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The chapter focuses on the personal characteristics of top executives in companies involved in corporate financial crime as well as the introduction of human governance as one of the mechanisms in preventing corporate misbehaviour. This chapter discusses directors’ and top management teams’ personal characteristics – in the context of corporate governance – that may influence the occurrence of corporate financial crime. The study further proposes the human governance factor as a possible mechanism to improve corporate governance in preventing such misbehaviour. This chapter highlights the personal characteristics of top executives, which may become the indicators of corporate financial crime, as well as human governance, which is shown to be one of the most important mechanisms of corporate governance for corporate financial crime prevention.

This study aims to evaluate the moderating impact of corporate governance on the relationship between internal control mechanisms and financial performance.

The study employs a structured questionnaire to collect data from 250 top managers of rural banks in the capital of Ghana. Cronbach alpha value and Fornell-Larcker tests were performed to assess the reliability and validity of the data used. The study adopted a partial least square structural equation model (PLS-SEM).

The results show that internal control and corporate governance both have a direct positive and significant impact on financial performance. Furthermore, the interaction of internal control and corporate governance also has a positive and significant impact on financial performance, thus confirming the moderating role of corporate governance in the relationship between internal control mechanisms and financial performance.

This implies that organizations need to strengthen their corporate governance procedures to increase the efficiency of their internal control systems, which would ultimately lead to an improvement in their financial performance.

The present study innovates by assessing the moderating role of corporate governance in the nexus between internal control mechanisms and financial performance. This moderating effect assessment implies that corporate governance may not only affect the technical implementation of the internal control structures but will subsequently make an impact on the overall performance of the organization.

This paper examines the association between corporate governance and financial inclusion in terms of correlation. This paper examines whether countries that have a strong corporate governance environment also experience better financial inclusion outcomes.

The indicators of financial inclusion are automated teller machines (ATMs) per 100,000 adults, bank accounts per 1,000 adults and bank branches per 100,000 adults, while the indicators of corporate governance are extent of corporate transparency index, the extent of director liability index, the extent of disclosure index, the extent of ownership and control index, the extent of shareholder rights index, minority investors protection index and ease of shareholder suits index. The association was analyzed using Pearson correlation analysis and granger causality test.

Strong corporate governance is significantly associated or correlated with better financial inclusion outcomes. The regional analyses show that corporate governance has a significant positive association with financial inclusion in Asian countries and in Middle East countries. However, a positive and negative association was observed between some indicators of corporate governance and financial inclusion in European countries, North American countries, South American countries, African countries and in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, implying that strong corporate governance has a positive and negative association with financial inclusion depending on the indicators of corporate governance and financial inclusion used. There is also evidence of uni-directional granger causality between corporate governance and financial inclusion.

Little is known about the association between corporate governance and financial inclusion. This paper is the first to examine this association.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate, using data on US manufacturing firms, how and when corporate governance affects managers' decisions to use discretionary accruals and thereby artificially influence company financial reports.

Three‐stage least squares is employed to study the relationship between financial status, corporate governance and financial reporting discretion. The sample spans the years 2001‐2003 during a severe downturn in the US stock market. Financial status is measured with the Altman Z‐score.

A significant difference is found between firms not classified as healthy or failed (i.e. the mid‐range group) and the two extreme categories when examining governance quotient using a well‐known index. A positive relationship is found between discretionary accruals and the governance index. Strong governance appears to reduce the incidence of mid‐range firms engaging in accruals management. The least healthy and the most distressed companies have the weakest relationship with discretionary accruals. By contrast, mid‐range firms are more likely to resort to discretionary accruals.

Non‐executive members of boards of directors are warned to be particularly vigilant about discretionary accruals with firms transitioning between healthy and high‐failure risk.

The relationship between firms' financial health and discretionary accruals reveals an agency problem in credit markets with financially stressed firms. More attention is required on firms whose financial condition is uncertain. Also, it is documented that significant findings of importance to the earnings quality and corporate governance literature by documenting the role of corporate governance on discretionary accruals and financial status.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the effect of country and corporate governance mechanisms on zero leverage is heterogeneous across market- and bank-based financial systems.

Using logit regression methods and a sample of listed firms from 14 Western European countries for the 2002–2016 period, this study examines the propensity of firms having zero leverage in different financial systems.

Country governance mechanisms have a heterogeneous effect on zero leverage, with higher quality mechanisms increasing zero-leverage propensity in bank-based countries and decreasing it in market-based countries. Board dimension and independency have no impact on zero leverage. A higher ownership concentration decreases the propensity for zero-leverage policies in bank-based countries.

This study’s findings show the importance of considering both country- and firm-level governance mechanisms when studying the zero-leverage phenomenon and that the effect of those mechanisms vary across financial and legal systems.

For managers, this study suggests that stronger national governance makes difficult (favours) zero-leverage policies in market (bank)-based countries. In bank-based countries, it also suggests that the presence of shareholders that own a large stake makes the adoption of zero-leverage policies difficult. This last implication is also important for small shareholders by suggesting that investing in firms with a concentrated ownership reduces the risk that zero-leverage policies are adopted by entrenched reasons.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to consider simultaneously the effects of both country- and firm-level governance mechanisms on zero leverage and to allow such effects to vary across financial systems.

The purpose of this paper is to overview the goals of corporate governance in the financial services sector from a theoretical perspective. This sector has experienced some high profile corporate scandals, including BCCI, Barings Bank, and Equitable Life. Yet the UK's Combined Code on Corporate Governance does not give any special prominence to the corporate governance issues involved in this important and idiosyncratic business area.

First, the broad parameters of corporate governance are discussed, from a theoretical perspective. From this particular characteristics are derived applicable to the financial services sector. These issues are examined and the extent to which they have been addressed by contemporary academic or policy‐related studies is considered, and also how they are related to the activities of the main bodies responsible for external oversight.

The main attention of this paper is banks and a key issue arising is that the typical structure of their balance‐sheets – high leverage, and a mismatch in their assets and liabilities, mean that it is imperative that they keep lenders' confidence, and imply a wider duty of care for bank directors. External regulators (FSA) and auditors have vital oversight functions, which should encourage sound governance practices. One avenue of future research would be to assess the effectiveness of compliance in the UK, given that financial companies have obligations concerning both FSA requirements and Combined Code provisions.

Some key issues pertaining to corporate governance in financial services are addressed, highlighting their significance, to encourage further investigation by academics and practitioners in the field.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance index (PAKCGI) on firm financial distress for a sample of 152 non-financial firms listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) over the period from 2003 to 2017.

To examine the impact of PAKCGI on financial distress (Altman Z-Score), random effect model is applied. The PAKCGI is a self-constructed index based on the five important factors of corporate governance practices, i.e. board of directors, audit committees, right of shareholders, disclosures and risk management. The binary coding approach is adopted for the construction of PAKCGI. Altman Z-Score model is used as a proxy for financial distress indicator. The absolute value of Altman Z-score has been taken as financial distress indicator.

The outcomes of the study indicate a positive impact of PAKCGI on risk of firms’ financial distress. The positive coefficient of PAKCGI implies that the good corporate practices work as catalyst to reduce risk of financial distress in Pakistan. A significant negative impact of block holders on financial distress suggests that the concentrated block ownership take monopolistic decision to protect their interests. It has also been observed that significant positive impact of institutional ownership on financial distress exists in the Pakistani listed firms. Furthermore, this study also reveals that significant negative association between board size, CEO duality and financial distress indicator.

The findings may encourage the Pakistani listed companies to follow and implement good corporate governance practices, which would lead to increase the confidence of investors, regulators and stakeholders.

The current study extends the corporate governance literature by examining the relationship between the corporate governance attributes and the financial distress status of Pakistani listed companies. From the academic perspective, this paper adds to the knowledge concerning the association between corporate governance practices and risk of financial distress in emerging markets.

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) mandated a variety of corporate governance mechanisms to improve the transparency of financial reporting quality. This paper's aim is to investigate whether SOX's recently mandated disclosure of corporate governance structures affects the market's perception of earnings informativeness and firms' earnings management.

Since the first compliant disclosure of the Act would be found in firms' 2002‐2003 financial reports, the authors retrieve the post‐SOX data (pre‐SOX data) from the 2002 to 2003 (2001‐2002) period. Further, the study adopts Anderson et al.'s model to test the relations between earnings informativeness, audit committee independence, and other corporate governance variables. A similar mode is used by Chang and Sun in their study of cross‐listed foreign firms. To measure the discretionary accruals, the authors adopt Kothari et al.'s model and use the two‐digit SIC code in the cross‐sectional regression.

It is found that the market valuation of earnings surprises is significantly higher for firms which disclose stronger corporate governance functions. It is also found that the effectiveness of corporate governance in monitoring earnings management is improved after the mandated disclosure.

The empirical evidence shows that the quality of accounting earnings is increased after the SOX's mandated disclosure, which strengthens the link between financial reporting and corporate governance functions.

Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is the single regulator of firms in the UK financial services industry. The Act grants extensive powers to the FSA such that it can impose by rules and regulations additional corporate governance requirements on firms in the financial services industry. The legislative and regulatory requirements also extend to individuals under the FSA approved persons' regime. The purpose of the paper is to examine this individualization of corporate governance.

The paper first explores the rise to significance of internal control and risk management in corporate governance and regulation, and links this to Beck's risk society and individualization theses. The extent of the individualization of corporate governance by the approved persons' regime is explored by examining three sources of evidence: the FSA's documents setting out the approved persons' regime; the initial perceptions about the implementation of the approved persons' regime from interviews with high‐level individuals in the financial services industry; and the outcomes of illustrative FSA enforcement actions against individuals.

The findings are that the FSA has developed a comprehensive and formidable apparatus for the individualization of corporate governance in the UK's financial services industry. It is argued that a discourse based on the interpretive evaluations of internal control and risk management may be replacing a discourse based on the quantitative techniques of management accounting, which may be characterised as the demise of the “calculating self” and the rise of the “auditable self”.

The FSA's approved persons' regime could be developed as a model for other areas of the private and public sectors, where for regulatory purposes it may be desirable to identify approved or official roles.

The ability of regulators to “make” corporate governance by rules and regulations is relatively unexplored. Also, the focus of corporate governance is on firms rather than individuals. The paper considers the extension of corporate governance from the firm to the individual that may be achieved by regulation.

This paper aims to examine the influence of good governance on corporate value, in which the stock returns and financial performance act as the mediator of the relationship among them.

This research was conducted on companies go public listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and was included in 2011 to 2017 LQ45 index list, with samples taking a purposive sampling approach through four criteria. Data analysis using WarpPLS with indicator approaches are formative (mutually exclusive between indicators).

The findings are as follows: good corporate governance has a significant influence on stock returns in a negative direction; good corporate governance has no significant influence on financial performance; good corporate governance has no significant influence on company value; stock returns have a significant influence on financial performance in a positive direction; financial performance has a significant influence on stock returns with a positive direction; stock returns significantly influence the value of the company in a positive direction; financial performance has a significant influence on the company value in a positive direction.

The novelty in this study is that the relationship between stock returns and financial performance is reciprocal, which is the relationship among variables that affect each other (back and forth causality), in which in the previous study, the relationship between variables is only one direction; besides, the previous study conducted an analysis to find out the influence of good corporate on stock returns, company value and financial performance separately, with mixed results.