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This article presents and analyses the role of the European Court of Auditors in the attempts to limit fraudulent behaviour and symptoms of officials' corruption within the European Union. First there is an examination of the existing situation regarding these two problems. After a short presentation of the Communities' legislative definition of fraud and corruption the article highlights the current role of the European Court of Auditors in combating them. The analysis is focused on the Court's approach of fraud and corruption as a result of exercising its auditing competences. Finally there are also suggestions regarding a more effective action on behalf of the Court either by granting it judicial authority (long‐term proposal) or by reinforcing its auditing and reporting competences.

This paper examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating standards to deter and detect fraud, domestically and abroad. Specifically, it focuses on the role played by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), and other national and foreign professional associations, in promulgating auditing standards and procedures to prevent fraud in financial statements and other white‐collar crimes. It also examines several fraud cases and the impact of management and employee fraud on the various business sectors such as insurance, banking, health care, and manufacturing, as well as the role of management, the boards of directors, the audit committees, auditors, and fraud examiners and their liability in the fraud prevention and investigation.

This paper discusses the politicisation of fraud within the European Union and continues the author's scries on fraud, supranational investigative arrangements and cross‐border crime. During 1999, the fight against European Community budget fraud became a controversy of central importance within the European Union. This was not because such fraud is wide‐spread, but because as a criminal offence of an all‐European nature it was the point of least resistance from which to construct a European criminal code and a European FBI. During 1998 the corpus juris was proposed as the proto‐criminal code and the next stage in the fight against fraud. This situated the anti‐fraud strategies debate into the conflict between member states and the Commission's alleged agenda for a European superstate. Moreover, with European parliamentary elections approaching, nationalists and Eurosceptics had an interest in exaggerating the problem of fraud in order to depict central European institutions as wasteful and corrupt as well as a threat to the nation‐state. Although since the introduction of the doctrine of subsidiarity, national sovereignty is a fraud in the European context, fraud is also a sovereign issue.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the mission of Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti‐Fraud (UCLAF); how it cooperated with Member States and how it accounted for its actions. The paper seeks to detail examples of its investigations and to consider the criticisms made of UCLAF by the European Court of Auditors and the Committee of Independent Experts which had been established to investigate allegations of fraud, nepotism and mismanagement within the European Commission. It will also seek to draw lessons from the UCLAF experience for the future fight against EU fraud.

The paper used a combination of semi‐structured interviews with EU and national officials in the UK and Ireland as well as a review of secondary materials such as organisational reports and academic sources.

The paper found that the fight against fraud was fatally undermined by the high degree of fragmentation due to the multiplicity of national and EU agencies involved. There were some self‐inflicted weaknesses on the part of UCLAF such as poor use of intelligence databases and the employment of a high number of staff on temporary contracts which led to high‐staff turnover and disrupted the investigative process.

The paper reveals how not to fight against transnational fraud. Lessons need to be learned from the UCLAF experience, so that the same mistakes are not made again.

The paper is an addition to a body of work which is not particularly extensive. It strives to offer some lessons for the future fight against fraud.

To examine the enabling legislation of European Union (EU) member country supreme audit institutions (SAIs) for their accountability to parliament and independence from the executive arm of government.

The sample comprises the SAIs of the 25 EU member countries and the European Court of Auditors. Data were collected on 30 accountability and independence issues directly from the enabling legislation of these SAIs.

Results indicate that apart from a number of instances where the enabling legislation is silent, provisions generally provide for adequate independence of the SAIs from the executive arm of government. On the other hand, the provisions for the accountability of the SAIs to parliament are somewhat weaker.

If actual practice or convention does not reflect the literal interpretation and application of the enabling legislation, then SAIs may have more or less independence and/or accountability than suggested by the analysis of the legislation alone.

Results of this study highlight where current provisions could be further strengthened through appropriate amendments to the enabling legislation.

Such findings may be useful to policy makers and legislators.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the role of the European Anti‐Fraud Office, OLAF, in the fight against EU fraud and to consider the difficulties and problems it has to contend with in attempting to carry out its mission.

The approach adopted was to carry out a number of semi‐structured interviews with relevant officials and to review secondary materials such as reports by the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and OLAF itself.

The paper finds a high degree of both organisational and legal fragmentation as well as difficulties caused by the personnel policies of the European Commission leading to a significant staff turnover often in the midst of complex investigations.

It provides an insight into the difficulties faced by OLAF such as the degree of fragmentation with a multiplicity of agencies involved in the fight against fraud and is a contribution to an area, which does not contain a great amount of academic literature.

This paper explores how public audit institutions establish themselves as distinct actors on the public stage through communication practices. By focussing on the journey of the European Court of Auditors (ECA), this paper addresses the following research question: how does a transnational audit institution construct its actorhood through visual communication practices?

Using the theoretical framework of actorhood theory and inspired by the visual accounting methodology, this study explores the ECA actorhood journey through the visual analysis of front pages of its official journal (ECA Journal) from its inception in 2009 up to 2019. The visual analysis is conducted through content analysis and a two-step cluster analysis.

By showing how combinations of different visual artefacts have evolved over time, this study highlights the ways transnational public audit institutions, such as the ECA, construct their actorhood and position themselves on the public stage. It further reveals the underlying legitimacy mechanisms through which organisations such as the ECA position themselves in the public eye.

This study sheds light on the depiction of individuals and their contexts in interaction with each other and how this interaction reveals the development of the actorhood journey of the ECA over time.

In just a short half century, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a paradigm of supranational, continent-based, integrated single economy with its micro- and macroeconomic parameters. The process began soon after World War II. The initial steps, which started with the Benelux Customs Union and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of France and Germany in 1951, soon progressed to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (see Chapter 1). A unique framework of Free Trade Area (FTA) came into existence. Its success called for the Single Europe Act (SEA) in 1986, followed by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, whereby a select group of sovereign nation state economies on one common geography volunteered to become one single economy. The Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Nice followed. The EU-25 as of 2004, on to the EU-27 as of 2007, became an epochal event.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the real reasons behind the widely accepted view that the European Anti‐Fraud Office (OLAF) is not performing to its full potential.

The approach takes the form of consideration of the main points of the regulatory framework and analysis of lacunae in the current and proposed framework.

The paper attributes ineffectiveness, in part, to the conflicting and vague regulatory framework within which OLAF is requested to operate.

The paper provides a list and an analysis of the main lacunae in OLAF's regulatory framework, an operation which has been neglected in the academic literature.