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This paper examines Korean reserve forces with respect to their missions, roles and utilisation. Korea has a huge standing army of 686,000 and reserve forces of 3,040,000. The Korean peninsular is the last spot of the cold war. In spite of mutual efforts by South and North Korea to keep peace in this region these days, there has been no sign yet to downsize military manpower and equipments by either side. It is generally believed that in the future, as the international security environment and inter-Korea relations change, the size of the standing army will be downsized and the role of reserve forces will increase instead. The Korea Institute of Defence Analyses (KIDA) estimated that the appropriate military strength of Korea be around 500,000 in the year of 2015, 200,000 less than the present size. In particular, the number of draftees will be reduced, while the number of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) will be kept at the present level (Lim, 2001). The reduction of the standing army, as has been observed in other nations, may require proper utilisation of reserves.

The purpose of this paper is to explain Japan’s role in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula that began in early 2018.

This paper emphasizes the historical context of international politics in Northeast Asia, rather than power politics or geopolitics. The paper reaffirms the significance of the ongoing peace process on the Korean Peninsula by considering a synthesis of three joint declarations published in 1998, 2000 and 2002 between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, the ROK and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and between the DPRK and Japan.

The normalization of diplomatic relations between DPRK and Japan, along with reaffirmation of the joint declaration between the ROK and Japan, and the Panmunjeom Declaration, would be a base for denuclearizing Northeast Asia.

In Northeast Asia, historical reconciliation among the two Koreas and Japan and peace-building between the two parties on the Peninsula are closely linked. Moreover, the three bilateral relationships among these three parties are also the basis for creating a new multilateral security order in Northeast Asia.

This chapter attempts to explore the convergence and divergence on perceptions of security issues by military professionals and civilians and then to portray its implications for civil–military relations in South Korea.

Since the 1990s, South Korea has experienced the development of political democracy and the improvement of the relationship between South Korea and North Korea. Although South Korea suffered from serious economic crisis in the late 1990s, it soon restored its economic basis to the earlier level. However, the country has become to encounter ideological cleavage and cultural diversity among people. Traditional views on national security and international relations, which were based on national consensus in the past, have been replaced by a new conception of diversification, heterogeneity, and even sharp opposition. Thus, we examine the consensus or dissension between military and civilian sectors on various issues related to national security, the role of the armed forces, and South–North relations.

This chapter reports that there are similarities on some issues (e.g., security situation assessment, attitudes toward neighbor countries, and trust in the military), while substantial differences are found on others (e.g., threats to national security, Korea–US relations, and threats from North Korea) between the military and the civilian society. These findings suggest that overall the views of military professionals are not so different from civilians on security issues in Korea even though divergences emerge on some other issues. This chapter concludes by stating that civilian society and the military are “different, but not separate.” This statement renders implications for civil–military relations in South Korea.

After the Korean War, South Korean politics was dominated by national security concerns. Reversing Carl von Clausewitz's well-known dictum, in South Korea, “politics is the continuation of war by other means.” Until the late 1980s, politics in South Korea was far from democratic. South Korea had five direct presidential elections (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007) and six national assembly elections (1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008) after the democratic transition of 1987. In 1992, a civilian candidate, Young Sam Kim, was elected president. Young Sam Kim (1993–1998) prosecuted and punished former generals turned presidents Doo Hwan Chun (1980–1988) and Tae Woo Roh (1988–1993) for corruption, mutiny and treason in 1995. Dae Jung Kim (1998–2003) was elected president in 1997. For the first time in South Korean political history, regime change occurred between a ruling party and an opposition party.

In this chapter, the change and continuity of civil–military relations through the fluctuating dynamics of the democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea is examined. A positive consolidation of democratic reform is one that, while securing indisputable civilian supremacy, grants the military enough institutional autonomy for the efficient pursuit of its mission. Civilian supremacy should be institutionalized not only by preventing military intervention in civilian politics but also by ensuring civilian control over the formation and implementation of national defense policy.

In sum, despite three terms of civilian presidency, civilian supremacy has not yet fully institutionalized. Although significant changes in civil-military relations did occur after the democratic transition, they were not initiated by elected leaders with the intention of establishing a firm institutional footing for civilian supremacy. South Korea's political leaders have not crafted durable regulations and institutions that will sustain civilian control over the military.

More than six decades, Korea is still divided. The most highly militarized zone in the world lies along the demilitarized zone. How to draw the line prudently between seeking national security and promoting democracy shall be the most delicate task facing all the civilian regimes to come in South Korea. That mission will remain challenging not only for civilian politicians but also for military leaders.

This study aims to analyze information on vessel traffic between the two Koreas with a probability distribution for each route/vessel type. The study will then conduct an estimate for maritime transport patterns of inter-Korean trade in the future. To analyze the flow of inter-Korean coastal shipping, this study conducted visualization analysis of shipping status between North and South Korea by year, ship type, and port using navigation data of three years from Port Logistics Information System (Port-MIS) sources during 2006 to 2008, which saw the most active exchanges between the two governments. Also, this study analyzes shipping status between the two governments as a probability distribution for each port and provides the prospects for future maritime transport for inter-Korean trade by means of Bayesian Networks and simulation. The results of the analysis are as follows: i) when North-South routes are reopened, the import volume for sand from North Korea will be increased; ii) investment in the modernization of ports in North Korea is required so that shipping companies can generate profit through economies of scale; iii) the number of the operating vessels including container ships between the two governments is expected to increase like when the tensions and conflict on the Korean Peninsula was release, especially between Busan port in South Korea and Nampo port in North Korea; and iv) among container ships, transshipment containers imported and exported through Busan Port will be shipped to North Korea by feeder transportation.

In North Korea, illicit activities directly or implicitly supported by the North Korean Government are an integral part of the nation’s survival strategies. This study aims to discuss how North Korea directs its national power and resources to facilitate narcotics trafficking activities and how the role of North Korean State in the narcotics trafficking network has changed over time since the 1970s.

Analysis of narcotics trafficking in North Korea has primarily involved a review of secondary data, including previous academic research in this field, news articles, circumstantial and forensic evidence, seizure data and defector testimony.

This paper argues that prior to 2000, North Korea was systematically and directly engaged in narcotics production and distribution. The nation state could be regarded as a form of “criminal sovereignty”, because the sovereign state is itself criminal. However, in the post-2000s, North Korea’s Government began to gradually withdraw from narcotics trafficking, creating space for various non-state actors – such as criminal syndicates, private traders and local officials – to enter the once-monopolistic network. De-centralisation of narcotics trafficking network in North Korea suggests that the state’s criminal sovereignty may be gradually eroding and the pattern of state criminalisation in North Korea may be transforming.

This paper draws on theories concerning state criminalisation to understand the changing dynamics of narcotics trafficking network in North Korea.

The purpose of this paper is to advance our understanding of international crisis mediation by introducing and examining the nested insider-partial mediator (NIPM) concept, a nuanced perspective on IPM behavior. This study challenges the traditional view of effective mediators as external, unbiased entities by delving into the behavior and contribution of mediators who are deeply embedded in the conflict environment, such as South Korea’s unique position in navigating the US–DPRK crisis in 2017–2018. By analyzing South Korea’s dual role as mediator and negotiator and its employment of both nondirective and directive mediation strategies, the paper demonstrates the potential effectiveness of NIPMs in managing complex biases and contributing to de-escalation in intense crisis scenarios.

This paper uses a focused single-case study approach to analyze South Korea’s role as an NIPM. Using a process-tracing methodology, it examines how contextual factors such as relationships, interests and inherent biases influenced South Korea’s mediation strategies in this complex geopolitical scenario. Empirical evidence was retrieved from public sources, including official statements and press interviews, providing an empirical foundation for understanding NIPM behavior. This approach facilitates a detailed study of South Korea’s unique mediation role within the intricate dynamics of the Korean Peninsula conflict.

The study’s findings illustrate the pivotal role NIPMs can play in complex international conflicts, underlining the significant potential of NIPMs in crisis prevention. The findings highlight South Korea’s adept navigation through intricate geopolitical dynamics, leveraging its unique insider position and established relationships with both the USA and North Korea. This behavior was instrumental in mitigating a potentially explosive situation, steering the crisis toward negotiation and de-escalation. The research underscores the effectiveness of the NIPM framework in understanding the nuanced behavior of mediators who are deeply integrated into multi-level conflicts, influenced by their connections, interests and inherent biases.

This research not only broadens the theoretical framework of insider-partial mediation by introducing the concept of NIPM, but also has practical implications for policymakers and practitioners in leveraging regional mediation strategies for international crisis mitigation. The study underscores the importance of mediators’ deep-rooted connections, biases and vested interests in influencing their mediation tactics, thus offering a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted nature of international mediation in complex geopolitical conflicts.