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This paper reports the results of an experimental study examining the joint effect of two group characteristics, responsibility and cohesiveness, on escalation of commitment in an ongoing unsuccessful project. Two levels (high/low) of group responsibility and group cohesiveness were manipulated to examine their effects on group escalation decisions. Forty-eight 3-member decision groups were formed and randomly assigned to four treatment cells with 12 groups in each cell. The results of a 2×2 ANOVA reveal a significant main effect of responsibility on escalation of commitment, as well as a significant interaction of responsibility and cohesiveness. Specifically, groups with both high responsibility and high cohesiveness committed the largest amount of resources to an ongoing unsuccessful project. These results provide support for the proposition that group responsibility and cohesiveness exert significant joint effects on group escalation of commitment in an ongoing unsuccessful project. The findings suggest that periodic changes of group membership to shift responsibility and cohesiveness may generate new attitudes and views to reduce group escalation of commitment.

This chapter addresses the criticisms that escalation of commitment research has focused only on individual (as opposed to team or group) decision-making. It has been suggested that research findings of individual-based decision on managers’ escalation behaviors may not be applicable in today’s business environment which is increasingly dominated by team or group-based decision. Specifically, this chapter examines the effects of information availability (public vs. private information) and type of responsibility (sole and joint responsibility) on managers’ project evaluation decisions. A laboratory experiment was conducted to test the hypotheses developed for this study. The results indicate that, consistent with prior research, project managers exhibited a greater tendency to continue a failing project under private information than public information conditions. In addition, in the private information condition, project managers with joint responsibility for an investment project expressed a greater tendency to continue a failing project than those with sole responsibility. Implications of our results for the design of management control systems are discussed.

How do organizations respond to negative feedback regarding their innovation activities? In this chapter, the authors reconcile contradictory predictions stemming from behavioral learning and from the escalation of commitment (EoC) perspectives regarding persistence under negative performance feedback. The authors core argument suggests that the seemingly contradictory psychological processes indicated by these two perspectives occur simultaneously in decision makers but that the design of organizational roles and reward systems affects their prevalence in decision-making tasks. Specifically, the authors argue that for decision makers responsible for an individual project, responses given to negative performance feedback regarding a project are dominated by self-justification and loss-avoidance mechanisms predicted by the EoC literature, while for decision makers responsible for a portfolio of projects, responses to negative performance regarding a project are dominated by an under-sampling of poorly performing alternatives that behavioral learning theory predicts. In addition to assigning decision-making authority to different organizational roles, organizational designers shape the strength of these mechanisms through the design of reward systems and specifically by setting more or less ambiguous goals, aspiration levels, time horizons of incentives provided, and levels of failure tolerance.

In this chapter we investigate the role of family-specific factors in facilitating or constraining business exit in family firms. Family business literature seems to have an implicit bias toward continuity and persistence in the founder's business. This is explained by heavy emotional involvement and development of path-dependent core competences over generations. However, several long-lived family firms were able to successfully exit the founder's business. Exit allowed them to free significant strategic resources, which were later reinvested in exploiting novel entrepreneurial opportunities. Our aim is to investigate the process of exit from the founder's business in family firms, to explain both triggers and obstacles to decommitment and de-escalation. We address this issue through the study of the Italian Falck Group's exit from the steel industry in the 1990s, followed by successful startup of a renewable energy business. By carefully triangulating different data sources and different voices within and outside the controlling family, we develop a framework describing family-specific facilitators and inhibitors of business exit, and subsequent startup of a new business. Three types of family-specific factors emerge as relevant in shaping a family firm's likelihood and speed of exit from a failing business: family-related psychological triggers and obstacles to business exit; family-specific components of the structural de-escalation context; family responses to ensuing de-escalation and exit needs. The emerging framework offers a more nuanced interpretation of decommitment activities in family firms, pointing to the differential role family-specific factors may play as facilitators or inhibitors of business exit. We also suggest how these family-specific results may contribute to a deeper understanding of exit in nonfamily firms. Our results also have practical implications for family business entrepreneurial management. Actively managing the different determinants of exit choices that emerged from our study will set the stage for de-escalation from a failing course of action – a dynamic capability all family firms should learn and practice if they intend to transfer their entrepreneurial orientation to next generations.

Compare and contrast how the accounting, organizational behavior and other literatures analyze sunk costs. Sunk costs form a key part of the decision-making component of the management accounting literature, which generally include previously incurred and unrecoverable costs. Management accountants believe, since current or future actions cannot change sunk costs, decision makers should ignore them. Thus, ongoing fixed costs or previously incurred sunk costs, while relevant for matters of accountability such as costing, income determination, and performance evaluation are irrelevant for most short- and long-term decisions. However, the organizational behavior literature indicates that sunk costs affect decision makers’ actions – especially their emotional attachments to the related project and the asymmetry of attitudes regarding the recognizing of losses and gains. Called the “sunk cost effect” or “sunk cost fallacy,” this conflict in sunk costs’ underlying nature reflects one element of incoherence in contemporary accounting discourse. We discuss this sunk cost conflict from an accounting and a philosophical perspective to denote some ambiguities that decision usefulness and accountability introduces into accounting discourse.

Review, summarize and analyze the above literatures

Managerial accountants can apply many lessons from the various literature sources.

We also show how differing opinions on how to treat sunk costs impact a firm’s decision-making process both economically and socially.

This study aims to partially replicate and extend prior escalation of commitment (e.g., Harrell & Harrison, 1994; Harrison & Harrell, 1993). It extends prior studies by examining the impact of risk propensity on managers’ project evaluation decisions. In addition, the study examines the joint effects of private information, potential for personal gain, and risk propensity on managers’ project evaluation decisions. A laboratory experiment involving 146 subjects was conducted to test the various hypotheses developed for this study. The results are consistent with prior studies, suggesting that managers exhibit a greater tendency to continue unprofitable projects under conditions of private information and potential for personal gain. Furthermore, the results reveal that managers with high risk propensity exhibit a greater tendency to commit additional resources to unprofitable projects than those with low risk propensity. The results support the proposition that high risk propensity managers who experience conditions of private information and potential for personal gain exhibit a greater tendency to commit additional resources to unprofitable projects than low risk propensity managers who experience only one or neither of these conditions.

Scholars have begun to recognize the importance of integrating organizational issues into real options theory. In doing so, some argue that options are inappropriate for evaluating critical strategic investments. In a more in-depth analysis, we argue that the organizational form that an option takes has a profound effect on exercise decisions. When options are initially integrated, organizational elements such as routines and culture become increasingly intertwined over time, raising the cost of abandoning the option – in effect, pushing firms to exercise options. In contrast, initially isolated options become idiosyncratic and more costly to integrate over time – pushing firms to kill them. There are also reputational and social capital effects that may bias exercise decisions beyond the mere consideration of costs, leading to escalation or missed opportunities.

Accordingly, firms must first be able to manage the associated organizational costs and minimize systematic bias in exercise decisions. Real options theory is moving away from the limitations of the financial options analogy and is increasingly integrated with strategy and organization theory. This shift requires that researchers consider issues such as intermediate organizational forms, external monitoring of exercise decisions, portfolios of competing options, and group process interventions.

This article considers real options approaches through the lens of firm's resource reallocation processes. It explores some potential drivers and consequences of mismatches between initial resource allocation logics and subsequent reallocation realities, highlighting a process of rational escalation in the presence of sunk costs. It also presents a new perspective on the traditional stage-gate process, and considers some recent empirical evidence on the efficiency of resource reallocation processes in organizations.

Prior escalation research (Harrison & Harrell, 1993; Harrell & Harrison, 1994) has supported the prediction that when a project manager has private information and an incentive to shirk (i.e. To protect his/her reputation) he/she will have a greater tendency to continue an unprofitable project than a manager who faces only one or neither of these conditions. Harrison et al. (1999) extended this line of research across cultures to Chinese nationals in Taiwan. The purpose of this paper is to extend the cross-national direction of this line of research by: (1) determining if Mexican nationals who have private information and an incentive to shirk have this same general propensity to continue an unprofitable project when compared to Mexican nationals who experience neither condition, and (2) comparing this general tendency with a sample of U.S. Subjects. The results of this study indicate that the Mexican subjects in the private information, incentive to shirk group also had a tendency to continue unprofitable projects at a rate similar to their U.S. Counterparts. The implications of these results are discussed.