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Using the Internet as a means of registering discontent with politicians, policies and groups is a growing phenomenon. There are various ways of manifesting protest on the Internet, including building protest sites, cyber‐squatting, defacing Web sites and organising denial of service attacks. Some of these methods are extremely effective, being cheap to use and requiring limited technical ability. Others err on the wrong side of the law and involve full‐scale hacking. Overall, hacktivism can be a productive part of the political process.

The aim of the paper is to assess the hacktivist group called the Syrian Electronic Army and determine what their motivations in terms of ethical and poetical motivations.

This paper looks at chronological examples of Syrian Electronic Army activities and assess them using a developed hacktivist criteria to try and gain a greater understanding of the motivations of the Syrian Electronic Army. The paper uses a netnography research approach.

This paper determines that the Syrian Electronic Army is motivated to protect the Syrian Government. This protection is highlighted by the new media and social media organisations that the Syrian Electronic Army attacks online.

This paper focuses only on one group the Syrian Electronic Army.

A greater understanding of the Syrian Electronic Army.

A greater understanding of the development of hacktivism.

A unique study into the motivation of the Syrian Electronic Army.

A research project exploring emerging student needs explored six aspects of student life: living, learning, working, playing, connecting and participating. Participating is explored here. This aspect focuses on the ways that students may become active citizens by participating in civic life. Insights are gained as to how students may engage with universities and governments and how they will contribute to the public sphere. Themes such as voting, (h)activism, transparency and digital strategies to improve governance are explored. This paper aims to summarize two scenarios about the Participating domain from the Student Needs 2025+ project and highlight implications for the future of higher education.

A modified version of the University of Houston’s “Framework Foresight” method was used to explore the future of six aspects of future student life.

The ability of students and citizens to innovate and affect change should not be underestimated. The maker movement and the “life hacking” meme are symbols of the hidden societal energy available to governments to improve the world and solve our pressing issues. For this to be effective, the role of the hacker, and hacktivism in general as a form of civic participation, should be reframed as a positive contributor of change. The relationship between governing bodies and activism is at a crossroads. The current age of interconnectivity offers tremendous potential for governing bodies to include civil contributions and innovation in a powerful, net-positive way. However, the status quo is so often the opposite and those who are being governed are perceived as a threat. There is a need for key players and leaders to creatively act according to innovative paradigms and principles that strategically reconcile the hacked and the hacking for the greater good of society.

In terms of research limitations, the paper is focused on the needs of students and does not purport to be an exhaustive analysis of all of the issues influencing higher education. It views the future of higher education through the lens of students and their emerging needs.

This paper explores student life in its totality as a way to more accurately identify student needs in the future.

The empirical record of cyberattacks features much computer crime, espionage and hacktivism, but none of the major damage feared in prevalent threat narratives. The purpose of this article is to explain the absence of serious adverse consequences to date and the durability of this trend.

This paper combines concepts from international relations theory and new institutional economics to understand cyberspace as a complex global institution with contracts embodied in both software code and human practice. Constitutive inefficiencies (market and regulatory failure) and incomplete contracts (generative features and unintended flaws) create the vulnerabilities that hackers exploit. Cyber conflict is a form of cheating within the rules, rather than an anarchic struggle, more like an intelligence-counterintelligence contest than traditional war.

Cyber conflict is restrained by the collective sociotechnical constitution of cyberspace, where actors must cooperate to compete. Maintenance of common protocols and open access is a condition for the possibility of attack, and successful deceptive exploitation of these connections becomes more difficult in politically sensitive situations as defense and deterrence become more feasible. The distribution of cyber conflict is, thus, bounded vertically in severity but unbounded horizontally in the potential for creative exploitation.

Cyber conflict can be understood with familiar political economic concepts applied in fresh ways. This application provides counterintuitive insights at odds with prevalent threat narratives about the likelihood and magnitude of cyber conflict. It also highlights the important advantages of strong states over the weaker non-state actors widely thought to be empowered by cyberspace.

The purpose of this paper is to identify how the management structure of cybercriminals has changed and will continue to be revised in the future as their criminal business models are modified. In the early days of hacktivism, a distinction was made between a “hacker” and a “cracker”. The hacker was considered someone who was interested in the vulnerabilities in a computer system, but they were not out to exploit these vulnerabilities for illicit gains. Today, this is no longer true, as loosely coordinated gangs of computer hackers exploit vulnerabilities of financial institutions and the public to steal and transfer money across borders without difficulty.

The paper reviews legal cases dealing with the computer theft of assets from financial institutions and individuals. The focus is on external exploits of hackers not on employee’s theft of assets. It explores the management structure used by cybercriminals who have been caught and prosecuted by legal authorities in the USA and other countries. The paper discusses how this management structure has evolved from older traditional crime business models based on “family” relationships to morphing criminal gangs based in Russia, the Ukraine and other locations almost untouchable by the US legal authorities. These new criminal networks are based on knowledge relationships and quickly disappearing network connections. The paper concludes with a discussion regarding the management structure cybercriminals will follow in the future, as they continue their criminal activities.

The study provides indications of a trend toward more complex management and organizational structures among cybergangs.

Although there are many annual studies identifying the growth of cybercrime and the types of attacks being made, but there is not even a single study that shows how the cybercrime business model has changed over the past 20 years. From that perspective, the paper provides information of a changing and more effective business model for cyberattacks.

This paper aims to examine whether there are morally defensible reasons for using or operating websites (called ‘booters’) that offer distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on a specified target to users for a price. Booters have been linked to some of the most powerful DDoS attacks in recent years.

The authors identify the various parties associated with booter websites and the means through which booters operate. Then, the authors present and evaluate the two arguments that they claim may be used to justify operating and using booters: that they are a useful tool for testing the ability of networks and servers to handle heavy traffic, and that they may be used to perform DDoS attacks as a form of civil disobedience on the internet.

The authors argue that the characteristics of existing booters disqualify them from being morally justified as network stress testing tools or as a means of performing civil disobedience. The use of botnets that include systems without the permission of their owners undermines the legitimacy of both justifications. While a booter that does not use any third-party systems without permission might in principle be justified under certain conditions, the authors argue that it is unlikely that any existing booters meet these requirements.

Law enforcement agencies may use the arguments presented here to justify shutting down the operation of booters, and so reduce the number of DDoS attacks on the internet.

The value of this work is in critically examining the potential justifications for using and operating booter websites and in further exploring the ethical aspects of using DDoS attacks as a form of civil disobedience.

Cyberspace is a virtual environment where instantaneous communications are initiated and consumed using computer networks without any natural or artificial boundaries. These communications are not only an exchange of information but also a catharsis on the socio-political environment of the real world. This explosion of electronic expression is often detrimental to the traditional secretive maneuvers of nation states and the exercise of its power. Unable to come to terms with the new reality nation states through legislative action or otherwise attempt to assert its sovereignty in the space that has no political and societal boundaries. This may lead to an encroachment on basic human rights that often have constitutional guarantees in the real world but may be violated in the online milieu. This paper aims to investigate this issue in detail and evaluate whether nation states are using cyber-security as a propaganda tool to transgress on electronic expression.

The Website of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights states “In December 2013, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 68/167, which expresses deep concern at the negative impact that surveillance and interception of communications may have on human rights”. It further says “The General Assembly called on all States to review their procedures, practices and legislation related to communications surveillance, interception and collection of personal data and emphasized the need for States to ensure the full and effective implementation of their obligations under international human rights law”. With this development, this paper seeks to unravel the role of nation states in using cybersecurity as a propaganda tool by raising the specter of threat to national security and economic wellbeing. The paper is based on exploratory research with data compilation from secondary sources. To collect data, various research papers, books and journals have been referenced and data available in public domain has been accumulated.

This paper has tried to unravel state action on cyberspace which often runs counter to the concept of civil liberties. It indicates that in terms of both national security and economic impact, cybercrime represent a very nominal threat vector. Also, cybercrime as compared with other forms of crime is again nominal. Finally, cyber laws and policies of different countries need to be more nuanced such as to allow space for civil liberties. Overall, the propaganda surrounding the malaise of cybercrime seems to be more hype than real. We already have examples of countries who have transgressed into electronic expression in cyber space. Therefore, UN has a valid reason to raise a red flag on this unfolding issue.

This paper was published at 21st Americas Conference of Information Systems held at Puerto Rico, USA, between August 13-15, 2015 (AMCIS, 2015). The authors of this paper seek review by Editors of the Journal for Republication of original work. The authors have taken cognizance of the Originality Guidelines for Emerald published at this URL www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/authors/writing/originality.htm

Nonviolent civil disobedience is a vital and protected form of political communication in modern constitutional democracies. Reviews the idea of both demonstrating its continued relevance, and providing a basis for considering its uses as an information‐age strategy of radical activism. The novelty of the forms of speech and action possible in cyberspace make it difficult to compare these new methods of expression easily. Whether in cyberspace or the real world, civil disobedience has historically specific connotations that should be sustained because the concept has special relevance to the political theory and practice of constitutional democracy. Civil disobedience is a unique means of political expression that is used to provoke democratic deliberation about important questions of just law and policy. Among the significant problems that new forms of radical political practice in cyberspace introduce is that their practitioners and advocates neglect the need to distinguish between violence and nonviolence. Examines that problem and others that are central to considering theoretical and political implications of radical activism in general, and civil disobedience in particular, in cyberspace.

Examines the use of the Internet by terrorists, extremists and activists. Analyses the methods employed by these various ideological groups and considers the advantages of using the Internet over traditional publishing and communication methods. Historically, extremists have used media of al kinds to as vehicles of propaganda, and have exploited new forms of communication over the years to put forward their views. Online extremists in the Internet age, perhaps was just a matter of course. Whatever the organisation, using the Internet has overcome the limitations of traditional publishing, offering a quick, inexpensive, and anonymous means of communication, and ideological information is reaching new audiences around the world. New threats of the twenty‐first century come from the extreme right wing environmentalists, neo‐nazis, animal rights groups and criminals who can exploit the technology and structure of the Internet. The term information warfare can mean the use of smart technology in a traditional war or the use of IT systems attacking a part of a country‘s infrastructure. The common fear appears to be the vulnerability of the latter. In some cases it appears the national laws cannot stem the tide of these emerging groups and governments are responding to this new threat with draconian measures by introducing electronic surveillance and interception to combat the increasing use of encryption favoured by terrorists and criminals alike. Governments have to strike a balance between freedom of speech on the other hand and the security of a country and its people on the other.