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The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of regulators’ independence, with a special focus on the competition authorities’ independence. The aim of the paper is to present a broader view of the competition authorities’ independence, by specifically questioning the Western Balkans’ competition authorities’ independence.

In the context discussed, the politicization of competition authorities does commonly result in decisions with uncompetitive nature, whose interference in the functioning of the market economy is fundamental. In that line, this paper discusses and argues in favour of non‐politicized competition authorities’ membership, whose structure should be determined by the law. Therefore, this paper goes on to argue that, when the competition laws determine the appointment of competition authorities’ members biased by and conditional on political factors, it is likely that the competition in the market will be crucially harmed, meanwhile the market mechanism would be insufficient in performance.

The paper finds that the competition policy's independence can be assured through a competition authority whose membership is freed from political appointments, and whose membership represents a plural environment of interests.

The paper limits itself to the organizational bases that precondition the competition authorities’ independence.

The paper provides/contributes for a new concept on competition authorities’ independence, and clarifies the limited role that the government can have in this regard. The paper can serve as a source of academic knowledge to both academicians and practitioners whose field of interest is market regulation.