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In his review of theoretical and empirical research on grievance procedures, Lewin (1999) states that the “grievance procedure is widely regarded by scholars and practitioners as the centerpiece of union-management relations.” It is somewhat strange, then, that a trawl through British industrial relations publications for the 1980s and 1990s reveals very few dealing with the process for resolving employment disputes in unionised workplaces (usually articles about industrial tribunals, now called employment tribunals). Given this paucity of studies in unionised workplaces, it is less surprising that almost no research has been published recently on how employees and management in non-union firms go about dealing with individual conflict in the workplace today.

This paper investigates the adoption, structure, and function of dispute resolution procedures in the nonunion workplace. Whereas grievance procedures in unionized workplaces have been an important area of study in the field of industrial relations, research on dispute resolution procedures in nonunion workplaces has lagged behind. As a result, our knowledge of the development of nonunion procedures remains relatively limited. Similarly, with a few noteworthy exceptions (e.g. Lewin, 1987, 1990), our knowledge of workplace grievance activity is almost entirely based on research conducted in unionized settings. Given the major differences in the institutional contexts of union and nonunion workplaces in the United States, existing ideas about workplace dispute resolution developed in the unionized setting will likely require significant modification in order to understand dispute resolution procedures and activity in the nonunion workplace. Issues relating to dispute resolution in the nonunion workplace are of increasing importance to public policy given the combination of continued stagnation in levels of union representation and mounting concerns over rising levels of employment litigation in the courts. Knowing what nonunion dispute resolution procedures look like and how they function will help answer the question of what role these procedures may play in the future governance of the workplace.

Purpose – Investor activism is the attempt by a dissident shareholder to alter firm behavior by filing a shareholder resolution with the firm. Faced with a shareholder resolution, management can either oppose it or attempt to negotiate a settlement. This study examines the factors that would cause a firm to adopt a compromise position with a dissent investor.

Methodology – A logistic regression is run in which the result of the shareholder resolution (whether or not a compromise has been researched) is a function of the topic of the resolution, the proposer of the resolution, and the firm’s history of compromising on previous shareholder resolutions. The model is tested using a sample of 762 shareholder resolutions filed in Canada over an eleven-year period from 2000 to 2010.

Results – The results indicate that compromise is more likely to occur when the shareholder resolution addresses an environmental or social responsibility issue, and when the dissident shareholder is an investment or mutual fund.

Practical implications – Institutional and mutual funds control the financial resources necessary for the firm’s survival. As such, firms are more likely to compromise when these powerful investors put forward shareholder resolutions. Furthermore, firms are more likely to compromise when the resolution does not address the core activities of the firm.

Originality – This study examines the factors that encourage Canadian firms to adopt a compromising strategy when confronted by dissident shareholders.

According to the 2005 Human Development Report, if the number of conflicts has decreased since 1990, the last two decades are still ridden with violent disputes. These conflicts are distinct from previous periods in the sense that victims are no longer primarily soldiers or military personnel, but also civilians. Women and children are the most vulnerable in these conflicts (the number of civilian loss today is about 90%, the majority being women and children). Because of their social status and sex, women are subjected to several types of violence: rapes, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, mutilation, or forced sterilization. Far more than the number of victims, the consequences of these conflicts on human development in terms of growth reduction due to infrastructure damages, and to food, health, and education system dislocations are important cost factors and must be taken into account (UNDP, 2005). And nevertheless, all of which revolves around the conflicts has always been considered as men's prerogatives. National and international institutions responsible for these issues are generally composed of men. Decisions, made about conflicts and peace, are often issued by men. Women's needs, opinions, and expectations are rarely taken into account. The specificity of the woman's role has not yet been put in integrated decision-makings, whether concerning the reintegration of women fighters after conflicts, their participation in the resolution process and the prevention of conflicts, or whether concerning postconflict reconstruction. Women associations have worked a lot to be heard and to be represented in various political authorities.L’absence des femmes dans les lieux de décisions et de pouvoir (ou quand elles sont représentées la place singulière qu’elles occupent) est l’un des symptômes qui révèlent un dysfonctionnement de la démocratie et oblige à reconsidérer les contours mêmes de la notion de citoyenneté, étant entendu que les femmes ne sont pas le seules cibles de l’exclusion et que ces questions s’inscrivent dans un contexte politique plus large ou exclure est devenu un mode de gouverner¹. (Apfelbaum, 1996)

In this chapter, we explore the legal framework of AGMs in seven Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) of shareholder decision-making rights. We find that, since only a small part of the decision-making rights is harmonized at the European level, there are numerous differences in shareholder rights among national laws. These decision-making rights are usually about the topics director (re-)elections, pay matters, share capital, amendments to articles of association, annual accounts, etc. To be able to conduct empirical research in the remaining chapters, we develop a categorization framework of 15 voting items.

This chapter is intended to elaborate on the existing academic literature addressing the migration of constitutional ideas. Through an examination of ongoing efforts to enshrine “defamation of religion” as a violation of international human rights, the author confirms that the phenomenon of migration is not restricted to positive constitutional norms, but rather also encompasses negative ideas that ultimately may serve to undermine international and domestic constitutionalism. More specifically, the case study demonstrates that the movement of anti-constitutional ideas is not restricted to the domain of “international security” law, and further, that the vertical axis linking international and domestic law is in fact a two-way channel that permits the transmission of domestic anti-constitutional ideas up to the international level.

In reaching the findings presented herein, the chapter also adds to the universalism–relativism debate by demonstrating that allowances for “plurality consciousness” on the international level may in certain instances undermine fundamental norms previously negotiated and accepted as authoritative by the international community. From this perspective, the movement in favor of prohibiting “defamation of religion” is not merely a case study that helps to expand our understanding of how anti-constitutional ideas migrate, but also indicative of a reenergized campaign to challenge the status, content, and stability of universal human rights norms.

In this chapter, we assess shareholder voting behaviour in our sample of seven European Member States. We consider the AGM’s agenda, shareholder proposals, rejected voting items and dissent rates. Our research shows, inter alia, that certain voting items receive higher dissent rates than others. These are, for instance, director elections and say-on-pay resolutions. Other voting items, such as the approval of the annual accounts, are merely a formality.