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We examine what changes, if any, firms are making to their capital structure around the time they cross-list because both of these affect a firm’s corporate governance. Cross-listing requires firms to follow SEC rules and regulations, which helps improve the firm governance. A firm’s capital structure, specifically the use of debt, is an effective way to mitigate the conflict between managers and shareholders by reducing the cash available to managers. We examine whether these governance mechanisms are complimentary or being used as substitutes by cross-listing firms.

We compare the capital structures of Level II and Level III cross-listing firms from both civil law and common law countries in the three years before and the three years after cross-listing.

We show firms are significantly reducing their debt to equity ratio after the cross-listing. This reduction is shown for both Level II and Level III firms; however, it is primarily seen in civil law countries.

The corporate governance improvement firms recognize by cross-listing is partially offset by the reduced use of debt after the cross-listing. These governance characteristics may be especially relevant for shareholders in Level III cross-listings because those firms are actually raising addition cash.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Purpose – The chapter seeks to contribute to the discourse concerning the United Nations Security Council's role in strengthening a rules-based international system and maintaining international peace and security under the rule of law. Its particular purpose is to examine the Security Council's Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime (1267 regime) from a rule of law and due process perspective.

Methodology – To this end, the chapter reviews the 1267 regime's controversial listing and de-listing procedure and identifies shortcomings in relation to traditional due process guarantees. It then discusses reform options available to the Security Council as far as forms and modalities of an effective review mechanism are concerned.

Findings – The chapter has two main findings. First, it concludes that the ‘individualisation’ of Security Council sanctions in terms of targeting individuals directly has not been accompanied by the creation of a means for the new targets to appeal the measures imposed on them. Second, it finds that a lack of political will has so far prevented comprehensive reform of the 1267 regime but that such reform is becoming increasingly urgent. The chapter suggests that reform initiatives need to address the value, effectiveness and sustainability of the 1267 regime more broadly. The Security Council, in particular, needs to consider what it is prepared to give up to maintain the 1267 regime as an effective UN sanctions regime, or whether it is prepared to give up the 1267 regime to maintain the authority it interprets to have from the UN Charter.

This chapter explores Hong Kong's future as a major public securities market. It concludes that Hong Kong has the potential to become one of the world's major – if not the number one – public securities market in the coming decades. However, there are four major factors that will affect how much this potential is realized: (1) How Hong Kong's market is treated by the Central Government in Beijing vis-a-vis its competitors in Shanghai and Shenzhen. If Hong Kong is allowed full access to the Chinese saver/investor and Chinese firms are allowed the choice of listing in Hong Kong, then Hong Kong will outcompete its Shanghai and Shenzhen rivals regardless of whether Shanghai and Shenzhen are opened for listings by foreign companies and to foreign investors. Hong Kong will thrive in an environment of no capital constraints on the renminbi. Conversely, a retention of the renminbi capital controls combined with free access of foreign firms to list on Shanghai or Shenzhen and/or restrictions on Chinese firms listing in Hong Kong would be very harmful to Hong Kong. (2) How skillful and aggressive Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd. are in making Hong Kong into a global competitor as a securities market. Hong Kong's principal competitors on a global basis are New York and London and the new electronic exchanges that have sprung up in Western countries. (3) The full force of new technologies is not inhibited in Hong Kong to protect a monopoly position of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd. (4) Hong Kong maintains its stable relationship with the US dollar, no capital controls are introduced in Hong Kong, and that Beijing continues to respect Hong Kong's information freedom as specified in the Basic Law.

Liability of foreignness (LOF) has been one of the central constructs in the field of international business and management. Over the past two decades, a significant body of theoretical and empirical research has accumulated, theorizing on the sources of these LOFs, investigating their magnitude, and prescribing approaches to mitigate these disadvantages. However, much of this research is almost exclusively related to firms expanding their products, services, and operations to other countries as part of their global expansion. The difficulties firms face in foreign product markets is just one dimension of the costs they can face in their attempts to secure resources abroad.

We expand the domain of the LOF construct to include liabilities faced by firms accessing foreign capital markets in light of the increasing integration of capital markets. We identify four sources of LOF in capital markets: regulatory costs, information costs, unfamiliarity costs, and costs arising out of cultural differences. Based on an extensive review of “home bias” in equity markets, we propose four strategies to erase the legitimacy deficits that firms encounter in foreign capital markets: bonding, signaling, adoption of business practices isomorphic with the host country, and certifications and endorsements by third parties. We also offer suggestions for operationalizing and measuring LOF in capital markets as well as several directions for advancing further research on LOF in the context of capital markets.

Purpose – This study aims at presenting an overview, development, and process of current corporate governance practices in Bangladesh.

Design/Methodology/Approach – Based on New Institutional Sociology (NIS) as a theoretical framework and by using archival data, this study highlights the roles of key institutional forces in reinforcing the existing corporate governance practices in Bangladesh.

Findings – This study notes that corporate governance practices in Bangladesh are still at infancy. While Bangladesh is trying to adopt many international corporate governance best practices for institutional legitimacy, the weak institutional enforcement regime, along with the absence of an effective check and balance, poses serious challenges to the firm-level good corporate governance practices in Bangladesh. The absence of isomorphic pressures to regulate the firms leads to many incidences of noncompliance.

Practical implications – This study takes part in the following global debate: whether corporate governance in an emerging economy is a reality or an illusion.

Originality/Value – This study seeks to contribute to the increasing literature by recognizing the interest of readers, academics, practitioners, and regulators to gain more insight and understanding of corporate governance practices in an emerging economy, such as Bangladesh.

The success of a firm is usually characterized by a constant re-thinking of its strategic model. Considerable entrepreneurial tension is involved in achieving competitive excellence, and the achievement of a right balance between the different elements that form a corporate strategy (e.g. economic perspective and social acceptability) (Coda, 1988).