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Since the late 1990s, developing countries have been encouraged by international financial organisations to adopt a shareholder primacy corporate governance model. It was anticipated that in an increasingly globalised financial market, countries which introduced corporate governance practices that favour investors would gain a comparative advantage and attract more capital leading to financial market growth. This paper aims to empirically test this hypothesis.

The present research paper quantitatively investigates whether adopting shareholder primacy corporate governance norms has had any impact on the growth of the financial market, focusing on nineteen developing countries between 1995 and 2014. Time series indices are prepared for corporate governance regulations, financial market development along with three control indices. Then a lagged multilevel regression between these indices is used to investigate the strength of causality between the adoption of pro-shareholder corporate governance and the growth of the financial market.

The research paper finds that shifting towards a shareholder primacy model in corporate governance has a very small effect on growth of financial market in developing countries. Overall the financial, economic and technological controls have much more impact on the growth of financial markets.

This paper conclusively ends the discussion as to whether change in corporate governance has any impact on financial market growth of a country. The papers uses Bayesian econometric model. The paper thus signals the end of LLSV led question as to whether law can affect finance.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the activities of tax havens in the global financial markets and explore their role in providing a supply‐side stimulant for corrupt practices. It aims to argue that the corruption debate needs to shift to a second phase in which the role of tax havens as supply‐side stimulants features more prominently.

Based on the author's original research into the practices and activities of tax havens, the paper explores the operational features of tax havens, with particular focus on their role in providing opaque and complex offshore structures through which illicit financial flows can be routed to disguise their origins, method of transfer and true beneficial ownership. The paper explores how bankers, lawyers and accountants create complex and opaque offshore structures to facilitate economic crime and impede investigation.

Despite severe limitations imposed by the absence of rigorously researched statistical data on capital flows into and out of tax havens, the paper argues that the available data support the view that tax havens have become prominent features of the globalised capital markets, and their activities create a criminogenic environment in which illicit financial flows are easily disguised and hidden amongst legitimate commercial transactions. The paper notes that effective remedies are available to reduce financial market opacity, but political will is lacking to take effective action.

This paper tackles a new and under‐researched subject. Drawing on the author's experiences of working on a prominent tax haven for a total of 14 years, the paper brings attention to the impact of tax havens on international development.

This paper aims to carry out a critical analysis of the proposed Australian emissions trading scheme (ETS) as a complex market solution to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs). Specifically it seeks to examine the financial regulatory infrastructure that will more than likely oversee the Australian ETS, the same regulatory infrastructure which failed to prevent the global financial crisis.

A critical examination of the financialisation of the atmosphere that follows the growth of the financialisation of capitalism when economic activity shifted from production and service sectors to finance. Financialisation of capitalism is supported by capitalist regulation influenced by neo‐liberal doctrines of free markets and small government.

Trillions of dollars of taxpayer funds bailed out large financial institutions that nearly collapsed after unregulated trading in complex financial products that were supposed to hedge future risk. Corporate emissions trading will involve similar financial products. The measurement and reporting of actual emissions to support the Australian ETS also creates challenges for the accountancy profession to provide a workable conceptual framework.

If the currently flawed financial infrastructure required for the GHG emissions trading scheme, no amount of taxpayer funded bailouts will reverse the extreme climate change associated with an environmental catastrophe.

The application of financialisation of monopoly capitalism and capitalist regulation theories to the critical analysis of commoditised GHGs traded as financial products in the proposed Australian ETS.

Analyzing how the post-Soviet transition interacts with the crisis of market finance exhibits a new “greed-based economic system” in the making. Asset grabbing is at its core and hinders capital accumulation. All the various privatization schemes have triggered off asset grabbing, asset stripping, and asset tunneling. A global contagion of such behavior has spread the power and cohesion of managers/shareholders (oligarchs) worldwide. Financial asset grabbing is less straightforward, though much widespread, and operates in financial markets through new financial products, securitization, firms buying their own shares, hedge funds, stock price manipulation, short selling, and the distribution of stock options.Shadow banking, and more generally a global informal economy, results from grabbing strategies in financial markets that breach the formal rules of capitalism. In alleviating and circumventing the rules, the oligarchy paves the way for economic malpractices and crime, calling capitalist laws into question.In such context, systemic greed underlies unconstrained maximization of relative wealth, for which asset grabbing is a rational means, in a winner-take-all economy. At the present stage of our research, a greed-based economy cannot yet be theoretically defined as a transition either to a new phase of capitalism or to another different system.

There has been much discussion over recent years of the likely impact of ‘financial globalisation’ on the financial services sector specifically and on the stability of national economies. This paper examines how and to what extent the ‘threats’ from financial globalisation manifest themselves in relation to the functions of regulation and supervision carried out by central banks. A theoretical perspective on these issues is put forward followed by an analysis of the specific case of a small island economy which is embracing financial liberalisation and competition, Mauritius.

This paper aims to explain the importance of the international cooperation and coordination among supervisory authorities of different countries in event of banking crises. It also suggests that the harmonious relationship has to be attained in the adoption of ex ante financial regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes. In other words, the paper highlights the linkage between ex ante preventive regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes, on the one hand, and cooperation among national regulatory and supervisory authorities in globalized financial markets. Although the paper is relevant to most developed and emerging financial markets, it chooses Hong Kong as a context to examine this proposal. In the current literature, there are no similar approach linking these two paradigms and examining them in an integrated context.

The paper adopts a conceptual framework after the 2008 global financial crisis and takes Hong Kong, an international financial centre in which numerous branches or subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions locate, as an example to examine how the coordination with foreign supervisory authorities are being conducted and to analyse whether the present regulatory framework in Hong Kong is effective and sufficient against banking crises. Through the review of the literature, the important link between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes is found to be significant in adopting proper solutions.

Through analysing the Hong Kong financial regulators’ reports on the collapse of Lehman Brother, the paper finds out that even though there is some weakness in the cooperation and coordination between regulators after the 2008 financial crisis, Hong Kong is still in the progress of proposing bank special resolution regime. Although there has been some awareness on the issue of coordination between home and host states regulatory measures, there is still a lack of awareness of the connection between regulatory measures and compensation schemes.

Conflict of interests could hardly be prevented in the course of cooperation and coordination among home and host regulatory authorities, and the coordination of the important link between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation scheme which involves legal and economic analyses is a challenging task.

The paper’s findings show that there are practical implications for the recent rapid development of special resolution regime for global systematically important financial institutions against future banking crises and for managing the balance between the adoption of financial supervisory laws and special resolution measures.

This paper suggests that the harmonious coordination between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes has to be achieved through international context to avoid the absurd situations. This conceptual integrated framework presented in the current paper is not touched upon by the existing literature. This important concept is valuable for future research, and it is significant to financial regulators, legislators and the government in adjusting policy against banking crises in both developed and developing countries.

Geographic diversification results in the improvement of firm value through an increase in scale and scope of economies, gains in synergy, reduction in cost and improved corporate governance, however, the capabilities of financial institutions get heavily affected due to information asymmetries, varied macro and microeconomic factors across economies. In this context, the purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the impact of geographical diversification on the performance of Indian Banks.

For an unbalanced panel data set of Indian Banks over the period 2001–2016, fixed effect model (FEM) with a distributed lag is used and tested for firm and time fixed effects. Further, the study also examines the role of bank size and ownership on the above association.

Findings of the study suggests that geographical diversification helps in increasing bank returns for the overall sample but does not have any significant impact on bank risk. For foreign and public banks, geographical diversification helps in increasing bank returns but does not have any significant impact on bank risk. This indicates toward the adverse selection, poor monitoring incentives in new markets and suggesting a lack of managerial skills.

The study indicates that while formulating the policies regarding branching and expansion these findings can serve as a guiding tool for managers and regulators. Findings have important implications for financial institution and policymakers in globalized financial markets.

This paper examines the need for international regulation of financial markets and suggests the possible role that a global financial supervisor might play in providing effective regulation of international financial markets. The first part discusses the nature of systemic risk in the international financial system and the necessity for international Minimum Standards of prudential supervision for banking institutions. The second part examines the efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to devise non‐binding international standards for managing systemic risk in financial markets. Recent financial crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America suggest, however, that informal efforts by international bodies such as the Basel Committee are inadequate to address the risk of systemic failure in financial systems. The third part therefore argues that efficient international financial regulation requires certain regulatory functions to be performed by a global supervisor acting in conjunction with national regulatory authorities. These functions should involve the authorisation of financial institutions, generation of rules and standards of regulatory practice, surveillance of financial markets, and coordination with national authorities in implementing and enforcing such standards.

This paper inquires into the root causes of global imbalances from an international trade perspective. The purpose of the paper is to establish a conceptual framework that links financial market governance, international trade and financial market integration, and to derive implications for the global financial crisis.

In order to analyze global imbalances, the paper draws on a theoretical Heckscher‐Ohlin‐Samuelson international trade model, in which it compares two open economies, solely differing in their financial market governance structures. Building on these findings, the paper extends the analysis to the role of financial market frictions in propagating global imbalances into excessive lending in high‐income economies.

To that extent, it argues that global imbalances are due to impasses in international production. This paper argues that countries seeking to suppress real appreciation have engaged in financial repression, which has, via financial globalization, translated into excessive expansion of financial service sectors in flexible market economies.

In order to derive a tractable framework, the abstract from inter‐temporal aspects and from an in‐depth analysis of financial modelling issues. Owing to the static nature of the set‐up, the analytic link between global imbalances and the global financial crisis is intuitive.

Given that differences in national financial market governance influence the direction of international capital and trade flows, it argues for more international policy coordination in preventing future crisis.

The unique feature of the contribution is that it links financial market governance and international trade to international financial market integration in a tractable theoretical framework.

This article aims to provide insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe.

First the authors define the potential changes in financial markets and then the tools available for the regulator to tame them. Finally, they build five scenarios according to the main evolutions observed on the financial markets and on the tools used by the regulator to modify these trends.

Among the five scenarios defined, two present highly unstable features since the regulator refuses to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance in order to preserve financial stability. Three of them achieve financial stability. However, they are more or less efficient or feasible. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the multi-polar scenario is the worst, because it necessitates coordination at the global level which implies moving further away from respective national preferences. However, the more realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: this level of coordination seems much more realistic than the global one; the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the “European government” might gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of cooperation with the rest of the world.

Foresight studies on financial markets and regulation are quite rare. This may be explained by the difficulty to forecast what will be their evolution in the coming decades, not least because finance is fundamentally unstable. This paper provides a framework to consider what could be the best strategy of regulators in such an unstable environment.