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This monograph identifies five essential elements for an effective policy to promote consumer interests viz. protection, information, advice, education and representation. The author explores each in considerable depth to assess the extent to which this year's Fair Trading Act will contribute to them. Her verdict is that although not as much as might be hoped will be achieved, by and large the Act is a useful measure. It should bring a higher standard to trade practices particularly in the field of selling and promotion. But it can do little to provide consumer education or representation and these the author considers to be major omissions from the present consumer scene.

The objective of this paper is to encourage compliance amongst the corporate community and to examine how statutory provisions will assist companies to implement internal control mechanisms and in managing risks, so as to achieve business efficiency.

This paper may be categorised as a general review paper that will elucidate on the efforts in integrating the corporate governance, internal control, and risk management provisions into the Companies Act 1965 (Act 125), (CA 1965) which is a principal legislation of company law in Malaysia.

With consistent compliance, companies will reap unlimited benefits that flow from efficient processes which will enhance corporate capabilities, effective management, coordination and the overall organisation's ability to create value and ultimately, in maximising its shareholders' wealth.

The paper shows that corporate risks could be managed and internal control could be achieved by companies through compliance with a legal framework that reinforces good governance and is infused with such provisions. The target audience of this paper is towards the officers of companies, corporate players as well as regulators, policy makers and legislators.

This purpose of this paper is to examine four separate though interconnected questions concerning corporations operating, in Anglo American jurisdictions.

The paper first examines the nature of the limited liability corporation as an entity dedicated to maximizing shareholder value, and how far this role is consistent with the pursuit of wider policies of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Second, it reviews the ownership arrangements of the corporation, the fiduciary duties of board directors and how this is translated into the task of maximizing shareholder value through the pursuit of profits. Third, it investigates how directors position themselves commercially in maximizing shareholder value and whether shareholders express views on how shareholder value can best be maximized. Finally conclusions are drawn on how best corporations and their directors can address the challenge of meeting shareholder value and how far this implies realignment in terms of wider societal expectations. The method of research used includes an examination of statute law governing the corporation, judge's law, regulatory law, other soft law in the context of outsider controlled capital markets. Relevant published research material is also declared in the bibliography.

Conclusions drawn suggest that the premise of maximization of shareholder value may very well entail the pursuit by directors of wider social and economic objectives consistent with CSR, if this is consistent with the enhancement of shareholder value. They also point to a lack of clarity on the question of what is expected of directors in meeting their fiduciary and broader director's duties as expressed in the objective of maximizing shareholder value. Evidence suggests that there is little effective communication between shareholders and directors on how best shareholder value can be maximized. Specifically the analysis focuses on how best to overhaul the mechanisms of governance and accountability if directors and the shareholders they represent are to develop and execute rational commercial policies aimed at maximizing shareholder value.

The paper breaks new ground in linking CSR to the enhancement of shareholder value and in suggesting that directors may be negligent in their duty to promote shareholder value if they fail do so. The paper should be of interest to company directors, company legal advisors; other corporate lawyers involved in litigation against directors, and policy makers in government.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Agency Theory in order to understand the true nature of the corporation by determining the respective roles of shareholders and directors/managers within a corporation.

The paper compares the economists' depiction of the firm with the legal conception of the corporation. It then analyses the legal concept of ownership and proves that the shareholders are the owners of their shares only and not of the corporation which is a separate legal person. The theories of corporation and relevant case law are also analysed.

The analysis reveals that currently there are two distinct models of the corporation. The economists view a firm in terms of a nexus of contracts like a partnership where shareholders are the owners of the firm and the directors/managers are their agents. The law, on the other hand, regards the corporation as a separate legal entity with rights and liabilities of a natural person that is not subject to ownership. This doctrine of legal personality is the grund norm of corporate law from which other principles like limited liability, perpetual succession, transferability of shares and independent board are derived. However, both economic and legal models converge upon the purpose of corporation i.e. maximization of shareholders value.

The paper highlights the distinction between economic and legal models of the firm. It points out that from a legal perspective, neither the shareholders are the principals nor the managers are their agents as proposed by the Agency Theory. The economists assume conflict of interests between the shareholders and directors and devise mechanisms to reduce agency costs. Law, on the other hand, determines manifestly the rights and liabilities of each participant in corporate structure. The directors owe their duties to the corporation and manage it without interference from the shareholders. Such arrangement is a product of historical process and qualifies a corporation as a sui generis form of business organization.

Following a seven year period in which there were two general elections, three Companies Bills and various amendments, together with much debate, the Companies Act 1980 finally received the Royal Assent on 1 May 1980. One of the principal reasons for this Act is that it forms the first stage towards the harmonisation of UK company law with that of other member countries of the European Economic Community. In addition to the implementation of the EEC Second Directive on Company Law (Parts I, II and III of the Act), the Act also contains some other quite significant and important changes in UK company law dealing with the conduct of directors (Part IV of the Act) and insider dealing (Part V of the Act). (See Box A).

This paper aim to examine the implication of section 172(1)(b) on employment rights, particularly on workers on precarious employment contracts. The aim of the paper is to analyse whether company directors have any liability for potential abuse of worker on precarious employment contracts. The paper examine the advantage of companies recruiting staff on precarious employment contracts and the effect of such contract on the worker.

The paper reviews case law, statutory provisions and academic opinions on precarious employment contracts and its advantages and disadvantages to the company and the worker. The paper critically reviews the impact of Section 172(1)(b) of the Companies Act 2006 on precarious employment contract workers.

The paper argues that companies benefit more from precarious employment contracts than workers do. The Companies Act 2006 is silent on whether directors should factor the interest of precarious employment worker when making company decision, thereby leaving these workers in a vulnerable position and at the mercy of the employers.

The paper offers a different argument about why the use of precarious employment contracts is on the rise in the UK. It highlights the silence of the Companies Act 2006 as a driver for the increase in the use of precarious employment contracts in the UK.

As there is inclusive evidence on relationship between board characteristics and firm performance in the Thai context, and mixed findings of this relationship are usually reported from previous studies, this study tries to clarify a reason for the mixed finding by determining the impact of board structures on different quantile levels of firm performance. Building on extant literature and using a developed econometric technique, the Quantile Analysis, on a sample of 446 listed firms in Thailand for a 15-year period ranging from 2000 to 2014, empirical evidence is provided which is consistent with prior studies that some characteristics of the board as the core mechanisms of corporate governance, i.e., board independence, board size, board meeting frequency, and dual role leadership on board, have significant influence on performance of Thai firms. In particular, when considering different quantile levels of firm performance, board structures are found to have different effects across quantile of performance distribution. Board independence and dual role leadership on board are found to have a significant influence on only moderate-performing firms, while board size and board meeting frequency are revealed as having significant impact on only firms with high-performance which need more effectiveness of the board in overseeing and supervising decision-making of the executives. Thus, these findings indicate that considering different quantile levels of firm performance for the board structures and performance relationship should be a reason of previous mixed findings. Moreover, the findings should be important information in encouraging better understanding an optimal governance system in Thailand for related stakeholders such as policymakers, corporate firms, and investors.

Improved creditor and community protection seemed attainable goals when Professor Daniel Prentice described s. 214 of the Insolvency Act (‘s. 214’) as ‘one of the most important developments in company law this century’. The profession and academics perceived that wrongful trading in its legislative form had a bright future because it promised to provide much needed protection. ‘Wrongful trading’ was introduced to minimise the abuse of limited liability by company officers. An honest director could not be liable for a company's debt despite reckless, unreasonable and cavalier business practices. Insolvency practitioners were having difficulty establishing dishonesty under the fraudulent trading provisions. The courts demanded a strict standard of proof for fraudulent trading and many cases never made it to court despite a prospect of recovery against directors. Wrongful trading by comparison is a recent development that, in theory, refines the standard of a director's duty and clarifies that conduct need not be fraudulent, illegal or unconscionable to attract legislative censure. Section 214 measures a director's conduct against a minimum standard of commercial morality and competence.

Considers the nature of the modern corporate structure and the divorce of ownership from control. Discusses the board’s role versus the management’s role. Looks at hiring and appointing. Covers specific responsibilities of corporate executives and compares this with the role of corporate officers. Addresses the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Provides some guidelines for performance of duties by boards and officers. Suggests some initiatives which can build the effectiveness of the board of directors.