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This article continues to assess the role of private nuisance as a common law tool for environmental protection, independent of the wider regulatory controls. It evaluates the decision in Cambridge Water and asks the question whether it would stand as good law before the Supreme Court. It concludes with illustrating the enduring role of the injunction in environmental protection and its capacity to coerce restorative environmental justice. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The paper is predominately a classic doctrinal article as it is principally library-based analysing both primary sources (that both pre- and post-date the modern law reporting system) and secondary sources whilst engaging in leading academic commentary.

Nuisance developed to a point in the nineteenth-century where a simple form of the tort was visible. At that juncture, it had an “unchanged” essence that emanated from a strict liability reciprocal identity. Recent judicial activity has visibly adulterated that identity: this article casts doubts on juridical restrictions that assess the conduct of defendants to assess liability. It is suggested that it may not withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court if, and when, they are tested. In light of that analysis and considering the potency of injunctions, it is argued that nuisance law potentially has a positive future in environmental protection.

Owing to the elected research approach, the scope of the article has been necessarily concentrated on succinct areas of a broader subject and viewed in a manner that works alongside the regulatory regime.

This paper recognises that nuisance law has a positive future in environmental protection especially if the courts are willing to embrace the historical paradigm which has served the common law in this field broadly well for hundreds of years.

Prosecutions under Criminal Law, associated in the minds of most people with “criminal offences” of a serious nature—“crime” in the traditional sense—and undertaken by the police authorities, constitute a very large and rather untidy body of public law. It includes a large and constantly growing number of offences in respect of which prosecutions are undertaken by various corporate bodies who, as in the case of local authorities, have a duty albeit with a power of discretion, to prosecute. There would appear to be little in common between such offences, as smoking in the presence of open food or failing to provide soap, nail‐brushes, etc, for food handlers, and the villainy and violence of the criminal, but their misdeeds are all criminal offences and subject to the same law. Other countries, such as France, have definite Criminal Codes and these offences against statutes and statutory instruments which in English Law are dealt with in the broad field of Criminal Law, are subject to special administrative procedure. It has obvious advantages. Although in England and Wales, prosecutions are undertaken by police authorities, local authorities, public corporations, even professional bodies and private individuals, with a few statutory exceptions for which the Attorney‐General's fiat or consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is necessary, may instigate a prosecution against anyone if he can provide prima facie evidence to support it. In Scotland, prosecutions are instituted at the instigation of the various authorities by an officer, the Procurator‐Fiscal. Many advocate such a system for England and Wales, despite the enormous difference in the volume of litigation. Supervision of prosecutions on a much smaller scale is by the Director of Public Prosecutions, an office created in 1879, with power to institute and carry on criminal proceedings—this is the less significant of his duties, the number of such prosecutions usually being only several thousands per year—the most important being to advise and assist chief officers of police, clerks to the magistrates and any others concerned with criminal proceedings Regulations govern the cases in which DPP may act, mainly cases of public interest. The enormous growth of summary jurisdiction over the years, especially that arising from so‐called secondary legislation, is largely outside his sphere.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical examination of the current law and the proposed changes made by the Law Commission, after consultation, in relation to non‐fraudulent pre‐contractual duties in insurance law.

The research is addressed using case law, statutes, current academic and law commission publications in the UK and Australia.

First, the paper finds that the current state of the law is unfair in relation to consumers and small businesses and much reform is needed to rebalance the nature of insurance contracts to reflect modern day practice.

This work does not address detailed issues in relation to fraudulent misrepresentations.

The law will be brought into line with current practice by the Financial Ombudsman Service.

This paper will be of interest to legal practitioners and academics and those in the insurance industry.