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The relevance of transparency related to public finances is considered fundamental for good economic policy management. An environment of greater fiscal transparency allows the private sector greater predictability, improving the entrepreneur’s decision-making ability. This study empirically analyzes fiscal opacity’s effect on business confidence in an emerging economy.

We use monthly data from the Brazilian economy from January 2010 to March 2023. Based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regressions, we analyze whether fiscal opacity, measured by the signal-to-noise ratio, affects business confidence. Moreover, to evaluate the duration of a shock transmitted by the fiscal opacity on business confidence, we consider an impulse-response function generated by a Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR).

We found that fiscal opacity resulting from the lack of information to anticipate the budgetary result of the public sector deteriorates business confidence.

We present robust empirical evidence that allows us to assume that using a strategy to reduce fiscal opacity through mechanisms that provide reliable economic data and fiscal forecasts is essential for fiscal policy to affect business confidence positively. Reducing fiscal opacity provides greater clarity regarding the budget outcome, reduces economic uncertainty and improves the fiscal policy expectation channel.

This paper is the first to analyze how the lack of information for market agents to anticipate the government’s budget execution accurately (fiscal opacity) affects business confidence.

This paper aims to contribute to the analysis concerning how inflation forecasts from different economic agents (professional forecasters and consumers) lead to varying levels of central bank credibility and how it affects the monetary policy interest rate and its expectations.

Based on the Brazilian economy data from June 2007 to May 2022, the authors provide evidence that is useful for search mechanisms that improve the conduct of monetary policy through the management of inflation expectations. The authors perform several ordinary least squares and generalized method of moments regressions inspired by the Taylor rule principle. In brief, the benchmark model considers that the monetary policy interest rate and its expectations respond to departures of inflation expectations to the target (a proxy for central bank credibility) and the level of economic activity.

The main result of the analysis is that inflation expectations from professional forecasters and consumers imply different perceptions of central bank credibility that affect the monetary policy interest rate and expectations for horizons until one year ahead.

The novelty that the authors bring from the analysis is that the authors calculate central bank credibility by taking into account the “public beliefs” of different economic agents. Furthermore, the authors analyze the effect of central bank credibility from professional forecasters and consumers on the monetary policy interest rate and its expectations.