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The study aims to estimate the impact of the vigilant board independence (BIND) dimension that potentially neutralises the unfair influence of chief executive officer duality (CEODU) on Indian public banks' performance.

The study takes into account the fixed-effects model to investigate the potential moderating effect of BIND in the relationship between CEODU and Indian bank performance. The econometric model is also robust against heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and cross-section dependence issues to ensure that the model is free from such biases. The study also addresses the major issue of endogeneity via vector autoregression and performs the analysis by considering one period lag of the explanatory variables.

The findings demonstrate that CEODU does not always lead to a negative outcome on the performance until or unless the board is monitored by the effective presence of outside directors.

The regulatory bodies consider the results to strengthen board capital where CEODU can benefit a business entity if vigilance BIND is present at or above a threshold point.

The study evaluated an under-researched role of BIND as a moderator that undermines the negative influence of CEODU on the performance of Indian banks. The study also establishes that the CEO's contribution to performance increases when the number of outside directors is at or above a certain threshold.

The paper aims to craft a non-parametric composite value for the board quality of Indian banks where the weights can be assigned endogenously.

The study employed a non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA)-based novel extension known as the benefit of doubt approach. To measure the strength of the Indian bank corporate board in terms of board efficiency (BEF), the study used a mixed approach, i.e. first, the study calculates the percentile ranks of the five attributes that the study assumes are the characteristics of the strong board including board size, number of outside directors, frequency of meetings, non-duality leadership and board gender diversity. Thereafter, the study performs the benefit-to-doubt approach to finally measure the efficiency of the board.

The findings of the study establish that the methodological framework present in the study to measure the strength of the board in terms of BEF has been a much superior method over the other weighted and non-weighted linear average methods.

This methodology aids the shareholders, investors and regulatory bodies in rating the Indian banks based on their strength in terms of better monitoring boards and ensuring a smooth agent–owner relationship.

The benefit of doubt approach has been a unique and novel methodology to craft the composite value for any multidimensional phenomenon. One of the major benefits of using this approach is that it assigns the weights endogenously to each dimension and thereafter collectively determines the efficiency of such a phenomenon.