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Organizational incentives and structures play a crucial role in realizing explorative and exploitative innovations in firms. Existing studies have neglected the role of trade-off mechanisms between the two on innovation ambidexterity. This study aims to investigate these trade-off mechanisms and their position on innovation ambidexterity.

Given the limited theoretical understanding, the authors conducted a case study with a sample of two Chinese firms with abundant interview and secondary data.

The results show that firms can develop innovation ambidexterity at two levels, namely, the time and space levels, using incentive synergy as well as organizational structures. Furthermore, the authors explain the role of the trade-off between incentive synergy and organizational structure in promoting a balance between explorative and exploitative innovation.

The authors propose trade-off mechanisms between incentive synergy and organizational structure and explore how trade-off mechanisms can play a role in promoting a balance of explorative and exploitative innovation at both time and space levels.

Agency problems are more severe for multinational corporations (MNCs) and multinational enterprises compared to their domestic counterparts. As companies develop diversified operations, their managers face more challenges. An incentive compensation structure has been designed to align the benefits of managers with those of shareholders. Additionally, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become increasingly crucial for companies. MNCs must gain the trust of more investors to improve their corporate reputation and financial performance. CSR enables MNCs with a high sense of social responsibility to expand their investor base, reduce perceived risks, and decrease information asymmetry. Our empirical findings reveal that Taiwanese MNCs can enhance their performance by implementing cash-based compensation and pursuing CSR activities.

Recent innovations in management control systems, such as the Balanced Scorecard System, reflect today’s complex business environment by accounting for performance in multiple areas. When individuals must allocate their time between multiple areas that compete for their time, the manner in which incentives are structured is hypothesized to influence their decisions differently depending on goal difficulty. A decision-making experiment was conducted to test this proposition. When incentives were structured so that each area of the Balanced Scorecard is rewarded separately, challenging goals received more planned attention than easy or unattainable goals following previous findings. When incentives were structured so that goals in all areas must be achieved together, the influence of goal difficulty on the time planning decision diverges from previous findings such that areas having unattainable goals receive the same planned attention as areas having challenging goals. The results suggest that companies must consider how performance is rewarded within a Balanced Scorecard framework.

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the design of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation generates incentives to engage in managerial behavior that enhances customer satisfaction and whether these incentives, in turn, lead to higher firm value.

A unique dataset combining customer satisfaction and executive compensation data was used, and the relationship between option sensitivity, customer satisfaction and performance was modeled using simultaneous equations modeling with industry and year fixed effects.

Findings suggest that CEO compensation plays an important role in explaining the variation in customer satisfaction and firm value. Specifically, CEO short-term compensation (salary or bonus) has no affect on customer satisfaction or firm value; the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to stock price changes is positively related and also exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with customer satisfaction; the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to stock price changes interacts negatively with CEO longevity and industry concentration but positively with advertising expenses in affecting customer satisfaction; the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to both stock price changes and customer satisfaction positively affect firm value; and the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to stock price changes interacts positively with customer satisfaction to affect firm value.

This study suffers from several limitations. First, the sample is limited to firms with ACSI scores available. Second, this study is limited to only publicly traded firms, which limits our ability to generalize regarding customer satisfaction, option sensitivity and firm value.

This study has several important implications for researchers and managers. The first is that the corporate board appears to view investment in customer satisfaction as similar to an investment in other intangible assets or technology, in that they reward managers with a nonlinear payoff profile. To encourage managers to invest discretionary funds wisely, incentive compensation is important. Second, compensation committees of corporate boards should not allow the option sensitivity to reach extreme levels because, at some point, managers’ incentives appear to shift more toward short-term earnings objectives and away from investment in intangibles, which have a longer-term payoff. Third, if boards are concerned about customer satisfaction and market value, when designing compensation packages, they should shift their focus from the structure of pay to the sensitivity of pay to performance. The exception to this is that for CEOs with very long tenures (or for those close to retirement), high levels of option sensitivity may distort incentives away from a focus on customer satisfaction. Finally, our results indicate that strategies that enhance customer satisfaction provide an incremental benefit in terms of firm value, beyond incentive compensation strategies.

The results indicate that a “stakeholder focus” which includes customers is value adding for shareholders as well. The results also imply that perhaps using a “balanced scorecard” approach to assessing performance in terms of customer satisfaction outcomes, or at least acknowledging the drives of customer satisfaction explicitly, could be an alternative to using highly sensitive incentive-based compensation when such compensation schemes are less desirable.

Prior research has found that the structure of fixed versus incentive-based compensation impacts customer satisfaction. However, this is one of the first papers to investigate the relationship between the sensitivity of CEO compensation and customer satisfaction. Findings have important implications for boards who seek to structure CEO pay so that CEOs have incentives to enact policies that benefit customers and, in turn, firm performance.

This case study examines how incentive pay programs are designed and changed over time in a financial organization that has typically relied on fixed salary compensation. Once incentive programs are introduced, pay plans change frequently, and this process allows the study of assumptions embedded in various incentive theories. Economic theories tend to explain incentives from an agency perspective, which suggests that incentives satisfy elaborate contractual requirements and vary with the risk preferences and costs of managers versus employees. Power theories, by contrast, argue that the interests and resources of various firm groups determine incentive structures. For this case study, qualitative data describing a firm’s process of changing compensation were gathered from documents, personnel manuals, and interviews with company managers. The findings suggest that instead of following from complicated cost‐benefit analyses, pay plans are often implemented within short time frames and with scant performance/effectiveness information. This evidence highlights the influence of power in efforts to change compensation structures and the importance of a multidisciplinary understanding of rewards.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of incentive contracts in multi-partner project teams (MPPTs) on the agents’ effort expenditure and project performance, analyze how the agents allocate their efforts between production and cooperation and offer suggestions for project managers on how to design incentive contracts.

The paper proposes a model of MPPT in which agents are inequity-averse and their effort expenditures are exogenously bounded. An extensive numerical example is presented in online Appendix 2 to illustrate the theoretical results.

The paper suggests that if the potential benefit of the agents’ cooperation in MPPT is high or if both agents exhibit inequity aversion and the efforts’ marginal costs are low, then group-based incentive contracts outperform individual-based incentive contracts. It also shows that the impact of the incentive contract on the agents’ effort expenditure and project team performance is correlated with several critical project attributes.

Fulfilling a need to study the design of incentive structures in MPPTs, the paper complements the existing literature in three ways. First, in contrast to single-partner project teams, it considers projects with multiple partners where cooperation between them enhances the project outcome. Second, rather than focusing on individual production problems, it considers multi-task projects with constrained efforts that must be allocated between production and cooperation. Third, it analyzes the effects of changes in the project attributes, incentive intensities and information transparency on the effectiveness of the contract.

The recent economic/environmental discourse on development issues has led to a new paradigm of development, called here the “eco‐economic development model”, but usually known as sustainable development (including both ecological and economic concerns), which has successfully substituted the traditional model of economic development in general acceptance. However, new models usually imply new rules and perhaps a new type of market, yet policy issues within the eco‐economic development paradigm are being addressed with theoretical constructs and a state of mind as if we were still in the old paradigm – perhaps because the nature and the internal structure of the new paradigm are not yet well known and understood, as nobody has apparently looked into this. It should be expected that the two paradigms are not equivalent to each other, and therefore, they should be addressed differently. This paper presents a qualitative approach, from a systematic point of view, which can be used to highlight how different the two paradigms are in terms of structure and policy implications. Then, this information is used to provide an answer to three questions: is the economic development market the same as the eco‐economic development market; if not, how many invisible hands are there in the eco‐economic development market; and what are the environmental, social, and economic policy implications of this situation?. Shows that new paradigms require a new line of thinking to market policy and planning.

Lean projects seek to optimise the project rather than its parts and to maximize value to the customer. To better align the behaviour of project participants with a Lean project delivery model, the purpose of this paper is to argue for compensation structures that better address the economic and non‐economic motives that impact project performance.

Social science research increasingly shows that non‐economic human motives play a key role in job performance and that they interact in complicated ways with economic incentives. By reviewing and extrapolating from relevant literature, this paper explores certain key non‐economic human motives and their impact on project performance, how these non‐economic motives interact with economic incentives, and strategies for structuring effective incentives.

The paper identifies certain contract incentive principles that the authors believe should promote non‐economic motivation.

The paper provides a starting point for further research regarding compatibility of incentives with non‐economic motives on Lean projects. In particular, more research is needed on the applicability of the social science findings to corporate entities.

The paper suggests that traditional compensation systems are ill‐suited to project‐optimised behaviour.

This paper provides important insight into the problems of traditional compensation systems for construction projects and offers both concepts and strategies that could better align economic incentives with project‐optimised behaviour.

Previous studies on international competitive strategies identify a number of loosely defined strategy types and suggest that the choice among them is based on their relative productive efficiency (i.e. ability to exploit such factors as economies of scale, economies of scope, and location economies). Our analysis highlights the additional role of motivational efficiency. We propose that the proportion of available productive efficiency that is actually realized under each strategy depends on the motivational efficiency of the best possible incentive system for implementing the strategy. Our conceptual framework allows the identification of precise theoretical relationships for empirical measurement and testing.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects that the framing of contractual performance incentives have on supplier’s behavioural and relational responses and on the buyer–supplier relationship.

The authors conducted three in-depth case studies of contractual relationships, which exhibit differences in terms of how performance incentives are framed, i.e., using promotion, prevention and “hybrid” frames, respectively. The study involved 38 semi-structured interviews and content analysis of contract agreements.

First, while promotion-framed incentives lead to positive supplier responses and improved relationships, prevention-framed incentives result in negative responses and deteriorating relations. Second, hybrid-framed incentives can lead to productive supplier responses when positive ex ante expectations are met, although the creation of such positive expectations in the first place depends on the proportionality of bonus and penalty elements. Third, promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives do not by default lead to positive effects, as these are contingent on factors pertaining to contractual clarity. Fourth, the overarching purpose of the contract moderates the effects of contract framing on supplier responses.

The study contributes to contracting research by showing how the framing of performance incentives influences supplier behavioural and relational responses. It also extends the existing literature on contract framing by examining the effects of hybrid-framed incentives, and stressing that contract framing should be considered in joint with the clarity and overall purpose of the contract to elicit desired supplier behaviours.

Managers of buying firms may differentiate their approach to contract framing depending on the type of supplier relationship in focus. Furthermore, effective design of promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives requires attention to: realistic performance targets (on the short, medium and long term); salient bonuses related to these targets; incentive structures that appropriately balance rewards and risks; and: mechanisms that explicate and consider uncontrollable factors in the calculation of bonus–malus payments.

The paper extends the literature stressing the psychological impact of contracts on buyer–supplier relationships by highlighting that contractual clarity and the overarching purpose of the contract moderate the effects of contract framing on supplier behavioural and relational responses.