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We investigate the effect of distance – political, economic, cultural and spatial, on developed-economy multinational enterprises’ (MNEs’) ownership decisions in cross-border (CB) acquisitions. We start with the premise that distance discourages full and majority ownership in CB acquisitions, and further investigate the moderating role of distance-reducing factors. We examine how the relationship between distance and acquisition ownership decision is moderated by firm-specific characteristics, such as firm size, general international experience, and specific host country experience. Our data sample consists of 1,041 CB acquisitions under taken by Finnish MNEs in 58 countries during the time period 1990–2010. We find substantial support for all our hypotheses and conclude that the negative effects of distance on CB acquisition equity stake are positively moderated by the three firm-specific resources but their individual importance is conditional on the host country type (developed or emerging).

This paper addresses the interaction relationship between debt financing and ownership structure towards firms’ value in Malaysia. Two issues are addressed in this study. The study examines whether managers and controlling large shareholders pursue rent-seeking objective through excessive leverage in a firm. Second, the paper examines whether financial restraint policy is effective in enhancing corporate governance. The sample of the study covers a small economy – Malaysia where rent-seeking opportunities prevail. A total 256 manufacturing firms are examined. The hypotheses are set to examine whether rent seeking prevails in firms with high intangible asset and less competitive industries. The findings show that first, financial restraint policy is only effective when managerial equity interest is relatively low. Managers with a higher equity interest hinder the positive effects driven by financial restraint policy. Second, at a higher threshold of equity interest, the use of excessive leverage by managers leads to a lower firm value, confirming the presence of rent-seeking motive. The presence of the largest shareholder as directors also follows the same conjecture despite at a lower magnitude. Both findings could not be refuted in less competitive industries. Other findings from this paper conclude that a high industrial concentration industry increases firms’ value in this economy. Financial institutions can also exert corporate governance on firms in less competitive industries. It is, however, the agency problem mitigates the positive effects brought forth by financial rent in this emerging economy.

We examine the empirical relationship between direct equity agency costs measures and corporate governance control mechanisms to control equity agency costs. We measure the three direct agency cost proxies commonly used in the literature: the operating expense; asset turnover; and selling, general, and administrative (SGA) ratios. Internal corporate governance control mechanisms examined are inside ownership (IO), outside ownership concentration (OC), the size of the board of directors (BODs), and the composition of the BODs (proportion of nonexecutive (NE) directors and separation of chief executive officer (CEO) and board chair). The external corporate governance control mechanism examined is the size of bank debt (short-term debt). Univariate and multivariate tests reveal that the only statistically significant relationship between corporate governance control mechanisms and direct equity agency cost measures is the negative relationship between the proportion of IO and direct agency costs. The asset utilization ratio (asset turnover) ratio is the best proxy for direct equity agency costs and can be useful for event studies of announcement period excess returns.

Deregulation shifts the responsibility for mitigation of agency problems from the regulatory parties to the firms' shareholders. We investigate whether and how governance structure changes in response to the dynamics of the new business environment after the Regulatory Reform Act of 1994 for the US trucking industry. We show that deregulation increases market competition in the trucking industry. The deregulated trucking firms not only adjust internal governance structure but also alter antitakeover provisions to adapt themselves to the competitive status of business environment after deregulation.

Private equity has acquired multiple large nursing home chains within the past few years; by 2007, it owned 6 of the 10 largest chains. Despite widespread public and policy interest, evidence on the purported impact of private equity on nursing home performance is limited. In our review, we begin by briefly reviewing the organizational and environmental changes in the nursing home industry that facilitated private equity investments. We offer a conceptual framework to hypothesize the relationship between private equity ownership and nursing home performance. Finally, we offer a research agenda focused on the important parameters of nursing home performance: financial performance, and quality of care.

We examine bidder returns in Japanese mergers and find that shareholders of bidders experience a significant positive announcement return. Bidder returns are higher when firms acquire targets in the same industry, when their managers performed well before the merger, and when their managers acquire relatively large targets. Unlike non-keiretsu firms, returns to keiretsu firms are higher when they acquire firms operating in different industries. We also find that bidder returns increase with the bidder’s leverage and the bidder’s ties to financial institutions through borrowings. Our evidence is consistent with the view that managerial incentives affect firm value.

This paper empirically explores the relationship between the identity and concentration of different block holders and firm value for 89 industrial and service firms listed at the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) over the period 1998–2001. The paper examines the role of block holders (institutional investors who are not on the board of directors, the institutional investors who are on the board of directors, the ownership of the board of directors, and the financial policy of the firm, such as the capital structure) in controlling the managerial actions which leads, on average, to better firm valuation in the emerging market of Jordan. The paper employs a piecewise regression specification methodology. The results of the piecewise regression analysis indicate a positive and significant relationship between the ownership of securities above 25% by the board of directors, institutional investors on the board of directors, the institutional investors not on the board of directors and firm value. There is no significant relationship between the above-mentioned ownership and firm value for ownership below 25%. The results also indicate a significant and negative relationship between ownership by the CEO below 5% and firm value. Leverage is significantly and positively related to firm value when we relate ownership by institutional investors not on the board of directors and firm value. This might imply that creditors work as complementary monitors of value along with institutional investors who are not on the board of directors. The paper concludes that block holders are important monitors of firm value especially if they own large amounts of securities to justify the high cost of monitoring.

We examine the benefits for firms participating in collaborations funded via minority equity placements. Selling firms, on average, realize significant increases in share value – strongly correlated with the size of the equity stake, its beta, and the relatedness of the two firms (by industry). Shares of purchasing firms, though, show neutral responses on average (but positive response for R&D intensive alliances). Further, purchasing firms have better financial performance than their industry peers in the years surrounding the announcement (suggesting, unlike joint ventures, that poor performance is not their motivation). Selling firms, however, may be motivated by poor operating performance.

Many studies of control and international joint venture (IJV) performance have focused on ownership and management control. We develop a conceptual framework to explain how strategies affect the relationship between management control and joint venture performance. Specifically, we focus on serving the host-country customer and extending the life cycle of the foreign partner's products. Using a sample of Sino–U.S. and Sino–Japanese joint ventures, we found that serving the host-country customer strengthens the positive relationship between management control by the foreign partner and IJV performance. However, extending the product life cycle of the foreign partner's products weakens the positive relationship between management control by the foreign partner and IJV performance. We discuss the performance implications of dealing with both strategies and reveal a complex relationship between equity ownership, management control, and IJV performance.

This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and agency costs of family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia. It presents a longitudinal study of the 290 publicly listed companies in the Main Board of the Bursa Malaysia over the period 1999–2005.The study applies the governance mechanisms such as board size, independent director and duality as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. There is strong evidence that larger board size has a significant effect as a device in mitigating agency costs. The study supports that independent directors and duality are viewed differently by family and non-family ownership. The evidence shows that an independent director in family ownership does not influence agency costs. But non-family ownership needs more independent directors to counsel and monitor the company and thus reducing the agency conflict with shareholders. The study also finds that family ownership experiences less agency conflicts when duality role exists. Contrary, non family ownership experiences high agency costs when duality exists on board.