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The purpose of this study is to investigate how the emotion expressed by a fictitious proposer influences the responder’s decision to accept or reject a severely unfair deal, represented by the splitting of a predetermined sum of money between the two players during an ultimatum game (UG). Rejection leads both parts to dissipate that sum. Critically the authors consider the situation in which both players have the best alternative to negotiation agreement (BATNA), which simulates a backup plan to rely on in case of no agreement.

The participants played a UG and, to foster the ecological validity of the paradigm, the parts could both rely on a more or less generous BATNA. The critical manipulation was the emotion expressed by the proposer while their BATNA was either hidden (Exp. 1) or communicated (Exp. 2).

The proposer’s emotions influenced participants’ own emotions, affected their social evaluations about the proposer, the desire for future interactions with the proposer and were used to infer the proposer’s BATNA when it was unknown. In this latter case, proposers’ emotions and in particular his/her happiness, decreased dramatically the participants’ tendency to reject even severely unfair offers.

Past research on UG has been predominantly aimed to investigate the effect of responders’ emotions or the effects of responders’ emotions on the proposer, devoting little attention to how the critical responder’s acceptance/rejection decision might be affected by the proposer’s emotion. Especially in the ecological situation where the parts have a BATNA in case of non-agreement.

Decision-making competence (DMC) of entrepreneurs and managers is a longstanding topic in this increasingly globalized world. These figures operate in conditions not within their own control, and good levels of DMC are often considered to be desirable for the flourishing of business and society. This paper reports an empirical investigation on the DMC of entrepreneurs and managers, in an attempt to inform about their tendencies to incur in risky and costly choices.

Three cognitive biases associated with operational strategies and individual characteristics of entrepreneurs and managers, namely under/overconfidence (UOC, i.e. self-confidence in taking decisions), resistance to sunk costs (RSC, i.e. propensity to take cost investments) and consistency in risk perception (CRP, i.e. how well individuals understand probability rules) were considered . Cognitive biases measures were used in a cross-sectional study on a sample of n = 639 entrepreneurs and n = 512 managers. Data collected via online survey were analyzed using descriptive statistics and inferential statistics to determine differences among entrepreneurs and managers DMC.

Analyses reveal that entrepreneurs exhibit higher levels of UOC compared to managers with a marked presence of UOC among entrepreneurs at younger ages. Conversely, performance regarding RSC improves with higher education levels while age and RSC are positively correlated only for managers, regardless of education. Lastly, entrepreneurs and managers resulted as not being affected by CRP. This study discusses these results to provide initial insights for further avenues of research and practice.

The study offers an innovative, evidence-based viewpoint on how entrepreneurs and managers deal with risky and costly decisions. It offers an initial understanding of the role of UOC, RSC and CRP, that is specific cognitive biases associated with operational strategies and individual characteristics, in the DMC of these working figures. The study forwards avenues of scrutiny of quick-witted entrepreneurs and systematic managers.