Search results

This paper develops a debt-run model to study the effects of liquidity injections on debt markets in the presence of a renegotiation option. In the model, creditors decide when to withdraw their funding and equityholders can renegotiate the contract terms of debt. We show that when equityholders have a large bargaining power, liquidity injections into distressed firms can rather cause more aggressive runs from their creditors, hurting the debt value. This outcome occurs because equityholders can strategically utilize the renegotiation option as a bankruptcy threat, pushing down the debt value below the potential liquidation value of the firm. In such a scenario, a deterred default resulting from emergency capital injections could be detrimental to creditors.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage of the firms they manage, with the aim to examine whether CEO incentives play a role in corporate risk-taking.

The authors investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (CIDH) (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage (DOL) of the firms they manage. Using a sample of 11,145 US firm-year observations over the period 2006–2017, the authors find a strong negative association between CIDH and DOL. Additional analyses reveal that the relationship between CIDH and DOL is more pronounced in firms with heightened agency issues, powerful CEOs and for CEOs with stronger professional networks. The results are robust to various sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

The authors find strong evidence confirming the expected negative association between CEO inside debt and DOL suggesting that firms with higher inside debt tend to maintain lower levels of operating leverage. These findings continue to hold with the alternative measure for the inside debt and operating leverage, and across a range of tests designed to rule out the possibility that the primary findings are in any way driven by potential endogeneity. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the presence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts can strengthen the inside debt–DOL relationship suggesting the strong role of inside debt in reducing firm risk.

Findings in this paper have implications for design of compensation structures so that corporate boards can establish incentives as a tool for risk management. A limitation of this study is that it is focused on one market, i.e. US listed companies, so the findings may not be applicable on a global scale.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that links firm-level management of operating leverage through design of CEO inside debt incentives (two obvious choices for risk-reduction at the CEOs’ disposal include reducing financial risk through reduction of firm leverage and reducing operating risk through reduction of operating leverage). While use of firm leverage as an instrument of choice has been explored in the past, use of operating leverage to achieve risk reduction when CEO possess high inside holding, has received very little attention.

This study aims to explore the relationship between firm risk, capital structure, cost of equity capital and social and environmental sustainability during the COVID-19 pandemic for companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange.

To this aim, the information about 190 companies in 2014–2020 was retrieved to be analyzed. The total risk and systematic risk were used as the indicators of company risk; the industry-adjusted earnings price ratio (IndEP) and GORDON were used for the cost of equity capital. To measure social sustainability and environmental sustainability, the procedure suggested by Arianpoor and Salehi (2020) was used.

Underleveraged firms have had a lower total risk during the COVID-19 pandemic, while overleveraged firms have not had a higher risk during this time. In overleveraged firms, using systematic risk has a negative impact on social sustainability during the COVID-19 pandemic. In overleveraged firms, using total risk and systematic risk has a significant negative impact on environmental sustainability in the pandemic. Besides, overleveraged firms have a lower cost of equity capital (IndEP) during COVID-19.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no similar study has so far examined the joint impact of COVID-19 and corporate risk on social and environmental sustainability and also the joint impact of COVID-19 and capital structure on the cost of equity. This study contributes to the related literature by providing corporations with insightful post-pandemic directions on capital structure decisions and social and environmental activities. Furthermore, this research and the relevant findings can help understand and develop social responsibility in Iran as a developing country.