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Deregulation and other factors permit and encourage financial institutions to become more integrated, both within their own (financial) industries, such as banking and insurance, and across these industries. Financial regulators have responded with like integration. As financial institutions increasingly compete with firms from other industries and areas, financial regulators similarly compete more across borders. The resulting competition in financial regulation enhances innovation, choice, and efficiency. The advent of home-run regulation, which in general allows financial institutions to adhere only to the financial regulations of their home area and is spreading across the US and Europe, may allow numerous regulatory regimes within a given market.

The economic and financial crisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis, discovered many deficiencies and weaknesses in the banking sector in the European Union (EU). The need for special surveillance and supervision of cross-border banking cooperation and termination of the toxic link between sovereign debt and banking sector have accelerated the process of forming and establishing a Banking Union (BU). An integrated financial framework has been established in which the European Central Bank (ECB) through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has a key role and the responsibility for the overall supervision of the banking sector of the euro zone. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and schemes of the Single Deposit Guarantee Mechanism (SDGM) are under the national supervisory authorities while the European Banking Authority (EBA) is responsible for developing the Single Rules. From the new architecture is expected the preservation of the single market and a common currency, breaking “toxic connections” between sovereign debt and banks, mitigation and removal of financial instability and economic growth. The research shows that the BU together with the ECB in a certain sense, also contributes to the normalization of credit and financial conditions in the single mark. Estimates through SSM, conducted by the ECB and the EBA, during, 2014 and 2015 on 107 banks in 21 countries indicate progress toward solvency and resilience of the banking system of the euro area. Despite some initial success the entire project BU seems to have missed on opportunities, resulted in late reactions, and was too complex to be feasible. The political will of national governments to give up sovereignty over its banking sector and transfer competencies to the supranational institutions is a key factor in the success or failure of a BU. It seems so but past experience indicates that there is no political willingness to solve problems. Mainly most of the government avoids cleaning a hidden “skeleton in closets” due to lack of means for recapitalization while some are trying for loans from the ECB to help their banks. The ECB plays a key oversight role at the EU level and has too much power, which can cause risks caused by conflicting goals. The ECB is losing the role of the final refuge of liquidity, which is the main disadvantage of a BU. The SSM is susceptible to criticism due to difficulty in operation because of slow incorporation of European legislation into national law. Slow implementation carries risks of fragmentation of the market, regardless of the responsibility of the ECB. The financial capacity of the temporary agreement with the SRM is insufficient in solving the crisis of more banks while procedural application is complex and time-consuming. Planned backstop with a centralized resource is a resolution that is insufficient for solving the failure of big systemic banks, which are too big to bail. The heterogeneity of the existing Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the banking systems of the member states of the euro zone caused controversy in terms of setting of common insurance schemes. The procedures for the recovery and resolution of critical banks are problematic.

This chapter explores the political economy of banking in Texas at the turn of the last century. The empirical work sheds light on why Texans voted to allow the chartering of banks by the state government. The evidence shows that county-level voting patterns for state-chartered banks were significantly related to business interests, consumer interests, agricultural activity, and the presence of existing national banks. The work also shows that the first counties to receive the new state banks were associated with higher agricultural activity, larger population size, and the presence of existing national banks. By examining the vote and the location of early entrants in state banking, this chapter contributes to the literature exploring the historical development of state-chartered banking and the dual-banking system in the US.

This chapter is devoted to the issue of ensuring financial stability in the state. The main goal of the research is to determine the role and policy of the National (Central) Bank, which was called up, together with the Government, to ensure financial stability in the Republic of Belarus. The actions of the National Bank for the implementation of monetary policy, macroprudential regulation, and supervision are reviewed. It is noted that the regulation and supervision of banks, nonbank credit and financial organizations, the payment system, the sector of other financial intermediaries (leasing activities, microfinance activities, activities of forex companies) is carried out by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. The main practical actions of the Government and the National Bank aimed at maintaining and ensuring financial stability is highlighted: monitoring of financial stability (goals, tasks, objects, monitoring directions are defined); creation of the Financial Stability Board (goals, objectives, representation, personal responsibility); disclosure of information on financial stability is carried out on an ongoing basis – the publication of the analytical review “Financial Stability in the Republic of Belarus.” The research provided a summary of the state of the country's financial sector and presented the achievements of the National Bank and state institutions for ensuring financial stability. The main problems affecting financial stability are highlighted: insufficient efficiency of the activities of large enterprises of the real sector of the economy; high levels of credit risk in banks; high dollarization of bank balance sheets. The directions of development of the financial market of the Republic of Belarus, contributing to ensuring financial stability are presented.

Purpose – This chapter compares the stability of the U.S. Dual Banking system's two bank groups, national and state banks, in light of the current financial crisis. The goal of the chapter is to answer three distinct questions: first, is there a difference in the (balance sheet) fragility between the two groups and, second, to what extent has the balance sheet fragility of both groups changed after the escalation of the financial crisis beginning in August 2007? Building on that, the third question asks to whether or not the respective regulatory agencies of both bank groups are responsible for these changes in balance sheet fragility in light of the financial crisis.

Methodology – To answer these questions the chapter uses U.S. Call Report data containing full quarterly balance sheets and P&Ls of all U.S. commercial banks over the period 2005–2008. Anecdotal evidence as well as univariate and multivariate difference-in-difference methodology focusing on the immediate pre-crisis period Q1/2005–Q3/2007 and the crisis period Q3/2007–Q4/2008 are applied.

Results – Highly significant and robust results show that, ceteris paribus, national banks reduced their potential balance sheet fragility after the escalation of the crisis in August 2007 by reducing lending and liquidity creation stronger than state banks. Anecdotal evidence supports the empirical findings. Although both FDIC and OCC did not anticipate the adverse effects of the crisis, the OCC publicly showed an earlier reaction to liquidity-related problems than the FDIC.

Originality – The chapter is the first of its kind to analyze bank fragility around the escalation of the financial crisis and the role of the regulatory agencies. The chapter holds especially interesting policy implications in the light of the current discussion about the future regulation of the banking markets.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the UAE national banks' practices of corporate governance (CG) and the perception of the UAE national banks of the effects of CG on performance and financial distress.

A modified questionnaire has been developed, divided into two parts. The first part covers disclosure and transparency, executive compensation, relationship with shareholders, governance structure, policies and compliance, relationship with stakeholders, and board of directors. The second part deals with performance and financial distress.

The results indicate that UAE banks are aware of the importance of disclosure transparency, executive compensation, the relationship with shareholders and stakeholders, and the role of the board of directors. The results also indicate that the corporate governance practices of UAE national banks are acceptable. In addition, the results reveal that there is a significant positive relationship between CG practices of UAE national banks and disclosure and transparency, shareholders' interests, stakeholders' interests, and the role of the board of directors. Furthermore, the results indicate that there is an insignificant positive relationship between CG practices of UAE national banks and performance level, and that there is a significant positive relationship between financial distress and CG practices of UAE national banks. Finally, the study found that there is no significant difference in the level of CG practices between the UAE's national conventional banks and its Islamic banks.

The current study is considered the first of its kind conducted on the UAE. To the best of the author's knowledge, no such studies have been conducted regarding the effect of CG on performance and financial distress of UAE national conventional and Islamic banks.

With rising industry consolidation in the banking industry, it is unclear whether community banks may find more or less market opportunities. This paper aims to investigate how industry consolidation may affect community banks’ market share outcomes. The second goal of this paper is to establish the ways in which community banks may successfully manage market share growth goals that may be antithetical to the principles of being a local brand.

The empirical analysis is on the US banking industry, spanning the years from 1994 to 2018. This comprehensive panel data set includes county-year level granularity for more than 15,000 banks. Panel regression models that include bank-, county- and year-specific fixed effects are deployed.

It is found that local brands, operationalized as community banks in this study’s empirical context, are having the most success in consolidated market contexts. When pursuing market share growth, a distribution strategy to saturate a local market is found to be advantageous while expanding across geographies is less advisable for community banks.

The findings shed empirical light on the challenges and opportunities for community banks, thereby contributing to the banking industry literature and to an emerging stream of research on local brand management. By demonstrating the means of which growth can be successfully managed by local brands, the important and largely unanswered question of how a local brand can effectively grow is addressed.

The purpose of this research is to examine the degree to which the UAE banks use risk management practices and techniques in dealing with different types of risk. The secondary objective is to compare risk management practices between the two sets of banks.

The authors developed a modified questionnaire, divided into two parts. The first part covers six aspects: understanding risk and risk management; risk identification; risk assessment and analysis; risk monitoring; risk management practices; and credit risk analysis. This part includes 43 closed‐ended questions based on an interval scale. The second part consists of two closed‐ended questions based on an ordinal scale dealing with two topics: methods of risk identification, and risks facing the sample banks.

This study found that the three most important types of risk facing the UAE commercial banks are foreign exchange risk, followed by credit risk, then operating risk. It also found that the UAE banks are somewhat efficient in managing risk, and risk identification and risk assessment and analysis are the most influencing variables in risk management practices. Finally, the results indicate that there is a significant difference between the UAE national and foreign banks in the practice of risk assessment and analysis, and in risk monitoring and controlling.

The article will be of value to those interested in the banking industry.

During the contraction from 1929 to 1933, the Federal Reserve System tracked changes in the status of all banks operating in the United States and determined the cause of each bank suspension. This chapter introduces that hitherto dormant data and presents aggregate series constructed from it. The new data series will supplement, and in some cases, supplant the data currently used to study banking panics during the period, which were published by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 1937.