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We examine whether variations in the most fundamental aspects of state corporate income tax regimes affect state economic activity as measured by personal income, gross state product, and total non-farm employment. We focus on a variety of statutory components of state corporate income taxes that apply broadly in most U.S. states and for most multi-state corporate taxpayers. Our econometric strategy consists of a series of fixed effects panel regressions using state-level data from 1996 through 2010. Our results reveal important interaction effects of tax rates and policies, suggesting that policy makers should avoid making decisions about tax rates in isolation. The results demonstrate a relatively consistent negative economic response to the combination of high tax rates with throwback rules and heavy sales factor weights. Combined reporting has no discernible effect on personal income, GSP, or employment after controlling for tax rates, apportionment, and throwback rules. In an effort to gauge the relative impacts of tax policies on the location of economic activity, we also estimate alternative models in which each state’s economic activity is measured as a share of the national economic activity in each year. Statistically significant effects for tax rates, apportionment formulas, and throwback rules in the shares models suggest that at least some of their impact involves the movement of activity across state lines, thereby leaving open the possibility of a zero-sum game among the states.

The purpose of this paper is to examine long‐term income tax liability for Chinese public corporations from 1998 to 2007. It also studies the factors that are associated with Chinese firms' long‐run effective tax rates.

The paper uses the measurement of long‐run effective tax rate, developed by Dyreng et al., which is measured as the sum of taxes paid over ten years divided by the sum of pretax book income over those same ten years. This paper is an empirical study using the financial report data collected from China stock market financial statement database and corporate ownership structure change from SINA Finance database. The tests include both univariate and multivariate tests.

The paper's findings are: ten‐year effective tax rates are considerably lower than the statutory tax rate; ten‐year effective tax rates vary significantly across industries and geographic areas; profitability, firm size, capital structure, and capital intensity are all associated with ten‐year effective tax rates; corporate ownership structures, i.e. tradable vs non‐tradable shares, are related to ten‐year effective tax rates.

Given that corporate ownership has changed dramatically in China in recent years, future studies should be conducted to explore the association between effective tax rates and ownership changes.

The paper is of interest to the policy makers, corporate managements, and academics, who seek to examine corporate income tax burden and the factors associated with tax rates over the long term. Given that corporate ownership has changed dramatically in China in recent year, future studies should be conducted to explore the association between effective tax rates and ownership changes.

The paper differs from Dyreng et al.'s paper in 2007. While Dyreng et al. conduct a univariate analysis on the association between firm characteristics and long‐run effective tax rates, this paper employs multivariate regression models to examine what factors are associated with long‐run effective tax rates. Second, this paper examines the relationship between corporate ownerships and effective tax rates.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

Current US tax laws provide investors an incentive to time the sales of their bonds to minimize tax liability. This gives rise to a tax-timing option that affects bond value. In reality, corporate bond investors’ tax-timing strategy is complicated by risk of default. Existing term structure models have ignored the effect of the tax-timing option, and how much corporate bond value is due to the tax-timing option is unknown. In this chapter, we assess the effects of taxes and stochastic interest rates on the timing option value and equilibrium price of corporate bonds by considering discount and premium amortization, multiple trading dates, transaction costs, and changes in the level and volatility of interest rates. We find that the value of the tax-timing option accounts for a substantial proportion of corporate bond price even when interest rate volatility is low. Ignoring the timing option value results in overestimation of credit spread, and underestimation of default probability and the marginal investor’s income tax rate. These estimation biases generally increase with bond maturity and credit risk.

This research surveys the recent surge of empirical studies on transfer pricing manipulation by multinational enterprises (MNEs), tax-motivated transfer pricing, particularly from the year 1990 to present. The review tackles transfer pricing income shifting behavior of MNEs from three different perspectives: taxation relationship with profitability, intrafirm trade, and foreign direct investment (FDI). There have been significant developments and contributions in this field, despite many limitations, mainly concerning the availability of micro-data in general, (specifically intrafirm trade data which allows capturing much of the heterogeneity which is dangling within inter-sectors), and the tax measurement issue. Yet, this area of study is still developing and promises more achievements.

To analyse the net present value (NPV) rule for corporate investments incorporating shareholder personal taxes, under the classical system of taxing corporate profits.

The after‐tax payoffs to shareholders are calculated, comparing immediate distribution as dividends of corporate funds available for investment with future after‐tax dividend distributions if corporate funds are invested.

Shareholders will disagree on the optimal corporate NPV rule. If, as in widely held public companies, corporate management are unaware of the marginal personal tax rate of shareholders, then the only rule which will accept investment projects that no shareholder would want the company to reject, is the rule which discounts after‐corporate‐tax cash flows at a before‐tax discount rate.

The analysis is based on the classical system of taxing corporate profits. A number of countries have adopted an integrated system of corporate taxation. The analysis may or may not extend to such alternative systems.

Simplifies the choice of NPV rules for corporate management, under a classical tax system.

The widely held view that after‐corporate‐tax discount rates should be used in discounting after‐corporate‐tax cash flows is shown to be inadequate.

This study aims to examine how corporate taxes affect corporate risk-taking decisions.

This study examines corporate risk-taking by analyzing how a firm’s asset risk changes following an acquisition carried out by publicly listed companies in the G7 nations. To measure the asset risk of a firm, this study uses the option pricing framework in Merton (1974).

Consistent with an implication of the Merton (1974) framework, the findings show that firms take more risk in their investment decisions when tax rates are high. Moreover, the tax effects wane for firms with a relatively large borrowing opportunity and this suggests that the risk-taking incentive from taxes is moderated by the reputation concern in the debt market, lending support to the Diamond (1989) reputation-building model. The empirical results also show that the tax-induced risk-taking incentive is restrained by creditor rights. Overall, the study reveals an important role of taxes in the structure of corporate investment decisions.

The implications of this study can be beneficial to policymakers when considering the alteration of tax rates, as it will affect the riskiness of firm investment decisions.

This study provides a better understanding of the role of taxes on risk-taking and also contributes to the growing body of evidence supporting tax effects of risk-taking. The relationship between taxes and risk-taking has proven that the corporate taxation is one of the key factors that firms consider during their selection of risky investments. Unlike previous studies, this research is the first to investigate the change in asset risk, estimating by the option pricing framework, through studying a particular event: mergers and acquisitions.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically explore whether and to what extent the changes in state corporate income tax rates affect corporate tax aggressiveness.

Using a differences-in-differences approach with dynamic treatment, the authors investigate the effect of staggered changes in state corporate income tax rates in the USA on corporate tax aggressiveness.

Firms become more aggressive in avoiding taxes following state tax increases but are insensitive to tax cuts. The effect of state tax increases on tax aggressiveness is weaker for firms with greater debt tax shields and marginal tax rates. Firms are more likely to shift their operations and relocate their headquarters out of states experiencing tax increases.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this paper is the first to study the relation between state tax policy changes and corporate tax aggressiveness. This paper finds an asymmetrical pattern of corporate tax aggressiveness in response to state tax changes.

The present study aims to investigate the impact of the reduction of the corporate tax rate on corporate tax revenue. The study adopts the theory of taxation by Ibn Khaldun, depicted as the Laffer curve.

The paper analyses time series data for the period 1996 to 2014 using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach.

The paper finds that the corporate tax rate has a dual effect on corporate tax revenue over the study period. It shows an inverted U-shape relationship between the corporate tax rate and corporate tax revenue and reveals that the optimal tax rate is 25.5156 per cent. Inferentially, a positive relationship exists between the two variables prior to the optimal tax rate, and a negative relationship prevails afterwards. A further test of causality shows a long-run unidirectional causality between corporate tax rate and corporate tax revenue.

First, it should be noted that the policy was not implemented in isolation. Several other tax incentives were given to corporate tax payers, and therefore, such incentives should be controlled for to have a more insightful evaluation of the policy. Second and most important, there is a need to investigate whether the increased cash flow available to firms as a result of the reduction in the corporate tax rate adds value to firms. It is also necessary to investigate whether firms’ stakeholders benefited from the increased cash flow or was there managerial diversion of firms’ resources.

The policy of gradual reduction of the corporate tax rate in Malaysia is suspected to have a positive impact on the productivity of Malaysian companies, which has contributed to an increase in corporate tax revenue. It also has a positive impact on the economic growth of the country. It means that the lower corporate tax rate has actually reduced the cost of doing business in the country.

The benefit of increased corporate tax revenue needs to be investigated empirically for insightful policy evaluation. In Malaysia, however, such investigation is close to non-existent to the best knowledge of the researchers. Thus, the present study aims at investigating the impact of the policy of gradual reduction of the corporate tax rate on corporate tax revenue over an 18-year period from 1996 to 2014.

In the past two decades, corporate casino gambling has expanded from being legal in only two U.S. states (Nevada and New Jersey) in the late 1980s to 12 states in 2007. As a result, the annual gambling revenue realized by the casino industry has grown from $9 billion in 1991 to more than $34 billion in 2007. The growth of gambling revenue as a source of additional state tax revenue, however, has not been matched by a corresponding increase of academic research on casino gambling. The research addresses the question of whether states are maximizing collected corporate casino tax revenue and finds that states fall into one of four clusters: undertaxing; overtaxing; undertaxing but close to the revenuemaximization tax level; and overtaxing but close to the revenue-maximization tax level.