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This study analyses interlocking directorates from the perspective of an emerging market, Mexico, where formal institutions are weak, and family firms with high ownership concentration dominate. It responds to recent calls in the literature on interlocks, which urge the differentiation between family and non-family businesses and to complete more research on emerging economies.

A database was constructed for 89 non-financial companies (52 family-owned) listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) from 2001 to 2014. This period includes normal times and an episode of financial crisis (2009–2010). To test the hypotheses, a dynamic panel model (in two stages) is used, applying GMM.

In normal times, the advantages of Board Chairman (COB) interlocks for the performance of publicly traded Mexican family firms are obtained regardless of the weak formal institutional environment. By contrast, during financial crisis, interlocking family COBs are more likely to jointly expropriate minority shareholders with actions that further their family objectives, which mitigates the positive effect of interlocks on performance. These findings contrast with the insignificant effects of COB interlocks found for non-family corporates.

A new framework is proposed which, through agency theory, finds points of concordance among resource dependence and class hegemony theories, to understand the effect of interlocking directorates on the performance of family firms operating in Mexico. The results of the empirical exercise for family companies listed on BMV during normal and financial crisis periods suggest its applicability.

The aim of this paper is to develop and test a behavioral theory of chief executive officer (CEO) succession and its performance consequences in family firms. Building upon performance feedback and slack research, the study hypothesizes that the effect of selecting a non-family outsider CEO on post-succession firm performance is contingent upon pre-succession firm performance aspirations level and the available slack resources.

The hypotheses are tested using a panel of 430 CEO successions in Italian family firms.

The findings show that a non-family outsider CEO is particularly valuable when performance resides far below aspiration levels, and there is a high availability of slack resources.

The study provides novel insights of the benefits and drawbacks of selecting non-family outsider CEOs offering behavioral-based theoretical explanations of performance consequences of CEO successions.

From an agency perspective, the authors investigate whether family ownership and control configurations are systematically associated with a firm's choice of auditor and audit fees. Agency theory is an economic theory that purposes the existence of a contract between two parties, principals and agents. Auditor choice and audit fees by family firms provide interesting insights given the unique nature of the agency problems faced by such firms.

The authors employ Big-4 auditors (PWC, KPMG, E&Y and Deloitte) as a proxy for high quality auditor (Big N) for the auditor choice model. For the audit fee model, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees (LnAF). The authors use two measures for family firm as explanatory variables: (1) a dummy variable (FAM_Control), which equals one if the firm is classified as a family firm and (2) FAM_Ownership, which is an indicator variable with a value of one if a firm has family members who hold CEO position, occupy board seats, or hold at least 10% of the firm's equity. Data of Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2021 are used. The authors adopt the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to mitigate the potential endogeneity issue involved in the selection of Big-N auditors.

The findings suggest that compared with non-family firms, Chinese family firms have a less tendency to employ Big-4 auditors due to less severe agency problems between owners and managers. Additionally, Chinese family firms sustain higher audit fees than non-family firms. Similar to the prior literature, however, Chinese family firms audited by Big-4 auditors incur lower audit fees than family firms audited by non-Big-4 auditors in this study. In contrast to young-family firms, old-family firms are less likely to pick top-tier auditors and sustain lower audit fees. Consistent and robust results are found from endogeneity tests and sensitivity analyses.

The empirical evidence provides a unique insight, for accounting practitioners, policymakers, family owners and other capital market participants concerning the diverse effects of various family ownership and control features on selecting high-quality auditors and audit fees. This study advances the understanding, showing that a lower demand for audit quality occurs in Chinese family firms as they encounter less severe Type I agency problems. However, the more severe Type II agency problems in Chinese family firms sustain higher audit fees due to higher audit risk and greater audit effort.

Our study aims to explore the ownership structure and accounting conservatism in influencing the value relevance that we analyse through the paradigm of open innovation and socio-emotional wealth (SEW). We also extended the test to identify how firm size could affect value relevance.

Through panel data testing, we collected all issuers on the stock exchange for the 2016–2018 period. The total collected observations are 735 observations from various industries.

The results of the study provide empirical evidence that institutional ownership is more pronounce, especially in companies with high asset levels. We also conducted other tests to see it from the perspective of SEW. We divide companies into family and non-family companies. The results of this study indicate that institutional ownership has an effect on increasing value relevance, especially in family companies compared with non-family companies. The results of the study also indicate that accounting conservatism plays a more important role in increasing value relevance in non-family firms compared to family firms.

This study advances in two main ways. First, we use a SEW approach and an open innovation perspective. Second, we conducted tests for family and non-family firms.

This paper investigates the impact of family influence measured by the F-PEC scale on private enterprise (both family firms and lone founders) leadership succession strategy.

The research dataset is comprised of 390 private enterprises whose head offices were situated in the voivodeships of Lower Silesia and Wielkopolska in Poland. The authors collected data through CAPI (computer-assisted personal interviewing) method, as well as through comprehensive, structured interviews with company owners. Data were analysed using hierarchical logistic regression for each type of succession strategy.

The results suggest that increased family influence does not necessarily lead to intra-family leadership succession in private enterprises. Importantly, a range of findings contradicted authors' predictions. The relationship between the overall F-PEC scale values signifying the multi-faceted family influence over the business and the choice of internal successor was weakly negative for the total sample; also, the higher the overlap between family and business values and the higher the commitment to family business, as evidenced by the Culture subscale, the lower was the occurrence of intra-family successor choice in the population of lone founders. The Culture subscale also increased the prevalence of lack of succession planning in the sample of lone founders.

While several studies suggests that family firms may be more prone to choose an intra-family succession scenario, it remains unclear how lower levels of business and succession experience, may influence the successor choice. Indeed, some studies suggest that a strong family influence over a business, may stimulate family firms to choose a family outsider as a business leader. Therefore, the key contribution of this study is contextualizing the response to an ongoing succession debate. This study investigates the strategic choices of companies in the first generation of ownership operating in Poland, which serves as an example of a post-transition economy. While the characteristics of this economic environment may be unique, the authors discuss how the surprising findings may add to the understanding of the general succession processes present in private enterprises.

Family business brand communication depends on the effect of the family on stakeholders' perception, and the family influences stakeholders differently, raising the question of whether family business branding varies across stakeholders. Drawing on social identity theory, this research classifies a family firm's stakeholders into family (in-group) and non-family (out-group) stakeholders and explores the communication of family business brands to these two groups of stakeholders.

Data for this research were gathered from a questionnaire survey of 327 Chinese family firms.

The results show that family business brand communication differs between family and non-family stakeholders. Additionally, family harmony has a positive relationship with family business branding to family stakeholders and an inverse U-shaped relationship with family business branding to non-family stakeholders.

This research is the first to demonstrate that family business brand communication varies across stakeholders and that the effect of family characteristics (family harmony in this research) on family business branding differs between stakeholders. In addition, it expands the scope of the out-group in family firms to embrace all non-family stakeholders and suggests an intergroup opposition between family and non-family stakeholders, which is important for advancing family firm theory.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of family control on the association between related party transactions (RPTs) and different forms of accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM), analyzing the effect of board characteristics on the possible association.

This paper studies a sample of Italian non-financial listed firms over the 2014–2019 period, by GLS regression models, controlling for the fixed effects of the company's sector of operation and the year.

Results indicate a different association between RPTs and earnings management (EM) in family and non-family firms. They point out that family firms use RPTs in association with downward AEM and REM perpetrated by abnormal discretionary expenses as well as a substitute of REM via abnormal production costs. For non-family firms, findings indicate only a substitution effect between RPTs and AEM. Furthermore, CEO duality, board gender diversity and the presence of the family on the board positively moderate the association between RPTs and, respectively, REM implemented through sales manipulations, downward AEM and upward AEM.

This study suggests that the socioemotional wealth (SEW) differently affects the relationship between RPTs and EM, according to the form of the latter. It also points out family firms' heterogeneity in earnings manipulations, by providing evidence of the moderating role of board characteristics on the association between RPTs and the various forms of EM.

Ownership structure plays a significant role in determining board demographic diversity. However, it is still unclear how different ownership configurations impact the structures of firm's boards and how board diversity influences firm performance. This study aims to investigate the relationship between family ownership and board diversity. Therefore, in this study, the authors argue that family firms have a lower level of board demographic diversity (in terms of age, gender and nationality) than non-family firms and that board diversity moderates the relationship between ownership and firm performance.

To test the authors’ hypotheses, we draw data from a sample of 341 German family and non-family firms for a period of five years.

The results show that family firms are less diverse in terms of age, gender and nationality diversity than non-family firms.

This study contributes to the general understanding of family firms and in particular the role ownership plays in shaping board demographic diversity.

Absorptive capacity (AC), the ability to leverage external knowledge for innovation, helps explain the mixed findings on family firms' (FFs) innovation performance. Our research focuses on the chief executive officer (CEO)’s role – whether family or non-family and founding or later generation – in influencing AC. We also explore how firm size and environmental dynamism affect these relationships, offering insights into varying AC levels among FFs.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models were estimated to test the hypotheses using a sample of 364 FFs in Spain.

FFs’ AC is greater when the CEO is a family member, and even more so when the family CEO belongs to the founding family generation. While AC diminishes in larger FFs, this effect is mitigated when the CEO is a family member. The predicted moderating effect of environmental dynamics is not supported by the analyses.

This paper adds insights about the drivers of heterogeneity in innovation among FFs, addressing recent calls for more nuanced views of how family members drive the strategic behavior of the business and incorporating considerations of different types of FFs based on the identity of the firm CEO. The results overall support the theoretical claims and also open up important questions for future studies.

Family governance is a topic of substantial practical relevance that merits much more attention in family business research (Gersick & Feliu, 2014; Suess, 2014). The purpose of this book chapter is to use the framework of a fair process to gain a better understanding of how family governance practices can help an entrepreneurial family firm flourish. Central to the analysis is the case of a 100-year-old entrepreneurial family firm that will serve as a best practice. Interviews with key members of the family and the business were held, and secondary data were gathered and analyzed. The chapter starts with a theoretical outline of the family as strategic resource and the family governance as a mechanism to manage this strategic resource. The principles of fair process are introduced as an underlying framework for the well-functioning of family governance practices. This is followed by the introduction of the case and the discussion of the key findings. This chapter ends with some concluding remarks.