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Purpose – Examine the role of institutional investors in accelerating the development of capital markets and economies abroad, the determinants of their investment, both in the domestic and foreign markets, and their importance in promoting good corporate governance practices worldwide and facilitating increased financial integration.

Methodology/approach – Review and synthesize recent academic literature (1970–2011) on the process of international financial integration and the role of foreign institutional investors in the increasingly global financial markets.

Findings – Despite the concern that short-term flow of international capital can be destructive to the emerging and developing market economies, academic evidence on a destabilizing effect of foreign investment activity is limited. Institutional investors’ systematic preference for stocks of large, well-known, globally visible foreign firms can explain the presence of a home bias in international portfolio investment.

Research limitations – Given the breadth of the two literature streams, only representative studies (over 45 published works) are summarized.

Social implications – Regulators of emerging markets should first improve domestic institutions, governance, and macroeconomic fundamentals, and then deregulate domestic financial and capital markets to avoid economic and financial crises in the initial stages of liberalization reforms.

Originality/value of paper – A useful source of information for graduate students, academics, and practitioners on the importance of foreign institutional investors.

Purpose – We study the investment behavior of foreign institutional investors operating in China. A detailed analysis of foreign institutional investors is examined, along with a comparison of domestic Chinese investors.

Methodology/approach – We adopt annual Chinese stock market data for the period 2003–2009 for both foreign and domestic funds to analyze the industrial preference of foreign funds and compare the different preferences between foreign funds and domestic Chinese funds in relation to financial characteristic and corporate governance indicators.

Findings – The analysis reveals that foreign funds have a preference for a range of sectors such as transportation, metals and nonmetals, and machinery, as opposed to industries with a requirement for local knowledge. The portfolios of domestic Chinese funds are distributed more evenly across sectors, compared to foreign funds. The comparative analysis reveals that the companies foreign funds invest in are significantly different from those firms favored by domestic funds in terms of size, profit, and management compensation.

Social implications – These empirical findings highlight the differences between foreign and domestic funds investment preferences and has implications for policy makers aiming to attract foreign investors to emerging markets.

Originality/value of chapter – Our chapter not only provides an introduction on the QFII scheme in China, but also examines the impact of a comprehensive range of firm-level characteristics, financial and corporate governance indicators, on the investment decisions of foreign and domestic funds in emerging markets.

Purpose – Run a comparative analysis between investments of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and mutual funds, focusing on firm-level, country-level, and institutional variables.

Methodology/approach – We use a hand-collected sample of 1,845 acquisitions around the world over the last 25 years (251 for SWFs and 1,594 for mutual funds). We then run univariate parametric and nonparametric tests to assess the differences in the investments of both subsamples.

Findings – We review the literature on the determinants of SWFs' investment decisions. Our analysis adds to the scarce available literature on the investment decisions of SWFs and their comparison with other institutional investors. Our results show that, compared to mutual funds, SWFs indeed exhibit different preferences: for instance, SWFs prefer to acquire stakes in larger, less liquid companies which are financially distressed but which also have a higher level of growth opportunities. They also prefer less innovative firms with more concentrated ownership, which are located in less developed but geographically closer countries with whom they do not necessarily share cultural and religious backgrounds.

Social implications – Our results are important for practitioners and firms seeking to attract a given type of institutional investment. They also add insights to the debate on the “hidden” political objectives behind SWF investments in the Western world.

Originality/value of paper – This is the first attempt to empirically assess the differences in the investment choices of SWFs and mutual funds.

Institutional investors have increasingly gained importance since the early 1990s. The assets under management in these funds have increased threefold since 1990 to reach more than US$45 trillion in 2005, including over US$20 trillion in equity (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Further, the value of institutional investors' assets represents roughly 162.6% of the OECD gross domestic product in 2005 (Gonnard, Kim, & Ynesta, 2008). Given the magnitude of institutional investors' holdings relative to the world market capitalization, challenging questions on the economic role of these investors have been raised. One such question concerns their impact on the stability of stock markets. On the one hand, active strategies of buying and selling shares by these investors may contribute to moving stock prices away from their fundamental values. On the other hand, if all institutional investors react to the same information in a timely manner, they are in fact helping to increase market efficiency by speeding up the adjustment of prices to new fundamentals (for competing theories on the role of institutional investors, see, e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992). This view of institutional investors as “efficiency drivers” generated considerable debate for many years (see, e.g., Ferreira & Laux, 2007; French & Roll, 1986).

Purpose – Study the firm-level and country-level determinants of US institutional investors' holdings in American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) from emerging markets.

Methodology/approach – We use a sample of 112 firms from emerging markets that listed as ADRs between 1990 and 2005. Rather than adopting the issuer's perspective, we take in this study the point of view of the investor and we focus on the US institutional investors' participation in ADR firms.

Findings – We find that institutional investors hold higher stakes in foreign firms that are listed on more restrictive exchanges, in large, privatized, more liquid, and more transparent firms. Mutual investors and other institutional investors also prefer firms from countries with weaker institutional environments and from civil law legal tradition. Controlling for country-level determinants increases significantly the explanatory power of the model.

Social implications – Our results have important implications for firms from emerging markets seeking to attract foreign institutional investors.

Originality/value of the chapter – We focus on the motivations of investors when they choose to invest in the ADR, rather than on the ADR issuer motivation. In addition, we consider all types of institutional investors that acquire a participation in an ADR firm.

The bankruptcy of Enron in December 2001 marked the beginning of broad awareness that American corporations had left behind the strategy of expanding through diversification that was the hallmark of the 1950s through the early 1980s. CEOs now made it job one to meet the earnings projections of securities analysts, such that by the year 2000 they were, in record numbers, “restating earnings” – admitting that they had cooked the books. Accounting shenanigans were the tip of the iceberg, and what lay under the water was a new approach to running the corporation to produce numbers that analysts and institutional investors would like. Three groups that stood to benefit from the new strategy spun it to investors as in the interest of all. Managers of hostile takeover firms defined their business as setting firms on the path to performing for shareholders. Institutional investors defined earnings management, rather than acquisitions management, as increasing shareholder value and focused management attention on earnings by popularizing stock options. Securities analysts hawked their own profit projections as the reigning metric of corporate performance, and favored easy-to-analyze single-industry firms through “buy” recommendations. These three groups changed the incentives executives faced, making accounting shenanigans in the pursuit of earnings management widely popular and enriching institutional investors, analysts, and executives in the process. Regulatory changes to end malfeasance have made it marginally more difficult to perform illegal accounting practices, but they have not changed the core corporate strategy that has emerged since the early 1980s. The changes illuminate the rise of groups of business professionals in the power structure, for it was not investors but different groups of business professionals who won the day. The changes illuminate, as well, the role of the social construction of interest in power relations among groups – it was by convincing executives and shareholders that a new corporate strategy was in their own interest, which these business professionals succeeded.

Some commentators suggest that the Wall Street views family firms with scepticism. The appointment of independent directors to form a majority on a firm's board of directors should constitute a strong signal to the market of a family firm's willingness to be monitored objectively and thus should alleviate Wall Street's scepticism. This is likely to be more important for the newly public family firms than for mature family firms since outsider-domination on the board pre-dates the involvement of other outsiders, such as underwriters, financial analysts, or institutional investors. Whether the presence of an independent board alleviates the market's scepticism may be evident in the responses of various external monitoring entities to the newly public family and non-family firms. Using a hand-collected sample of newly public firms, we cast brand-new light on whether an independent board provides any advantage to the newly public family firms in underwriter reputation, analyst coverage, and investment by institutional investors over newly public non-family firms. We find that independence of board of directors is overall a positive signal and that while the independence of board is more important than the independence of management for underwriters and financial analysts, the reverse is the case for institutional investors.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) creates long-term shareholder value through managing risks from economic, environmental, and social developments. Among institutional owners, pension funds have a long-term investment horizon and can influence a firm's strategy. They promote CSR activities in the long run. Mutual funds and investment banks tend to have more of a short-term investment horizon. They are not strong supporters of CSR activities. Our results support the previous time horizon hypotheses. Although pension funds prefer CSR firms in the hotel and casino industry, mutual funds and brokerage firms had no interest in CSR firms. Pension fund and mutual fund ownership is negatively related to CSR firms in the restaurant industry. Brokerage firms are indifferent to CSR firms.

Purpose – The aggregate investment by foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in the Indian stock market is significant compared to that by domestic institutions and individual (retail) investors. The question of whether FIIs exhibit herding and positive feedback trading while investing in the Indian stock markets has not been examined so far. This study is an attempt to fill the gap and contribute to the existing evidence on foreign portfolio investment in India.

Methodology/approach – We have analyzed the daily data on purchases and sales of securities by FIIs sourced from the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). We have adopted the approach of Lakonishok et al. (1992), and Wermers (1999) to examine herding and positive feedback trading by foreign investors.

Findings – Our results suggest that FIIs exhibit herding and positive feedback trading during different phases of the stock market. This observed behavior is prominent in but not restricted to large cap stocks as they enjoy better liquidity.

Social implication – The herding and positive feedback trading by FIIs is a cause for concern for government of India, capital market regulator (SEBI), and the country's central bank (RBI) as it adversely affects stock prices and volatility. They are required to formulate and implement a suitable policy response given their objective of protecting the interests of small investors in the market. They may also have to monitor the purchases and sales of equities by FIIs in general and of better performing large cap stocks in particular.

Purpose – This study investigates the relationship between the ownership structure and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies of the Italian listed banks. In particular, it focuses on the impact that institutional investors characterized by a philanthropic orientation (banking foundations) exert on the socially oriented management of the Italian financial institutions.

Methodology – This chapter adopts a case study approach. It examines the CSR of the bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena and the role that its controlling shareholder (Fondazione MPS) plays in promoting the social strategy implemented by the Italian bank.

Findings – The Monte dei Paschi di Siena CSR strategy appears to be strongly influenced by the activity of its institutional investor. The skills, knowledge, and the cultural proneness toward social issues of the Fondazione MPS are successfully transferred to the bank and shape its social strategy.

Research limitations – This chapter suffers of the limitations generally associated to the case study research methodology. In particular, the findings of this study can be extended to other cases only after a detailed examination of market wide, institutional and corporate governance differences.

Social implications – The positive relationship between nonprofit institutional investors and the CSR strategy effectiveness unveils corporate governance mechanisms useful to increase the overall value creation process of the organizations.

Originality/value of the chapter – This study contributes to the CSR literature by analyzing if and how the philanthropic nature of the blockholders affect the CSR policies carried out by the entities they control.