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The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic literature review on Shariah governance and Islamic banks.

The literature was searched from Scopus and Web of Science using various queries related to Shariah governance and Islamic banks. Through a screening process, 93 articles were considered fit for the systematic literature review.

The paper provides a systematic review based on different themes, including measurement of Shariah governance in Islamic banks, disclosure of Shariah governance and its determinants, the impact of Shariah governance on performance, risk management and other outcomes of Islamic banks. Finally, issues and challenges of Shariah governance in Islamic banks are discussed, followed by conclusions and recommendations related to future research.

This study is the first of its kind, to the authors’ knowledge, to provide a comprehensive systematic literature on Shariah governance and Islamic banks by exploring different themes and highlighting multiple future avenues of research.

Literature on the board diversity of Islamic banks (IB) found limited knowledge of the “deep-level” attribute. This study aims to explain the impact of the board diversity attributes (education levels, educational backgrounds and the interactions between these two attributes of diversity) on profitability.

The research sample is 37 fully flagged IBs from five Southeast Asian countries, covering nine years (2010–2019). Data were analyzed using the two-step system generalized moment (2SYS-GMM) method.

We found that the cognitive conflict between the board of directors (BOD) and the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB), which has heterogeneity in its education level and educational background, positively affects profitability. These results reinforce the resources dependence theory (RDT) approach that having boards with heterogeneous characteristics is beneficial for IB.

The findings of this study would offer useful information for Islamic banking authorities to revise or formulate rules and guidelines and make a greater effort to implement corporate governance (CG) reform measures by determining educational level and background as a requirement to become a member of a BOD or an SSB.

This paper contributes in three ways: (1) we use the “deep-level” diversity attributes of the BOD and the SSB, (2) it focuses on cognitive conflict in boards by presenting the expertise diversity of the BOD and SSB and (3) we interact with the level of education to evaluate the effect of a cognitive conflict.

Intellectual capital (IC) is a paramount resource for competitiveness in the knowledge-based financial sectors of the economy. As financial technology advances, specifically in the banking industry, it is vital to understand the effect of IC on financial performance. This study aims to investigate the effect of IC on return on equity (ROE), with a unique emphasis on the moderating role of board attributes. Previous studies have overlooked this moderating role.

The study sample consists of 17 banks and a panel data set spanning 2016–2021, extracted from annual reports. Antel Pulic’s value-added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) model is used to compute IC. To analyze the data, a generalized least squares analysis is conducted. The robustness of the analysis is ensured by using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) econometric technique.

The findings indicate that both the VAIC and human capital efficiency (HCE) have a significant impact on the ROE of banks. In terms of moderation, it is observed that board size (BS) exerts a negative effect on the association between VAIC, HCE, structural capital efficiency and ROE. Additionally, BS positively compounds the connection between capital employed efficiency and ROE. Similarly, the presence of independent directors (IND) significantly moderates the effects of VAIC and its components on the ROE of banks in Pakistan.

Banks should focus on the HCE for a higher ROE. Moreover, banks ought to prioritize appointing more independent directors in the boardroom for effective utilization of IC and greater ROE.

The findings of the study, which analyzed data from Pakistan’s banking sector, are original and provide additional insights into the literature on IC and board attributes.

This article aims to answer two research questions that remain controversial in the accounting and corporate governance literature: (1) how corporate disclosure is related to board monitoring and (2) how this link is affected by the institutional environment and firm-level governance.

The study is based on S&P data on corporate disclosure by Russian companies collected over 2002–2010 and supplemented by information from the SKRIN database. The dataset covers 125 non-financial companies, with 559 observations in total. We use three indicators of board monitoring: the percentage of non-executive directors, a dummy for two-tier boards, and a dummy for an audit committee. The firm’s governance is proxied by a dummy for single class stock, while the institutional environment is proxied by a dummy for ADRs/GDRs. We apply conventional methods of panel data analysis with several robustness checks, including the random- and fixed-effects models, 2SLS that addresses the potential endogeneity of board composition, alternative definitions of the dependent variable, and an extended list of controls.

We find a positive (complementary) relationship between the amount of disclosure and the proxies for board monitoring employed. This complementary relationship turns out to be the strongest among companies that have better internal governance but face a weaker institutional environment. There is little evidence of such complementarity under strong institutions.

The findings may be of interest to investors and policymakers. As to the former, the results warn of firms that provide limited disclosure in the presence of strong corporate governance arrangements, such as independent boards, as these factors are not substitutes for each other. As to the latter, the results support comprehensive policies aimed at simultaneous improvements in both board governance and corporate disclosure in weak institutional settings.

This paper uses a unique setting and rich, partly proprietary data to extend the existing literature on the relationship between corporate disclosure and board monitoring, with an emphasis on the moderating role of the institutional environment and firm-level governance. It is also one of the very few studies of corporate disclosure in Russia, an important emerging economy of the early 2000s.

This study examines the association between internal corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board of directors and audit committee) and the information value of bank earnings. The authors comparatively assess this association across different bank types, Islamic versus conventional banks. The authors also investigate the mediating effect of Shariah governance.

The authors utilize a unique and an international sample of 723 bank-year observations representing 100 listed banks from 16 countries during the period 2007–2015. The authors investigate the characteristics of the board of directors and audit committee (i.e. size and independence) and employ three core analyses for earnings informativeness (i.e. earnings persistence, cash flow predictability and reliability of loan loss provisions). Additional analyses address Shariah supervisory boards’ (SSBs’) size, financial expertise and multiple outside directorships. The authors use the random-effect Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimation technique and provide several robustness checks and sensitivities.

The authors find that, on average, having large and independent boards (and audit committees) increases the informativeness of reported earnings for banks. Conditional on bank type, our results report strong evidence for differential effects across the two alternative banking systems. In Islamic banks, large and independent board of directors (and audit committees) is positively associated with all measures of information value. There is insignificant evidence for conventional banks. However, SSBs show no significant effect on the reported earnings’ informativeness.

This is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, that empirically and comparatively assesses the information value of reported earnings in association with effective internal governance while recognizing the institutional characteristics of different bank types. The authors offer new insights to policymakers, investors and other stakeholders located within countries operating on a dual banking system. The results could help regulators to improve their rules/guidance related to double-layer governance and financial reporting quality.

The objective of this paper is to study the impact of political connection and governance on credit rating and whether there is a substitution or complementary relationship between them.

In order to achieve the objective, a succession of eight ordered probit regressions has been carried out. Moderating variables between the political connection and governance characteristics were introduced. The whole population is taken as a sample, i.e., 27 Tunisian companies that are evaluated by FITSH NORTH AFRICA agencies over a period of 10 years (2009–2018).

The outcomes are mixed. They show that the political connection does not always influence credit rating; the size and board independence always improves credit rating; the duality between the functions affects credit rating; whereas the majorities’ proportion does not influence credit rating; and a substitution between the political connection and the governance characteristics is validated.

Like any other research, our results are factors of our measures and variable choice and depends heavily on the how these variables were conceived. Also, although our number of observations responds to the statistical result generalization requirements, our sample remains relatively narrow with 27 companies only.

In practice, the research will allow investors to have a better vision upon the future of their investments based on whether to develop their governance system or promote political networking. It will also prompt lenders to look beyond ratings and consider factors such as political connections to make a rational judgment on their future placements.

This study leads us to find various solutions: the establishment of credit agencies that take into consideration all the data of all the operators taken as a whole (bank, leasing company, and factoring). It encourages the reorganization of the Tunisian banking sector through mergers for example.

This study is a pioneer in the credit rating field in Tunisia, where the source of debt financing is the most used by all enterprises across all sectors. This study extends the literature of political connection effectiveness, independent directors, board size, in improving corporate performance and credit rating.

The study aims to estimate the impact of the vigilant board independence (BIND) dimension that potentially neutralises the unfair influence of chief executive officer duality (CEODU) on Indian public banks' performance.

The study takes into account the fixed-effects model to investigate the potential moderating effect of BIND in the relationship between CEODU and Indian bank performance. The econometric model is also robust against heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and cross-section dependence issues to ensure that the model is free from such biases. The study also addresses the major issue of endogeneity via vector autoregression and performs the analysis by considering one period lag of the explanatory variables.

The findings demonstrate that CEODU does not always lead to a negative outcome on the performance until or unless the board is monitored by the effective presence of outside directors.

The regulatory bodies consider the results to strengthen board capital where CEODU can benefit a business entity if vigilance BIND is present at or above a threshold point.

The study evaluated an under-researched role of BIND as a moderator that undermines the negative influence of CEODU on the performance of Indian banks. The study also establishes that the CEO's contribution to performance increases when the number of outside directors is at or above a certain threshold.

The role played by corporate governance mechanisms on corporate deleveraging policies has not been clarified. Empirical evidence is confined to developed economies, even with conflicting and inconclusive results. This paper aims to examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure, board composition and CEO dominance, in explaining corporate deleveraging policies.

Using a sample of listed Pakistani firms between 2010 and 2022, this study resorts to binary response models to examine the effects of governance mechanisms on firms’ decision to go debt-free.

A greater ownership concentration, institutional ownership and family ownership increase the propensity for zero leverage. Board gender diversity decreases the propensity for deleveraging policies, which seems to indicate that the presence of females reinforces the monitoring function of the board. Finally, lower managerial ownership or CEO dominance decreases the propensity toward zero leverage (interest convergence hypothesis), but higher managerial ownership or CEO dominance increases the propensity toward zero leverage (managerial entrenchment hypothesis).

Risk-averse managers who prefer to control a firm using little or no debt will find it easier to implement these financing policies in firms with greater ownership concentration and where institutional holders have a substantial stake. For shareholders, this study suggests that investing in firms with females on board reduces the risk of corporate deleveraging policies being adopted for entrenched reasons.

The presence of females on board seems to decrease the propensity of managers to adopt opportunistic actions and may also contribute to enhancing human welfare and society in developing countries.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study considering the effect of board diversity on zero leverage. Another singularity is that this study exhibits a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and corporate deleveraging policy.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the synergy of corporate governance (CG) with intellectual capital (IC) and to assess the moderating effect of profitability indicator on the aforementioned synergy using agency theory, resource-based view theory and theory of financial ratios as conceptual frameworks.

The sample includes 72 companies with a six-year data set drawn from the KSE 100 Index companies of Pakistan. In addition, the study adopts Pulic’s model to compute the efficiency of IC. The research uses fixed-effect panel regression for analysis and two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) to address endogeneity issues in the estimation process.

The results showcased that chief executive officer duality possesses negligible impact on IC efficiency (ICE), while independent directors, audit committees and board size tend to attain a strong association with IC. Moreover, it postulates that the moderation of return on equity strengthens the path between all governance components and ICE significantly.

The research uses a 2SLS regression analysis to explore how CG practices take hold on the effectiveness of IC in Pakistan while taking into account the moderating impact of profitability. The findings add to the body of knowledge on the value that strong governance practices have on businesses and society.

The purpose of this study is to examine the association between the combined roles of chief executive officer (CEO)-chairman titles (CEO duality) and investment efficiency, defined as a lower deviation from expected investment for targeted S-curve firms used to propel an innovation-driven economy. This study also aims to investigate the moderating effect of financial reporting quality on this association.

This paper focuses on the ten targeted S-curve industries – under the definition of the Thailand 4.0 model – listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) from 2000 to 2019. Data related to CEO/chairman titles and investment supports were manually collected from the annual reports, the SET market analysis and reporting tool database and the company websites. Financial data used to estimate investment behaviors and discretionary accruals were extracted from 1999. The study analyzes unbalanced panel data using fixed-effects regressions. Additional tests embrace replacing the sample with nontargeted firms, partitioning into granted and nongranted firms, adding CEOs’ demographic moderators, using alternative variable measures and analyzing for lagged independent variables.

The main findings show that CEO duality reduces overinvestment but worsens underinvestment in targeted firms. Financial reporting quality (FRQ) appears to strengthen CEO duality in mitigating extreme spending but has no impact on the association between CEO duality and underinvestment. Additional results, for example, conclude that CEO duality has no association with both over- and underinvesting at nontargeted firms, but its effect becomes positively significant on overinvestment when financial reporting quality is high. The negative association between CEO duality and overinvestment is found only in government-granted and targeted firms. FRQ encourages CEO duality in lowering overinvestment among targeted firms without grants. CEOs’ female and serviced early years appear to elevate those main findings.

These findings assist innovative corporations in choosing a proper leadership structure to cope with investment inefficiency. The research gives the government and regulatory bodies an insight into the qualifications of the leadership structure and financial information that helps them put forward effective policies.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to establish the association between CEO duality and investment efficiency for innovation-driven firms in a transforming economy. The study fills the gap in the literature on management, accounting and finance by unveiling the interplay between dual leadership and financial reporting in affecting the efficiency of investments.