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Wages have been spreading out across workers over time – or in other words, the 90th/50th wage ratio has risen over time. A key question is, has the productivity distribution also spread out across worker skill levels over time? Using our calculations of productivity by skill level for the United States, we show that the distributions of both wages and productivity have spread out over time, as the right tail lengthens for both. We add Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries, showing that the wage–productivity correlation exists, such that gains in aggregate productivity, or GDP per person, have resulted in higher wages for workers at the top and bottom of the wage distribution. However, across countries, those workers in the upper-income ranks have seen their wages rise the most over time. The most likely international factor explaining these wage increases is the skill-biased technological change of the digital revolution. The new artificial intelligence (AI) revolution that has just begun seems to be having similar skill-biased effects on wages. But this current AI, called “supervised learning,” is relatively similar to past technological change. The AI of the distant future will be “unsupervised learning,” and it could eventually have an effect on the jobs of the most highly skilled.

The first Research in Labor Economics (RLE) volume was published in 1977. Its founding editor, Ronald Ehrenberg, saw the need for high quality substantive research papers in the labor/human resource area. Each volume was to contain “original contributions comparable (or exceeding) those found in leading journals.” The articles were of three genres: (1) results from ongoing or completed important research endeavors, (2) critical survey articles, and (3) symposia on policy related topics (RLE, Vol. 1, p. vii). In 1995, Solomon Polachek took over as series editor. Beginning in 2007 RLE affiliated with the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), an international network of about 1,100 labor economists spanning more than 40 countries. Konstantinos Tatsiramos became the IZA coeditor in 2008 after taking over from Olivier Bargain. Finally in 2011 RLE established an editorial board consisting of Orley C. Ashenfelter, Francine D. Blau, Richard Blundell, David Card, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Richard B. Freeman, Daniel S. Hamermesh, James J. Heckman, Alan B. Krueger, Edward P. Lazear, Christopher A. Pissarides, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. Two are Nobel Laureates and all are top labor economists.

Variable pay, defined as pay that is tied to some measure of a firm’s output, has become more important for executives of the typical American firm. Variable pay is usually touted as a way to provide incentives to managers whose interests may not be perfectly aligned with those of owners. The incentive justification for variable pay has well-known theoretical problems and also appears to be inconsistent with much of the data. Alternative explanations are considered. One that has not received much attention, but is consistent with many of the facts, is selection. Managers and industry specialists may have information about a firm’s prospects that is unavailable to outside investors. In order to induce managers to be truthful about prospects, owners may require managers to “put their money where their mouths are,” forcing them to extract some of their compensation in the form of variable pay. The selection or sorting explanation is consistent with the low elasticities of pay to output that are commonly observed, with the fact that the elasticity is higher in small and new firms, with the fact that variable pay is more prevalent in industries with very technical production technologies, and with the fact that stock and stock options are a larger proportion of total compensation for higher level employees. The explanation fits small firms and start-ups better than larger, well-established firms.

Analysis of management compensation has focused on the principal — agent problem. We address the problem confronting owners who must choose a manager without knowing the productivity of individual managers. We find performance contingent contracts may result in a separating equilibrium in which high productivity managers accept contracts low productivity managers find unacceptable.

This chapter explores a number of relatively unknown aspects of the controversy over Milton Friedman’s March 1975 visit to Chile through the analytical framework provided by James M. Buchanan’s late 1950s assessment of the economist-physician analogy. The chapter draws upon a range of archival and neglected primary sources to show that the topics which generally rear their head in any contemporary discussion of Friedman’s visit to Chile – for example, whether it is appropriate to provide policy advice to a dictator – were aired in a largely private mid-1970s exchange between Friedman and a number of professional associates. In particular, the controversy over Friedman and Chile began several months before Friedman arrived in Santiago.