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Firms tend to transfer more knowledge in technology joint ventures compared to contractual technology agreements. Using insights from new institutional economics, this chapter explores to what extent the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer is sensitive to an evolving industry norm of collaboration connected to the logic of open innovation. The chapter examines 1,888 dyad-year observations on firms engaged in technology alliances in the U.S. information technology industry during 1980–1999. Using fixed effects linear models, it analyzes longitudinal changes in the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer, and how such changes vary in magnitude across bilateral versus multipartner alliances, and across computers, telecommunications equipment, software, and microelectronics subsectors. Increases in industry-level alliance activity during 1980–1999 improved the knowledge transfer performance of contractual technology agreements relative to more hierarchical equity joint ventures. This effect was concentrated in bilateral rather than multipartner alliances, and in the software and microelectronics rather than computers and telecommunications equipment subsectors. Therefore, an evolving industry norm of collaboration may sometimes make more arms-length governance of a technology alliance a credible substitute for equity ownership, which can reduce the costs of interfirm R&D. Overall, the chapter shows that the performance of material practices that constitute innovation ecosystems, such as interfirm technology alliances, may differ over time subject to prevailing institutional norms of open innovation. This finding generates novel implications for the literatures on alliances, open innovation, and innovation ecosystems.

In this chapter I would like to recall how I got started on my research on the multinational enterprise (MNE) and outline how my thinking on this important economic institution has evolved through the years.11I thank Sondra Grace of Gracefully Put for editing this manuscript.

We provide a comprehensive synthesis and extension of the real option (RO) literature on joint ventures (JVs), contributing in three main areas. First, we examine major alternative theoretical perspectives on JVs – learning, bargaining, transaction cost and agency theory – to elaborate how they complement or contradict RO predictions. Second, we compare arguments and variables used to explain different JV stages – initial RO explicitness and equity shares, JV stability, and performance consequences – and highlight research opportunities. Third, we discuss and extend research about behavioral aspects of making RO (JV) investments. Overall, we offer new predictions and suggestions for a better integration within the RO literature, and between RO and related literatures on JVs.

Many studies of control and international joint venture (IJV) performance have focused on ownership and management control. We develop a conceptual framework to explain how strategies affect the relationship between management control and joint venture performance. Specifically, we focus on serving the host-country customer and extending the life cycle of the foreign partner's products. Using a sample of Sino–U.S. and Sino–Japanese joint ventures, we found that serving the host-country customer strengthens the positive relationship between management control by the foreign partner and IJV performance. However, extending the product life cycle of the foreign partner's products weakens the positive relationship between management control by the foreign partner and IJV performance. We discuss the performance implications of dealing with both strategies and reveal a complex relationship between equity ownership, management control, and IJV performance.

This study examines the determinants of performance of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries in Japan. The study finds that a foreign parent’s size, the subsidiary’s age, and a complicated distribution system influence a subsidiary’s performance. There was little significant change in these determinants over a 20-year period. However, for subsidiaries that survived over the observation period of this study, some determinants changed. We also found that by forming joint ventures with Japanese firms, foreign firms can overcome the obstacle of distribution and circumvent the disadvantage of inexperience. Moreover, the mitigating effects of joint ventures vary, depending on the type of Japanese partner.

In tandem with the drastic increase of IJVs, the academic research regarding various issues about them has also augmented. Myriad of studies examining the antecedents and outcomes of partner/location selection, different control and safeguarding mechanisms, performance, and stability of IJVs have appeared in revered scholarly outlets. A review of the previous research on IJVs reveals that a vast amount of these studies is focused on their formation (e.g., Kogut, 1988) and the advantages of them as governance structures (e.g., Hennart, 1988).

Despite the growing interest in IJVs and their governance, systematic research is limited on the board of directors and their roles in international joint ventures in emerging markets. In this study, we draw from corporate governance research that suggests that the levels of control and collaboration by boards are influenced by organizational complexity. While joint ventures possess several similarities compared to unitary firms, they also have unique sources of complexity given the fact that two or more international partners collaborate within JVs under an incomplete contract. Based on a sample of 114 IJVs, we argue and show four separate conditions that influence the functions that boards undertake as well as how control and collaboration as two separate functions are interrelated. Our findings address calls for research to open the black box of what boards actually do as well as to bring corporate governance theory to new organizational forms such as joint ventures.

This study empirically identifies three strategies for creating shareholder value for firms who venture into Emerging markets (EMs) in search of corporate growth and profitability.

To uncover these value creating strategies, we apply Cluster analysis techniques, analysis of variance as well as survey several qualitative case-studies of firms who have entered EMs worldwide.

Our findings demonstrate how firms can – and do – tap into the potential that EMs offer, despite the inherent riskiness of these markets and/or constraints on corporate resources. Statistically, no single shareholder value creating strategy is more (or less) remunerative than other strategies. Many equally profitable trajectories coexist vis-à-vis corporate growth in EMs.

Our findings are based on stock-markets’ expectations of firm performance; these expectations may not correspond to the actual future firm performance.

The principles we have isolated have a broad appeal because they identify variety of paths that facilitate shareholder value creation via participation in EMs. We expose the inner workings of these trajectories and illustrate particular firm-specific and location-specific combinations associated with profitable EM ventures.

This study seriously challenges the conventional view that value creation is a function of singular positive influences. On the contrary, this study establishes that value creation is multi-dimensional and submits that a more refined way to augment performance is to develop an ability to combine relevant firm-specific and location-specific factors so that they can, if needed, offset the impositions of each other.

We propose that in addition to its resources and capabilities, a firm’s capital structure and financial health will act as an important determinant of its attractiveness as an alliance partner. Alliances with leveraged firms are prone to unplanned termination due to financial distress, which puts at risk the value embedded in the collaboration. As a result, ceteris paribus, highly leveraged firms will be viewed as less desirable partners in the market for interfirm collaboration when compared to low leverage firms. In support of this proposition, we find that when forming an alliance firms tend to partner with other firms with similar levels of leverage: low-leverage firms partner with other low-leverage firms while high-leverage firms partner with other high-leverage firms, as well as with lower quality ones. Furthermore, we show that alliances with highly leveraged firms are more likely to involve equity participation as a form of ex post protection, especially when they involve partners with relatively lower leverage. Finally, we show that leverage is negatively related to the intensity of alliance activity, suggesting that firms also maintain lower leverage in their capital structure in order to attract potential partners. Overall our results imply that financial policies regarding capital structure have an important role to play in alliancing activity.

A key argument in transaction cost economics (TCE) is that transactions are aligned with governance structures so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction cost economizing – match (Williamson, 1991). The archetypical problem in TCE is the vertical integration or “make-versus-buy” decision, and the focus of transaction cost economizing in this context is on mitigation of “holdup” problems associated with investments in specific assets (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985). However, this asset specificity condition in only one example (albeit a significant one) of a more general class of contractual hazards. Indeed, in his most recent discussion of the TCE agenda, Williamson (1996, p. 3) suggests that “identification, explication, and mitigation of contractual hazards – which take many forms, many of which long went unremarked – are central to the exercise.”