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This study aims to analyze the effect of cognitive load and social value orientation on managers’ preferences when they face with two types of restructuring choices in financially distressed firms: the first belonging to the family of organizational restructuring (massive layoffs) and the second to the family of financial restructuring (debt increases).

The authors investigate experimentally the impact of managers’ cognitive load and social value orientation on the decision to restructure leveraged buyout (LBO) firms in financial distress by using either massive layoffs or debt increases.

By investigating the impact of managers’ cognitive load and social value orientation on the restructuring decision of an LBO firm in financial distress, the research reveals that, on average, cognitively loaded managers prefer massive layoffs over increased debt levels. The massive layoffs seemingly provide a relatively easier way to avoid conflict with influential, residual claimants. In contrast, social value–oriented managers actively avoid massive layoffs and prefer to increase debt.

These results imply that the performance mechanisms emphasized to improve agency relations, for example, in LBOs, have their own limitations during periods of financial distress. This study shows that one of these limits is related to cognitive distortions and personality traits.

In this research, the originality lies in understanding how managers’ internal factors affect their restructuring decision-making, in the case of LBO firms in financial distress.

The unsustainable public debt of most African economies adversely affects their economic growth and stability. This study aims to explore the influence of cross-country indicators of governance from African countries on public debt accumulation.

The study deployed a quantitative research design technique. Secondary data was used in this study. The frequency of the data is annual, and it is available from 1996 to 2022 for 48 countries in Africa. The study deployed the system generalized method of moments for the estimation.

The study finds that countries with high regulatory quality standards, control corruption and ensure effective governance accumulate less government debt while countries that abide by the rule of law instead accumulate more government debt. The study also finds that economic growth and government revenue reduce government gross debt while government expenditure and investments increase public debt.

Due to data unavailability, other factors which are likely to influence government debt accumulation were not included in the study as control variables. This is the limitation of the study.

African governments should strive to maintain high regulatory quality standards through the formulation and implementation of sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, and ensure quality and accountability of public and civil services. Governments are also urged to control corruption and enact good laws so that the enforcement of these laws will not worsen the risk of becoming debt-distressed.

Recent studies on governance and public debt were focused on the Arabian Gulf countries, countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and a combination of high and low-income countries. This study scrutinizes exclusively the effects of the quality of governance indicators on public debt accumulation, in the context of Africa.

This study aims to explore how earnings management techniques are affected by corporate financial debt risk (FDR), internal control (IC) effectiveness and CEO education.

The study uses a sample from listed firms in China from 2010 to 2017, comprising different industries, including agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fishing; mining; manufacturing; electric power, gas and water production and supply; construction; transport and storage; information technology; the real estate industry; social services; and communication and cultural. The regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses. The two-stage least squares technique is used to check for endogeneity issues.

The study finds that firms are less likely to manage real earnings when they have more robust IC and FDR. Likewise, companies with weak ICs are more likely to manipulate real earnings. Besides, the study finds an influence of CEO education on the relationship between IC, FDR and real earnings management (REM). These results can be applied to the sectors in the sample covered by the research, and the authors do not overlook the energy industry sector for the importance of its role in the economy.

There are some limitations for the researcher when performing any research, and this study is no exception. Researchers are urged to take these circumstances into consideration when generalizing or comparing the results because the methods used to calculate the measurement variables in each study may differ somewhat from those used in other research. In addition, expanding the current research design to incorporate additional nations may be an area of interest for future research and could aid in evaluating the effects of nation-specific elements (such as inflation, culture, legal systems and political considerations) on the usefulness of IC and decreasing FDR. Second, the current study focuses on the impact of IC and FDR on REM; this paper does not dissect the “black box” of IC and consider how each element affects earnings management. Future research may need to focus specifically on how effective IC would affect earnings management and precisely what IC mechanisms would discourage the management of earnings.

Helping companies listed in China to make decisions and improve investors’ vision of the results of real companies’ businesses, as well as helping management to avoid falling into debt risk and the consequent effects and manipulation of earnings.

By highlighting the significance of IC and debt risk in enhancing information quality in China, the results contribute to the body of work examining the relationship between IC, FDR and REM. In addition, this study uses a CEO’s education to moderate this link.

This paper aims to examine whether firms engage in earnings management immediately after experiencing a downgrade in their credit rating.

This paper uses fixed-effects regression models to examine real- and accrual-based earnings management after firms experience a downgrade in their credit rating.

Inconsistent with prior studies where firms are reported to opportunistically increase their earnings prior to a credit rating event, this paper finds that firms use income-decreasing earnings management after their ratings are downgraded. This paper also finds that firms downgraded to below the investment grade rating not only significantly reduce both abnormal cash flows and discretionary accruals but also report larger asset impairments, suggesting that these firms exploit the rating downgrade to employ a big bath accounting.

The results of this paper have practical implications for investors fixating on firm earnings after a credit rating downgrade, for shareholders of downgraded firms and regulators such as credit rating agencies.

The findings of this study contribute to the thin literature on earnings management after changes in credit rating by shedding lights on earnings management after a rating downgrade and complement the literature on the accounting choice of financially distressed firms. The empirical evidence documented in this study suggests that the occurrence of income-decreasing earnings management is not limited to only after a sovereign country rating downgrade as documented in a prior study but also occurs after a rating downgrade not associated with this event.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage of the firms they manage, with the aim to examine whether CEO incentives play a role in corporate risk-taking.

The authors investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (CIDH) (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage (DOL) of the firms they manage. Using a sample of 11,145 US firm-year observations over the period 2006–2017, the authors find a strong negative association between CIDH and DOL. Additional analyses reveal that the relationship between CIDH and DOL is more pronounced in firms with heightened agency issues, powerful CEOs and for CEOs with stronger professional networks. The results are robust to various sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

The authors find strong evidence confirming the expected negative association between CEO inside debt and DOL suggesting that firms with higher inside debt tend to maintain lower levels of operating leverage. These findings continue to hold with the alternative measure for the inside debt and operating leverage, and across a range of tests designed to rule out the possibility that the primary findings are in any way driven by potential endogeneity. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the presence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts can strengthen the inside debt–DOL relationship suggesting the strong role of inside debt in reducing firm risk.

Findings in this paper have implications for design of compensation structures so that corporate boards can establish incentives as a tool for risk management. A limitation of this study is that it is focused on one market, i.e. US listed companies, so the findings may not be applicable on a global scale.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that links firm-level management of operating leverage through design of CEO inside debt incentives (two obvious choices for risk-reduction at the CEOs’ disposal include reducing financial risk through reduction of firm leverage and reducing operating risk through reduction of operating leverage). While use of firm leverage as an instrument of choice has been explored in the past, use of operating leverage to achieve risk reduction when CEO possess high inside holding, has received very little attention.

This study aims to explore the determinants of public debt in selected South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries for 19 years, from 2001 to 2019.

Using ordinary fixed and random effect models, the authors examine the role of internal and external factors in determining the composition of public debt. Furthermore, for robustness, they compare the results with two-stage least square (2SLS) regression estimates after considering the problem of endogeneity, overidentification, under-identification and weak instruments.

The findings show that among the selected macroeconomic variables, inflation, exchange rate and broad money have significant negative effects on the debt-GDP ratio. In contrast, military spending, corruption and interest rates appear to positively influence the same as per 2SLS results. From the policymaking perspective, SAARC countries should focus more on reducing military spending and make a concerted effort to augment investments in productive projects. Further, with strong fiscal consolidation and institutional quality, it is important to mitigate the frequent occurrence of corruption conundrums in emerging economies for the development of a transparent economic system.

The study is distinct from previous studies in two ways. First, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies focusing on SAARC countries in the context of public debt. Second, the study expands the existing literature on public debt by taking into account both external and internal debts to decipher the within-country and cross-country determinants of debt accumulation. More specifically, this model considers accountability and transparency in the public sector, cross-border security challenges and benefits of globalization by including explanatory variables such as corruption, military expenditure spending and capital inflows.