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The preceeding article has examined some of the motivations behind the high premiums offered shareholders of target firms in acquisitions and mergers. In essence, the acquirers appear to be looking for gains largely through enhanced efficiency of operations or by the replacement of inefficient management.

Increases in stockholder wealth around leveraged recapitalization (recap) announcements are related more to reductions in the firm's financial slack than improvements in operating efficiency. Moreover, while recaps significantly reduce the firm's workforce and asset base, they do not improve operating profitability. These results support the argument (often espoused by non‐finance writers) that the market for corporate control is inefficient and, in many cases, outright destructive. Alternative systems of corporate governance should be explored.

This research uses accounting information to supplement abnormal returns evidence in order to gauge the performance of greenmailed firms. Our results support the management entrenchment hypothesis; target firm earnings are poor relative to industry in the years surrounding the greenmail event, and earnings do not significantly improve as would be expected under the shareholders' interest hypothesis. This result holds after adjusting for greenmail premia net of tax effects. Evidence on investment spending suggests firms that pay greenmail differ substantially from their industries, but in a negative direction. In contrast, the industry‐adjusted earnings of non‐greenmail repurchasing firms are significantly greater than the earnings of greenmailed firms. Together, these results are consistent with the contention that greenmailed firms are not managed in shareholders' interests; they underperform their industry, the poor operating results are not attributable to higher investment outlays associated with a long‐term strategic focus, and performance does not improve. This is consistent with observed negative abnormal returns being attributable to both a lost takeover premium and a lost opportunity for improved corporate performance.

The purpose of this study is to determine if an earnings forecasting model based on factors hypothesised to result in differential profits across firms (industries) reduces model error relative to the model developed by Ou (1990). Initial research attempting to forecast earnings found that the random walk model, where current year's earnings are the prediction for next year, provides the best forecast of annual earnings (Ball and Watts 1972; Foster 1973; Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes 1970; Albrecht, Lookabill, and McKeown 1977; Brealey 1969). Ou (1990) developed an earnings forecasting model using financial statement information beyond prior years' earnings as the explanatory variables that outperformed the random walk model in predicting annual earnings.

This paper examines whether financial buyers are more likely to initiate takeovers of inefficient firms. We show that they indeed are and thus conclude that takeovers by financial buyers play a potentially beneficial role in the allocation of corporate assets in the US. economy. Our analysis of determinants of takeovers initiated by financial buyers uses an application of the methodology developed in Trimbath, Frydman and Frydman (2001). In order to illustrate efficiency enhancements introduced by financial buyers, we select Forstmann Little’s acquisition of General Instrument for a brief case study. We show that their aggressive programs of cost management substantially improved the efficiency of General Instrument. Moreover, it allowed General Instrument to expand research and development to become the global leader in high definition television.

The market for mergers and takeovers, often referred to as the market for corporate control [Manne (1965)], has always attracted the attention of investors and researchers because takeovers represent corporate investment decisions on a scale several times larger than the normal, ongoing, growth‐maintaining capital outlays by the typical value‐maximising firm. Although the theoretical justifications for such corporate actions are reasonably well understood, the true motives for the mergers and the strategies adopted by acquiring firms to consummate them can be complex and diverse in scope. Corporate acquisitions can therefore have widespread effects on the wealth of various groups of agents involved in the market for corporate control.

The empirical evidence on mergers and takeovers indicates that positive gains due to mergers and takeovers ac‐crue almost entirely to the target firms. While average abnormal returns to target firms are invariably positive, returns to bidding firms are negative in case of mergers and not significantly different from zero in case of takeovers (see Jensen and Ruback [1983] and De and Mathur in this issue for a review of the empirical evidence). That acquiring firms should offer the shareholders of the target firms such handsome rewards and accept marginal returns for themselves is one of the unresolved problems in the context of mergers and takeovers.

The pace of international mergers and acquisitions activity has quickened dramatically in the past few years. European companies have continued their spending spree in the United States, while Europe, especially the United Kingdom, has become a corporate battleground. In addition, Japan has become a major buyer in Europe as well as in the United States.

This study develops a model for estimating an index measure of asset specificity based on the liquidation value of corporate firms and the proportional distribution of their pre‐liquidation assets. A statistically significant positive relationship was found to exist between the estimated specificity index and financial leverage supporting the theoretical prediction. Additional evidence was found that firms with higher variability in sales, lower probabilities of failure, higher valued non‐debt tax shields and higher levels of financial slack use less financial leverage.

With rising industry consolidation in the banking industry, it is unclear whether community banks may find more or less market opportunities. This paper aims to investigate how industry consolidation may affect community banks’ market share outcomes. The second goal of this paper is to establish the ways in which community banks may successfully manage market share growth goals that may be antithetical to the principles of being a local brand.

The empirical analysis is on the US banking industry, spanning the years from 1994 to 2018. This comprehensive panel data set includes county-year level granularity for more than 15,000 banks. Panel regression models that include bank-, county- and year-specific fixed effects are deployed.

It is found that local brands, operationalized as community banks in this study’s empirical context, are having the most success in consolidated market contexts. When pursuing market share growth, a distribution strategy to saturate a local market is found to be advantageous while expanding across geographies is less advisable for community banks.

The findings shed empirical light on the challenges and opportunities for community banks, thereby contributing to the banking industry literature and to an emerging stream of research on local brand management. By demonstrating the means of which growth can be successfully managed by local brands, the important and largely unanswered question of how a local brand can effectively grow is addressed.