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This study explores the interrelationship between regulatory risks and strategic controls within the financial supervision architecture of an emergent global financial centre of China that embraces innovation as part of its strategic objectives.

This paper employs a longitudinal case study approach to examine the institutional dynamics of the key financial regulators in connection with the regulated financial institutions in Hong Kong before and after the financial tsunami of 2008.

First, this study reveals an organic development of a specialised financial regulatory architecture that resists transforming itself structurally despite the significant impact of externalities. Second, in this post-financial crisis analysis, regulated financial institutions swiftly respond by strengthening their risk controls through compliance with the guidelines imposed by the regulator. Institutional dynamics in influencing the implementation of risk controls through a top-down interactive mechanism are observed. Such dynamic and pertinent rapid responses induce the pursuit of optimal risk management within a regulatory framework.

This paper provides a longitudinal case study to reveal regulatory risks and strategic controls of the global financial centre of China. It unveils mitigating risk control measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The study demonstrates how regulatory institutions strive to take precautionary, coercive measures such that the regulated institutions mimic and implement prudent mechanisms.

The objective of this study is to analyze the framework within which microfinance institutions (MFIs) deliver their services and provide an assessment of their operations and financial management. These institutions are examined because of their current importance to a special group of consumers, primarily the poor and disenfranchised in the developing world, and of their future promise as an economic development solution. Since the objective of these institutions is somewhat unique, the manner of their assessment must also differ from that used to assess the performance of traditional financial intermediaries. In particular, assessment of MFIs must recognize their dual (bank and development instrument) status. Their efficiency, then, must be analyzed in terms of its economic (or financial) dimension as well as its social dimension. The first dimension may be examined with traditional measures, while examination of the second requires measures that reflect the MFI’s social objectives. In order to accommodate the special nature of MFIs, this study proposes the use of a Balanced Scorecard approach. It contributes to the study of financial institution performance by examining a non‐traditional group of institutions using a variety of assessment measures. The findings should be of value to those interested in the financial sector as well as those involved in public policy decision making.

This paper examines the need for international regulation of financial markets and suggests the possible role that a global financial supervisor might play in providing effective regulation of international financial markets. The first part discusses the nature of systemic risk in the international financial system and the necessity for international Minimum Standards of prudential supervision for banking institutions. The second part examines the efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to devise non‐binding international standards for managing systemic risk in financial markets. Recent financial crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America suggest, however, that informal efforts by international bodies such as the Basel Committee are inadequate to address the risk of systemic failure in financial systems. The third part therefore argues that efficient international financial regulation requires certain regulatory functions to be performed by a global supervisor acting in conjunction with national regulatory authorities. These functions should involve the authorisation of financial institutions, generation of rules and standards of regulatory practice, surveillance of financial markets, and coordination with national authorities in implementing and enforcing such standards.

Like other developed countries Australia has seen intensifying competition between financial institutions as a result of the combined pressures of economic and social change, deregulation of financial systems and the introduction of new technology. Increased competition has led to a blurring of the traditional boundaries between institutions, changes in market structures and a proliferation of new services and products. A new awareness of the role and importance of marketing in the services as something more than advertising and selling has arisen. The Final Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Australian Financial System (the Campbell Committee) in 1981 recommended almost total deregulation. Any necessary government intervention in the system should be by market methods, not direct controls. The effect has been most noticeable on banks and life assurance. The consumer will benefit from deregulation with a wider range of choice, but it may bring about job losses through new technology and poorer standards of service may arise. Its economic effects are feared. Eventually the need for legislation may arise again.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the similarities and differences of both conventional and Islamic financial institutions from various institutional perspectives.

This conceptual paper describes the insights held by the financial institution theory which is discussed from the perspectives of the economics of the financial institution, legal environment, the political aspect of an institution, the philosophical underpinning, the components of institution and also the ethical role of institution. Then, this paper will proceed to justify the similarities and differences that have been observed between both institutions.

Discussions in this paper will reveal that specifically specific similarity is prevalent on the nature of the supervisory role. The differences between both institutions from the aspects of business organization, economic roles and law of origin have also been found.

The similarities and differences that are established on both institutions will affect the structure of the financial contract and the design of financial systems.

The paper will contribute a new knowledge specifically on the design of the Islamic financial contract based on Shariah law at the initial phase.

Purpose: This chapter explores some of the difficult issues in financial regulation for financial stability. Noting the lack of prior academic work in the topic, this chapter presents a discussion of some difficult issues in financial regulation for financial stability.

Methodology: The chapter draws from real-world experiences in financial regulation and draws support from existing literature.

Findings and conclusions: Some of the difficult issues include: the difficulty in breaking too-big-to-fail financial institutions into small insignificant parts; the difficulty in regulating executive compensation in the financial sector without limiting the ability of financial institutions to offer competitive pay for executive talent; difficulty in instilling strict financial regulation and supervision without limiting the ability of financial institutions to exploit emerging profitable opportunities; difficulty in ensuring that financial institutions increase lending in bad times and during recessions; the rarity of having both a female CEO and Chair in a major financial institution; difficulty in making Central Banks independent from the Federal Government; difficulty in making financial institutions relevant in the midst of hostile technological innovation and disruption.

Practical implications: The implication of the findings is that financial regulation for financial stability is not an easy task. There will be issues that financial regulation can address, and there will be issues that financial regulation cannot address. Acknowledging that such difficulties exist on the path to financial stability is the first step to addressing these issues.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between bank market power and stability of financial institutions in Italy between 2001 and 2012. The authors first test the existence of a U-shaped relationship between market power and financial stability. Second, they regress the market share indicator on bank risk-taking to underline whether financial stability is affected by increasing or decreasing the market power of banks. Third, they explore whether this relationship is affected by the size, level of capitalization and credit insolvency of banks.

Relying on highly territorially disaggregated data at labor market areas level, the authors estimate the impact of bank market power and other explanatory variables on a proxy of risk taking behavior such as the banking “stability inefficiency” derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Bank market power is taken into account through an individual measure based on loans. Financial stability is calculated through the Z-score. The authors use, as risk-taking measure, the stability inefficiency whose estimation approach is the stochastic frontier analysis.

The empirical evidence shows that the inefficiency of financial stability is found to be U-shaped related with respect to the measure of market power. Bank size is an essential factor in explaining the relationship between bank market power and risk-taking. Cooperative banks have fewer incentives to gain market power to better perform in term of risks. The reform of the cooperative banks that took recently place in Italy is not supported by the data.

The relationship between bank market power and financial stability has been analyzed using a rich sample of cooperative, commercial and popular banks in Italy over the 2001-2012 period. The authors rely on labor market areas being sub-regional geographical areas where the bulk of the labor force lives and works. The paper investigates the market power-stability link considering both cooperative and non-cooperative banks. Indeed, specific attention has been paid on cooperative banks because of their mission in favor of the local community as only few studies, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, examine cooperative banking.

The purpose of this paper is to review the continued development of the “shadow banking” market in the USA, namely, lending to the private middle market, defined as financings of $5-100m to non-public, unrated operating entities or pools of assets with not more than $50m in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.

The analysis includes a continued review of an innovative segment of the financial markets and primary evidence from direct participation in four actual cases of private, non-bank lending between 2013 and 2015 and theoretical observations around that data.

Although there have been considerable challenges, historically, in providing credit for small and mid-sized businesses in the USA, the authors show further evidence that private middle market capital is growing (post credit crisis) at a dramatic pace, in part because of excessive constraints placed on the regulated depositary institutions. The authors also explain the nature of the shadow banking innovation and how it is intrinsically linked to “arbitraging” often excessively restrictive banking regulation. The growing US shadow banking market, while providing an important service to middle market companies, may pose a new systemic risk post 2007-2008 credit crisis in the USA.

Any generalization is limited because of the difficulty in extrapolating from a small number of specific case studies and the absence of adequate survey data for the US capital markets and the limited examples examined.

This research calls for additional case studies, including participant observation research that offers a unique close-up view of financial behavior that is often beyond the view of regulators and the public. Data obtained may be useful in providing a deeper, more timely understanding of credit market behavior and contribute to efforts at formal financial modeling as well as the development of practical regulatory regimes.

The shadow credit market is a key source of funding for the global financial system, thus contributing to job creation and economic growth. The authors demonstrate the value of financial innovations and show that shadow credit fills a void left by depository financial institutions, shifting much of the risk from the public to investors. This research increases transparency in the operation of this market, which is extremely important for the industry, the government and the public. The authors offer a modest attempt at understanding credit behavior to avoid a repeat of the 2007/2008 financial crisis.

Direct participation is unique to the firms studied. Value is in developing a general framework to analyze an emerging credit market in advanced economies.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the risks Islamic financial institutions face in an emerging market context, including risk sharing in Islamic financing and Shari’ah (Islamic law) compliance risk. We explore current risk management practices and establish the link between risk management and the financial performance of banks and the efficiency and effectiveness of financial sectors in emerging markets. Because of their distinctive risk profile, Islamic finance institutions face challenges in risk management. We show that Islamic banking is riskier in emerging markets because of the presence of immature money markets, limitations in the availability of lender of last resort facilities, and deficiencies in market infrastructure. There is also no evidence that Islamic banks have developed effective solutions for managing the risks conventional banks face as well as their own unique risks. We suggest that the countries that do this best are those that prioritize the structure of risk management knowledge and capabilities in a single financial regulator.

This study examines the dynamics of financial institution development among economies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and how volatility in forex-adjusted price of key globally traded, commodities and macroeconomic risk influence such development.

The study is based on data collected from the period starting 2001 to 2019 for relevant variables; and the empirical test was performed using the two-step system generalized method of moments (TSS-GMM) estimation method.

Empirical estimates suggest that volatility in forex-adjusted prices of crude oil and cocoa are inimical to development of financial institutions among economies in the sub-region. On the other hand, volatility in the price of gold is found to have a significant positive effect on development of financial institutions. Additionally, political instability is found to exacerbate the adverse effect of volatility in the price of globally traded commodities on the development of financial institutions in the sub-region.

The study verifies how volatility in forex-adjusted prices of key traded commodities on the global market influence development of financial institutions in the sub-region. Additionally, the study examines the impact of macroeconomic risk, a principal component analysis (PCA) constructed index on the development trajectory of financial institutions. Finally, the authors examine the moderating role of institutional quality and political instability in the relationship in question.