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Purpose – This chapter examines the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of international businesses to combat commercial and governmental corruption. The focus is on multinational enterprises (MNEs) as key business actors globally.Design/methodology/approach – The methodology of the chapter is a combination of literature review, summary of international anticorruption accords, and analysis of available data sources. The literature review is not a systematic survey of academic literature but rather citation of key works bearing on the chapter's purpose. Greater emphasis rests on anticorruption accords and data sources to provide practical guidance to business managers and public officials.Findings – Corruption is global and ubiquitous although varying markedly by country and industry. Corruption occurs in multiple forms such as bribery, entertainment, extortion, facilitating payments, favors, gifts, gratuities, and travel. International anticorruption accords now constitute a formal global norm against bribery and extortion in commercial or governmental transactions. Economic and political costs of corruption are high. Active national enforcement is gradually increasing.Practical implications – The needed corporate policy is not to pay bribes, large or small, in any form for any reason. Such policy will in future extend to prohibit even minor facilitating payments. Businesses should define and enforce broadly applied anticorruption norms. The chapter cites key examples of prosecutions and anticorruption efforts.Originality/value of chapter – This chapter marshals available information from literature, anticorruption accords, and corruption data sources. The chapter is intended to be a useful guide for business managers and public officials.

Family businesses have several distinct features that distinguish them from other businesses. This aspect makes it imperative that scholars investigate issues with an additional focus on the interplay of family business dynamics. In this chapter, we explore the issues of power and corruption within family business, with the understanding that prior examinations of this phenomenon were primarily restricted to large public corporations that are not family owned. The key contribution of this chapter is to shed light on the dark side of family business, namely power enabled corruption. We do so by considering three dimensions that are unique to family firms, namely, ownership and control, generations, and governance. In particular, we highlight how these dimensions can facilitate corruption. It is possible that they may also challenge family business that try to detect, deter, and control corruption within their ranks. The lack of objective external evaluation, the ineffectiveness of internal checks, generational issues, family control, and the restricted nature of governance appear to contribute to exacerbating tensions that promote corruption becoming entrenched within family businesses. Following a case method approach, several illustrative examples of cases of power and corruption within family firms are provided, representing different geographic regions of the world, to showcase the widespread nature of this phenomenon. The three family business cases we illustrate (Grupo Odebrecht in Latin America, Sahara Group in South Africa and Foremost Maritime Group in China) represent multiple countries, continents, and geo-political frontiers. Each case illustrates how both corruption and power reinforce each other in family businesses. Implications of the magnifier effect of power on corruption in family business are discussed in terms of its impact, scale, and its enabling effect by providing a road map to corruption.

The Australia–China business relationship is immensely important for the economic prosperity and living standards of both the countries. There are major differences in business culture between the two countries – Australia from the Global South with Anglo Imperial business traditions and practices, compared with the fast-developing economic might of China, the largest country by population and economic scale in the Far East. China is currently experiencing a crackdown on corruption under President Xi Jinping which started in 2012. Gift giving, guanxi (significant relationships), bribery and corruption are some of the biggest business relationship management issues between Australia and China. Appropriate gift giving and guanxi are distinguished here from bribery and corruption. Guanxi has been associated in the business and academic literature with deterioration in business ethics practices, including bribery and corruption – however, the literature also notes that this does not need to be the case. Following a review of the institutional setting and the literature here, a series of research propositions are developed that provides a framework within the whole ethics of governance regime for a corporation to manage bribery and corruption challenges for corporations. This framework can be used for Australian Stock Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange listed companies which have legal systems parented in the United Kingdom; elements of the model may be useful in the China business setting.

In 2006 the German-based electronics company Siemens faced widespread corruption and bribery allegations. Investigations of the German state attorney’s office disclosed an amount of more than 2.3 billion of suspicious payments to foreign governments (Schubert & Miller, 2008). It turned out that Siemens had bribed governmental officials in order to secure contracts and to obtain favorable conditions over more than three decades (Schmidt, 2009). Though Siemens had a clearly stated anticorruption policy this did not prevent the company from getting involved in one of the largest corporate scandals in German business history.

A deeper analysis of the scandal reveals at least four fundamental shortcomings which enabled the corrupt practices on all organizational levels. First, most of the managers saw no alternatives to secure their foreign business, especially in countries where bribery payment has been a widespread practice. Second, the managers had created misguided bonds of loyalty believing that personal engagement in the corruption scheme was part of their dedication to the company. Third, due to corporate routines and commonly accepted practices, most managers lacked a clear sense of reality seeing corruption as part of the regular business at Siemens. Fourth, poor governance structures and a lack of clear regulations for doing business in a corrupt environment made it easier for managers to bypass official regulations.

The research question is how home country corruption and nationalism may affect operations of BRIC multinational enterprises. BRIC composition permits a comparison of two authoritarian regimes and two constitutional democracies. Each BRIC features a different combination of corruption and nationalism. The chapter adds South Africa information for two limited reasons. First, from 2010 South Africa is a member of the BRIC summit process. South Africa is an important entry point to Africa, for BRIC multinationals and particularly for China. Second, concerning corruption and nationalism South Africa is analytically useful as a control context that helps illustrate but does not appear to change highly exploratory BRIC findings.

The chapter draws on limited literature and information concerning corruption and nationalism in BRICs to suggest tentative possibilities. Transparency International provides bribe payers index estimates for 28 large economies, with important multinational enterprises, and corruption perceptions index estimates including those 28 countries. These estimates include the four BRICs and South Africa. The available sources suggest some suggested findings about varying impacts of home country corruption and nationalism on operations of BRIC multinationals.

China and Russia are authoritarian regimes in transition from central planning-oriented communist regimes. They are global military powers, expanding influence in their respective regions. Brazil, India, and South Africa are constitutional democracies. India, a nuclear-armed military power, seeks a regional leadership role in South Asia. Brazil and South Africa are key countries economically in their regions. BRIC multinationals are positioned between home country and host country conditions. Chinese and Russian multinationals may reflect a stronger nationalistic tendency due to home country regimes and ownership structure.

The chapter is an original but highly exploratory inquiry into impacts of corruption and nationalism on BRIC multinationals. Extant BRIC literature tends to understudy effects of home country corruption and nationalism on managerial mindset and incentives in either commercial or state-owned enterprises.

This study examines the contingent impact of corporate anti-corruption policies on multinational enterprises’ foreign investment strategy. The authors propose that the differences in foreign investment motives will moderate the assumed deterrent effect of anti-corruption policies. Our analysis of overseas production investments by Japanese firms (2011–2017) supports some of the hypotheses. The authors find that the deterrent effect of anti-corruption policies may be diminished when a new subsidiary has an efficiency-seeking purpose. Conversely, the deterrent effect is more prominent when a new subsidiary has a competence-creating purpose. These results not only contribute to the research on control of corruption in international business, but also have implications for research on corporate self-regulation more generally.

Facilitation payments (petty corruption) are small payments to an officer or employee, public or private, who is responsible for a nondiscretionary service, in order to facilitate, accelerate, or cheapen a procedure, for example, issuing a passport or connecting a house to a power distribution network. They are widespread in some countries, and are often considered irrelevant, but they have very large negative impacts in generating a culture of corruption, affecting the functioning of public offices or private companies and on costs for citizens. This chapter explains what facilitation payments are, why they are an ethical problem for people who pay and receive them, for companies and for society, and the positioning of the fight against those payments within the overall strategy against corruption.

Corruption is a phenomenon that is ubiquitous, but the extent and the form differ across countries. According to Transparency International, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in year 2001 varied from 0.4 to 9.9 (10 is completely corruption free). The average score for the 91 countries surveyed was 4.76 (with a standard deviation of 2.39). Why is there so much cross-country difference? Why are some countries virtually corruption free, but are others fraught with corruption?

The implicit assumption underlying the work of most anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) is that they need to change public attitudes toward corruption to ensure a cleaner future. The means of achieving this objective usually rest on sanctions, prevention, and sermons. Changing attitudes is seen to be largely a matter of prosecuting the corrupt, putting preventive measures in place, emphasizing the negative social and criminal consequences of corruption, and exhorting the public to achieve higher moral standards. Engaging the public is rarely undertaken directly. If it were, it would entail a community relations approach based on face-to-face, decentralized interaction between the ACA and the public. In principle, this approach might have three significant advantages. First, it could enable the anti-corruption message to be communicated more directly and, possibly, more effectively. Second, it might assist the ACA in identifying groups within the community which have developed, or are developing, attitudes which are potentially antithetical to its objectives. Third, it could serve as a springboard for local anti-corruption initiatives which might help to embed desired practices in the community or groups within it. In this chapter, we examine the extent to which one of the few agencies to adopt a full-blown community relations strategy – Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) – has been able to achieve those benefits.

Purpose – The paper addresses the MNCs’ sensitivity to corruption which varies across economic sectors depending on the interaction between sectoral characteristics and home-country formal institutions’ strength.

Design/methodology/approach – A theoretical framework is proposed based on the economic sector and host-country's institutional factors. The framework is empirically tested using 245 cross-border FDI valuations. Given that the energy sector is representative of high levels of industry concentration and government involvement – the sectoral characteristics considered to be moderating the relationship between corruption and FDI – the focus of the paper is on the energy sector. The study also tests the moderating effect of corruption distance.

Findings – The results indicate a lack of evidence that MNCs are deterred by corruption when investing in the energy sector of emerging and developing economies.

Research limitations/implications – The study provides a starting-point for further research of how economic sector characteristics can moderate the relationship between corruption and FDI. A key practical implication is that international anti-corruption measures are likely to be insufficient for some economic sectors.

Originality/value – The paper has proven to be of interest to the US State Department for studying the effectiveness of the international foreign bribery laws, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The framework can assist in identifying economic sectors likely to be resistant to comply with the foreign bribery laws when conditions of weak host-country formal institutions are present. The study challenges and complements the prevailing theory that host-country corruption has a negative effect on inward FDI.