to predictions, the results show that forecast specificity, minimum, maximum, range and point MEFs make no additional contribution to the differences in the market reaction to bad or good news.

The study extends the research investigating the short‐run market impact of MEFs. The main element of innovation derives from the interaction between specificity and news content, as well as distinguishing between routine versus non‐routine cases. Notably, it found little support for the view that more specific forecasts elicit greater market responses. What the results do suggest is that managers appear to choose the form of the forecast to suit the news being delivered. In particular, bad news delivered in a minimum forecast seems to be ignored by the market.

The purpose of this paper is to assess management earnings forecasts in a continuous disclosure environment.

A large sample of hand checked Australian management earnings forecasts are examined. These data are analysed using a series of logistic regressions. Hypotheses are proposed and tested based on Skinner's litigation cost hypothesis. Increases in non‐routine management earnings forecasts post‐2000; and increases in the proportion of such forecasts that contain bad news are predicted. The relationship between forecast specificity and forecast news content is investigated.

It was found that, post‐2000, legislative changes and increased enforcement action by ASIC were followed by increased disclosure of non‐routine management earnings forecasts. For routine forecasts, no significant increase in forecast disclosure is observed. This result is consistent with Skinner as is the finding that the increased disclosure is only apparent for bad news non‐routine forecasts. For the second objective, evidence was found that the larger the gap between market expectations and actual performance the more specific the forecast, but only for bad news forecasts.

The study extends the small amount of research investigating the characteristics of management earnings forecasts. It also provides an assessment of the effectiveness of efforts by ASIC to ensure that management meet their continuous disclosure obligations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the introduction of New Zealand's statutory‐backed continuous disclosure regime enacted in December 2002 on the differential disclosure behaviour of New Zealand firms with good and bad earnings news.

This paper examines the level of information disclosure, analyst forecast error and forecast dispersion, abnormal returns and abnormal volumes for firms with good and bad news earnings announcements in a sample period surrounding reforms to New Zealand's continuous disclosure regime.

The authors find evidence that the pre‐announcement information flow was poorer prior to the reform for bad news firms compared to good news firms, in terms of greater analysts' forecast dispersion and a larger abnormal price reaction to the actual earnings announcement. Second, the reform reduced the asymmetry of information flow between good and bad news firms, with the differences in analysts' forecast dispersion and abnormal price reaction dissipating after the reform.

The findings suggest that the reforms to New Zealand's continuous disclosure regime have reduced managers' propensity to withhold bad news and improved the quality of information provided to investors by firms with bad earnings news.

This study improves our understanding of the impact of disclosure reform on the behaviour of managers in a market with relatively low liquidity and less litigation risk in comparison to larger and more developed markets.

In this study, the authors extend upon Brockman et al. (2008), who provide evidence that managers opportunistically accelerate bad news prior to share repurchases, but provide limited evidence that managers withhold good news until after repurchases. The authors examine management forecasts surrounding share repurchases in periods when companies must disclose detailed repurchase information. The authors argue these disclosures increase managers' legal and reputation risks of accelerating bad news, but have a lesser effect on delaying good news.

First, the authors examine whether managers alter the information released to the market before buying back shares by comparing managerial forecasts made within 30 days before the beginning of a repurchasing period with those made outside of this window. Second, the authors examine whether managers are more likely to provide good news forecasts, in terms of both magnitude and frequency, after buying back shares. Lastly, the authors examine the impact of CEO stock ownership on managerial forecasting behavior surrounding share buybacks.

Consistent with the authors’ hypotheses and contrary to Brockman et al. (2008), the authors find limited evidence that the likelihood or magnitude of bad news forecasts is greater in the period before share buybacks. Instead, the authors document that the frequency and magnitude of good news forecasts increase in periods following share buybacks and that these associations are positively moderated by managerial equity incentives. The authors also find that the withholding of good news is associated with lower average repurchase prices and greater repurchase volume. The authors further show that, when litigation risk is greater, managers are less likely to accelerate bad news prior to repurchases and more likely to withhold good news until after. Overall, the study results are consistent with managers balancing the benefits of opportunistic repurchase behavior with the costs.

This study contributes to the management forecast and share repurchase literatures by providing evidence consistent with managers opportunistically releasing earnings forecasts in the period after buying back shares. Most importantly, the authors show that after the rule revision, managers refrain from actively disclosing bad news that carry higher legal costs. Instead, they opt for the omission of good news to repurchase stocks at lower prices. The study results reconcile the conflicting evidence of Brockman et al. (2008) and Ge and Lennox (2011).

The purpose of this paper is to explore the question of if and when leaders should communicate bad news to their stakeholders. Previous research in the crisis communication literature has highlighted the need to communicate quickly and persuasively to minimize losses; however, the authors argue that such tactics assume certainty in negative outcomes and tend to generate predominantly one-way, company-centric communication. In this paper, the authors propose that under conditions of uncertainty (i.e. when the bad news has an unknown outcome or cause) different communication strategies are needed.

Drawing on the stakeholder theory, the authors argue that organizational decision makers have a clear moral obligation to share bad news with affected stakeholders. The authors then review the existing approach to crisis communication and discuss its limitations under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, the authors develop a set of scenarios to guide the communication of bad news under conditions of uncertainty.

The authors formulate a framework to guide leaders on how to communicate with stakeholders when the nature of the bad news is uncertain and open to multiple interpretations. The authors propose a situational approach for responding to stakeholders that emerges from the context of the bad news.

The authors propose a situational framework for communicating bad news that overcomes the current limitations of extant crisis communication strategies under conditions of uncertainty. This involves balancing existing crisis communication recommendations with a more collaborative sensemaking approach.