Search results

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of executive severance contract maturity policies on the likelihood of forced turnover and the length of tenure for CEOs who are forced from their positions.

The paper utilizes logistic and accelerated failure time models to test the hypothesis that severance contracts decrease information asymmetries resulting in an increased likelihood of forced turnover and a shortened tenure for those CEOs who are forced out.

The results provide evidence that fixed‐term severance contracts increase the likelihood of forced tenure and decrease the length of tenure for CEOs who experience a forced turnover during the period, while time‐independent contracts do not.

The limitation is the possibility that an omitted variable jointly determines the likelihood of the presence of a severance contract and the effect on forced turnover. Future research should investigate other possibilities beyond the CEO coming from outside of the firm.

The findings confirm that the maturity policies of severance contracts affect forced turnover. The results suggest that there may be a benefit in designing severance contracts to expire to encourage more efficient turnover of underperforming CEOs.

This paper contributes to the empirical corporate finance and accounting literature by differentiating between forced and unforced turnover when analyzing the effects of severance contracts and demonstrating that the time dimension of severance contracts may provide the desired result of encouraging the identification of CEO‐firm mismatches.

Contract duration is a central part of a facilities management contract and clients enjoy many benefits if they make the right decision. Provides a basis for this decision and sets out a model of the influences on and issues surrounding contract duration. Demonstrates the relevance of the model by linking it to current market practices through a May 1994 review of 51 real facilities management contracts.

The purpose of this research is to determine whether the trading of equity index futures contracts on the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) results in an increase in the volatility of the underlying spot indices. Since equity index futures contracts were first listed in the USA in 1975, various studies have been undertaken to determine whether the volatility of shares in the underlying indices increases as a result of the trading of such futures contracts. These studies have lead to the development of two schools of thought: [a] Trading activity in equity index futures contracts leads to an increase in the volatility of index shares. [b] Trading activity in equity index futures contracts does not lead to an increase in the volatility of the index shares and could in fact lead to greater stability in equity markets. Although some evidence of higher volatility in expiration periods was found, volatility in the expiration periods was not consistently higher than in the corresponding pre‐expiration period.

Presents a discussion of the research survey carried out at the Faculty of Technology Management at the Eindhoven University of Technology concerning contractors’ maintenance. First, gives a brief introduction to the emerging contracting out phenomenon in The Netherlands. Then, provides an overview of several contract types that can be offered by contractors and the potential difficulties that have to be solved in establishing such contracts. Complements this with some first‐hand experiences gained in actual situations. Further discusses the importance of taking the initiative by the contractor in developing a contracting out market for maintenance. Finally, makes suggestions with respect to developing in‐depth research in this area.

This paper reviews how social care contracting in learning disability services has developed in the UK, making use of experience in Berkshire. The monitoring of block contracts for residential care is explored from the perspectives of the keyworker in the home and the purchaser who is monitoring the contract. An action research approach was used to develop monitoring and change subsequent practice in contracting. Particular areas identified as needing improvement were staff induction and training, care planning and review, meeting health needs, and building the setting and measuring of individual service outcomes into all areas of practice, especially provider internal quality‐assurance. The limited role of the service user in the process is highlighted.

The purpose of this paper is to verify whether higher education increases the likelihood of young Italian workers moving from non‐standard to standard wage contracts.

The authors exploit a data set on labour market flows, produced by the Italian National Statistical Office, by interviewing about 85,000 graduate and non‐graduate individuals aged 15‐29 in transition between five labour market states: standard wage employment; non‐standard wage employment; self‐employment; unemployment; inactivity. From these data, an average six‐year transition matrix was constructed whose coefficients can be interpreted as probabilities of moving from one state to another over time.

As the authors find evidence for the so‐called stepping stone hypothesis (that is, a higher probability of moving to a permanent job for individuals starting from a temporary job), the authors expect graduates to be more likely to pass from non‐standard to standard wage contracts than non‐graduates, because the signalling effect of education is enhanced by the stepping stone effect of non‐standard wage contracts. Nevertheless, the authors find that non‐standard wage contracts of graduates are more likely to be terminated as bad job/worker matches.

This paper adds to the empirical literature on the probability of young workers moving from non‐standard wage contracts to a permanent job. By separating graduates from non‐graduates, it was found that education reduces the likelihood of passing from non‐standard to standard wage contracts. The authors interpret this result as evidence of the changing labour market that makes it more difficult to infer the productivity of graduates as opposed to non‐graduates.

A common justification for state term commodity contracts is that they are beneficial to taxpayers because of savings that result from the price concessions expected from volume purchasing. With the growing popularity of performance based budgeting in state legislatures, there is a clear need for performance measures to document these taxpayer benefits. Based on a survey of state purchasing offices and a review of the major purchasing associations and the academic literature, this paper develops guidelines and a set of performance measures for evaluating the financial benefits of state term commodity contracts.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze and solve the problem of moral hazard in firms because of asymmetry information between firms and workers and to contract upon the workers' shiftless actions.

Based on principle‐agent theory and human resource management practice, an optimal dynamic wage contract model is designed. By applying simulation technology, the dynamic wage contract model is compared to the general static wage contract model and the affects made by the optimal dynamic wage contract to workers and firms are analyzed.

According to the consequences of simulation, the dynamic wage contract has better characteristics and is more practical than the static one. In the dynamic wage contract, the current action of a worker has a persistent effect on the future outcome. It is proved that the dynamic wage contract is optimal to the firm. The optimal dynamic wage contract is renegation‐proofness. It not only can incentive workers to work hard and help the firm achieve Pareto efficiency, but also can smooth the firm's incentive costs and reduce the risk born by workers.

The paper provides some reasonable conclusions for the human resource management in firms.

The purpose of this article is to investigate the role that the principle of pacta sunt servanda plays in consumer contracts under the Common European Sales Law (CESL).

The new proposal for the CESL resembles quite closely other global and European instruments and collections of rules on contracts, such as the CISG, PECL, and DCFR. At a closer look, the concept of contract, and in particular the consumer contract, differences between the CESL and its predecessors becomes readily apparent. This article will point out these differences and thereby analyse the role of the pacta sunt servanda principle in consumer contracts.

The question must be answered whether the consumer protection provisions that weaken the bindingness of contracts will discourage traders from opting into CESL? The Article also shows the inconsistencies in the CESL in business‐to‐business (B2B) contracts in the areas relating to mistake and lack of conformity.

The article poses a question which is of such relevance that it should be more comprehensively discussed by European legislators before the CESL is adopted as an EU regulation.

Performance measurement has been receiving increased attention in public organizations. As performance measurement systems begin to take on a central focus by public sector organizations, the challenges of measuring and improving critical organizational processes continue to increase in importance. Furthermore, as the procurement process continues to gain critical importance in public sector organizations, the need to apply specific performance measurement methods to measure and improve the procurement processes is essential for mission success. This article introduces the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) as a method for assessing, measuring, and improving an organization’s procurement processes. The results of the case study describe the organizational benefits of using a contract management maturity model as a performance measurement, as well as a process improvement method.