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The versions of positivism that are critically assessed in Bruce Caldwell’s Beyond Positivism bear two dominant sets of implications. One is that knowledge growth is monistic in nature; the other is that science has a specific deductivist structure. Caldwell focuses mainly on the former and its critics. I argue here that the second set of implications always did, and still does, perhaps more than ever, warrant critical attention.

The received wisdom on classical accounting thought is that its early stages were methodologically vacuous, while, in its “golden” age, it espoused the methods and philosophical commitments of received-view hypothetico-deductivism but actually remained methodologically incoherent. The purpose of this paper is to argue, to the contrary, that classical accounting thought possesses a coherent constitutional structure that qualifies as a methodology and unifies it as a body of argument.

The paper draws on Cartwright’s metaphysical nomological pluralism, which holds that we should attend to the actual practices of successful inquiry and the methodologies and metaphysical presuppositions that support it.

The paper argues that accounting does achieve disciplinary success and that classical accounting thought, using the methodology of defeasible postulationism, provides the theoretical infrastructure that supports that success. The accounting domain is a world of “dappled realism”, in which theories are useful in the construction of reporting schemes and inform our understanding of the nature of the domain.

Applying metaphysical nomological pluralism rescues classical accounting thought from the charge of methodological incoherence and metaphysical naivety.

The paper justifies a place for classical accounting theorising in the endeavours of modern accounting scholarship and moves the analysis of classical accounting thought within a philosophy of science framework towards an approach with a contemporary resonance.

In a recent article, Boland attacks critics of Friedman's methodology. He writes:

Considers two main strands of literature. The first deals with the tension between the falsificationist view of how economic know‐ledge could or should be acquired, and the view that economics is a separate, deductive science. The second concerns the metaphors used in economic analysis, the main contrast being between metaphors which involve homeostasis and time reversibility, and those that involve hysteresis and time irreversibility.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the school of thought known as Critical Realism and the thinkers involved in the current revival of interest in British Idealism would benefit from interacting with each other.

The paper proceeds by critically examining central tenets in the thought of each school, and exhibit their affinities and differences.

It is found that there are central themes and concerns shared by each school of thought, and that the recognition of such commonalities might prove mutually beneficial to the relevant parties in their goal of positively transforming social reality. Furthermore, the Critical Realist worry about Idealisms “irreality” is shown to be unfounded.

The close relationship of the ideas of these two “lines of thought” has not, to our knowledge, previously been highlighted. Having done so in the paper, a useful dialogue may ensue.

Methodological pluralism in consumer research is usually confined to post‐positivist interpretive approaches. Argues, however, that a positivistic stance, radical behaviourism, can enrich epistemological debate among researchers with the recognition of radical behaviourism′s ultimate reliance on interpretation as well as science. Although radical behaviourist explanation was initially founded on Machian positivism, its account of complex social behaviours such as purchase and consumption is necessarily interpretive, inviting comparison with the hermeneutical approaches currently emerging in consumer research. Radical behaviourist interpretation attributes meaning to behaviour by identifying its environmental determinants, especially the learning history of the individual in relation to the consequences similar prior behaviour has effected. The nature of such interpretation is demonstrated for purchase and consumption responses by means of a critique of radical behaviourism as applied to complex human activity. In the process, develops and applies a framework for radical behaviourist interpretation of purchase and consumption to four operant equifinality classes of consumer behaviour: accomplishment, pleasure, accumulation and maintenance. Some epistemological implications of this framework, the behavioural perspective model (BPM) of purchase and consumption, are discussed in the context of the relativity and incommensurability of research paradigms. Finally, evaluates the interpretive approach, particularly in terms of its relevance to the nature and understanding of managerial marketing.

This essay begins with an examination of the differences between natural reality and social reality, but along lines different from those of the traditional Methodenstreit. The aim is to clarify the methodological implications of these differences, which appear essential to proper motivation of the objectives, purposes, and the very existence of social economics. The analysis pays a particular attention to identifying some procedures useful in formulating general principles and, more broadly, to achieve some robust notions notwithstanding the growing intensification, in modern society, of innovation. A main result of the research is that it permits an unambiguous distinction between the aspects that express necessity and those that can be the object of choice in the organization and development of economic and social systems, and a peculiar treatment of ethical‐ideological aspects.

Attempts to express certain views about the relationship that Robbins advocates between economics and psychology. Develops two main conclusions: first, Robbins maintains that economic theories are independent of psychological theories, even in those cases in which the economist has tried to present his economic conclusions as grounded on specific psychological theories. This procedure, however, is greatly misleading and can damage the autonomy of economics, making it dependent on the particular theories that are provided to explain human behaviour. At the same time, Robbins defends the view that economics should not be entirely deprived of certain references to psychological or subjective notions. A positivistic attitude as the one that tries to avoid this sort of concept can be the result of a behaviouristic approach to economic science, distrusted by the British economist. It can also be fostered by an empiricist and monistic view of economics, according to which only observable data can be employed as the starting point for the true development of science. His own position in methodology, more oriented towards scientific dualism and a deductivistic procedure as the main tool to elaborate theories, prevents him from considering valid only those conclusions grounded in empirical support.

This paper aims to counter the view that Marshall was an opponent of the historical school. This false account has survived and prospered because it has fitted into more general conceptions of intellectual history, held by both orthodox and heterodox economists.

Marshall's affinity with the historical school is established by examining his writings and his relationship with historical school sympathisers in the UK.

It is established that Marshall regarded his work as building on historical school insights, and he repeatedly referred positively to the ideas of the German historical school. It is argued in this paper that Marshall's opposition to the historical school was confined to its anti‐theoretical wing, principally Cunningham. In other important respects Marshall's position was compatible with German and British historicism.

In preceding literature, Marshall's affinities with the historical school have been denied, unacknowledged, or unexplored.