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The current and widespread view in option trading is that early exercise of call options is suboptimal unless there are large dividend payments on the underlying stock (e.g., Finucane, 1997; Hull, J. C. (2008). Options, futures and other derivatives (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; Poteshman & Serbin (2003)). Our study substantially refines this view by demonstrating that U.S. tax rules governing capital gain holding periods can create incentives for early exercise under certain conditions. Hence, this study adds to the factors that investors likely consider when making option exercise decisions. We further note that recent research documents early exercises in the absence of large dividends, and refers to these option exercises as “clearly irrational.” Predictions of early exercise from our tax-based model are consistent with the observed patterns of early exercise, suggesting that the criteria for denoting an option exercise as “irrational” should be refined to incorporate capital gain holding periods.

In some contexts, this illiquidity of executive stock options is referred to as non-transferability. In others, the problem is cast in terms of the highly concentrated portfolios that managers hold, an implication of which is that managers could not trade the options to diversify. The notion of option liquidity usually conjures up images of trading pits at the Chicago Board Options Exchange or other exchanges. The existence of an active trading pit gives a powerful visual image of liquidity, but, as evidenced by the success of electronic options exchanges such as New York's International Securities Exchange and Frankfurt's EUREX, a trading pit is hardly a requirement for liquidity. The existence of a guaranteed market for standardized options as implied by options exchanges (whether pit-based or electronic) further gives a misleading appearance of high liquidity. There is also a very large market for customized over-the-counter options. It is a misconception to think that these options are not liquid when they are simply not standardized. If an investor can create a highly customized long position in an option, that investor should be able to create a highly customized short position in the same option at a later date before expiration. If both options are created through the same dealer, they will usually be treated as an offset, as they would if they were standardized options clearing through a clearinghouse. If the two transactions are not with the same dealer, they would both remain alive, but the market risks would offset. Only the credit risk, a factor we ignore in this paper, would remain. Hence, these seemingly illiquid options are, for all practical purposes, liquid.²

In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.

Executive stock option grants are intended to remove corporate governance problems by aligning the managers’ interests with those of the outside shareholders. Conventional schemes leave several problems in place. Exotic option structures can resolve these. In this paper, such structures are proposed and tested on the Dow Jones constituents over a 10-year period. These alternative schemes increase the financial rewards to the better performing managers, at no extra cost to the company whilst offering a resolution or mitigation of the identified agency problems No one scheme dominates the others and a portfolio of option types is indicated.

The current volume in the Research in Finance series features an international set of contributors. The overall theme of the volume is a timely topic capturing one of the leading issues of the year: coping with “systemic” risk.

This paper provides a fuller characterization of the analytical upper bounds for American options than has been available to date. We establish properties required of analytical upper bounds without any direct reliance on the exercise boundary. A class of generalized European claims on the same underlying asset is then proposed as upper bounds. This set contains the existing closed form bounds of Margrabe, (1978) and Chen and Yeh (2002) as special cases and allows randomization of the maturity payoff. Owing to the European nature of the bounds, across-strike arbitrage conditions on option prices seem to carry over to the bounds. Among other things, European option spreads may be viewed as ratio positions on the early exercise option. To tighten the upper bound, we propose a quasi-bound that holds as an upper bound for most situations of interest and seems to offer considerable improvement over the currently available closed form bounds. As an approximation, the discounted value of Chen and Yeh's (2002) bound holds some promise. We also discuss implications for parametric and nonparametric empirical option pricing. Sample option quotes for the European (XEO) and the American (OEX) options on the S&P 100 Index appear well behaved with respect to the upper bound properties but the bid–ask spreads are too wide to permit a synthetic short position in the early exercise option.

This exercise should make apparent to introductory accounting students the importance of internal controls both as a deterrent and as an early detector of fraud. We use the fraud triangle (PCAOB, 2010) framework to help students understand and evaluate this fraud. We believe completing this exercise will give students a better understanding of fraud in general, the fraud triangle, and internal controls and their use in preventing and detecting fraud.

This exercise presents an actual embezzlement committed by a long-tenured employee of a local not-for-profit organization. Each component of the exercise contains a series of questions to facilitate classroom discussion.

Student surveys confirm that students learn about detecting and preventing fraud. Students also indicate that they find the not-for-profit setting interesting and would use the principles in the exercise if they become affiliated with a not-for-profit organization.

To our knowledge, this is the first fraud exercise directed at educating students in introductory and survey courses in accounting where students likely have only a minimal understanding of accounting and internal controls.

Exercises are key components of assessment centers (ACs). However, little is known about the nature and determinants of AC exercise performance. The traditional exercise paradigm primarily emphasizes the need to simulate task, social, and organizational demands in AC exercises. This chapter draws on trait activation theory in proposing a new AC exercise paradigm. First, we develop a theoretical framework that addresses the complexity of situational characteristics of AC exercises as determinants of AC performance. Second, we argue for planting multiple stimuli within exercises as a structured means of eliciting candidate behavior. Third, we show how the new paradigm also has key insights for the rating part of ACs, namely, in selecting dimensions, designing behavioral checklists, screening assessors, and training assessors. Finally, the impact of this new AC exercise paradigm is anticipated on important AC outcomes such as reliability, internal/external construct-related validity, criterion-related validity, assessee perceptions, and feedback effectiveness.

This chapter, completed in 1999, provides an overview and critical analysis of the validity research agenda undertaken by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) for its assessment to certify accomplished teachers at the end of its first decade of assessment development and implementation. The review is presented in three major sections: (a) an overview of the validity criteria underlying the review; (b) a description of the National Board's research agenda presented in its own terms, focusing first on the studies that were routinely carried out for each certificate and second on the “special studies” that were not part of the routine agenda; and (c) a series of six critical observations and explanations based on the validity issues described in the first section.

To meet the needs of the professional environment sector, environmental science graduates need to be suitably equipped in terms of their knowledge, understanding, and skills. At the University of Southampton, the first-year module Environmental Science: Concepts and Communication aids students in their journey into Environmental Science by preparing them to face the challenges of university study and beyond. This module thus engages students in independent learning and provides them with opportunities to develop and enhance the skills necessary to do so. Formative and student-led activities and tasks are considered important tools to achieve this aim. This review provides an overview of selected formative and student-led activities with focus on methods and approaches, values and benefits, and the practicalities of delivery. Three assessments are reviewed: a practice essay, a communication exercise, and a practice presentation. The intended benefits and value of these assessments are (1) engagement with environmental issues and topics and (2) development and enhancement of study skills. The value of such work is only realized, however, with student engagement. Delivering this module has demonstrated that formative elements are most effective when orientated to tutor group activities. Motivation for engagement appears most effective when the visibility – or absence – of students’ work is brought to the foreground through working in small groups. There is added value in that the collation and sharing of feedback within a small group permits students to learn not only from their own work but also from their peers.