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The aim of this paper, which is based on Cheng et al.’s (2012) research, is to re-examines the relationship between a firms’ voluntary disclosure of forward-looking non-financial information (FNFI) and investment efficiency.

The authors chose firms that publicly traded in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets from 2005 to 2011, a total of 926 firms and 6,482 firm-year. To control the endogeneity problem between FNFI and investment efficiency, the authors lagged the FNFI variable for one year.

The authors found that FNFI alleviates a firms’ underinvestment but leads to overinvestment. These effects become gradually weaker over time. In addition, the results indicate that corporate governance helps improve the quality of FNFI, thus boosting investors’ confidence and easing financial constraints.

The limitations of this paper are mainly focused on the measure of FNFI. The authors only considered the quantity of FNFI disclosed by firms and ignored other characteristics of FNFI.

Based on Cheng et al.’s (2012) static findings, this paper considers the dynamic role of FNFI in firms’ investment decisions.

Following Cheng et al. (2012) and Tan et al. (2015), this paper aims to investigate how does the forward-looking information disclosure quality affect the investors’ decisions and then the investment efficiency.

The authors obtain the information disclosure quality rating data from the official website of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), and firm financial information is mainly from the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) and China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). The authors choose firms that publicly traded on the SZSE during the period from 2004 to 2010, and the final sample consists of 2,415 firm-year observations for 345 unique firms.

The authors find that a firm with a high information disclosure quality rating is trusted by investors more. Forward-looking non-financial information (FNFI) disclosure alleviates financial constraints and improves investment efficiency, including alleviating underinvestment and preventing overinvestment to a larger extent for firms with high information disclosure quality rating, especially for the firms rated A (excellent) or B (good) every year since 2001, when the rating began. Moreover, this study proves that investors trust the firms rated high more but do not guard against the firms rated low enough.

The authors only considered the quantity of FNFI disclosed by firms and ignored other characteristics of FNFI. Limited by the data of information disclosure quality rating, the research sample is just from the SZSE.

This paper extends the research of Cheng et al. (2012) and Tan et al. (2015) to show that one of the reasons behind the extant mix results of the relationship between FNF disclosure and investment efficiency is different information disclosure quality. High-quality FNFI disclosure can alleviate underinvestment and prevent overinvestment at same time.

This study aims to investigate the accounting role’s deficiencies in managers’ decision-making processes.

The current research applies a critical review method, which along with a deductive approach – based on a library review of existing sources – examines the underlying causes for the deficiencies of accounting role in the decision-making process of managers; moreover, based on the results obtained, the current study proposes a structural model to explain the issue.

The results exhibit the inadequacies of the accounting role in the decision-making process of managers into three sections: “dilution of financial reporting information content,” “malpractice of accounting information providers” and “managers’ unwillingness to use accounting information.”

This research provides a new perspective on critical accounting studies for the accounting profession, policymakers and managers and invites them to examine the roles of accounting information in more depth and breadth.

This article is the first study that critically expounds upon the literature on the deficiencies of accounting role in the decision-making process of managers and presents these deficiencies in the form of a structural model from three different perspectives.