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While climatic conditions are believed to have some influence on triggering conflicts, the existing empirical results on the nature and statistical significance of their explanatory role are not conclusive. We construct a dataset for a sample of 139 countries which records the occurrence of an armed conflict, the annual average temperature and precipitation levels, as well as the relevant socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic measures over the 1961–2011 period. Using this dataset and controlling for the effect of relevant nonclimate variables, our comprehensive econometric analyses support the influencing role of climatic factors. Our results are robust and consistent with the hypothesis that climate warming is instrumental in raising the probability of onset of internal armed conflicts and suggests that, along with regulating population size and promoting political stability, controlling climate change is an effective factor for inducing peace by way of curtailing the onset of armed conflicts.

Over the last decades, there has been an increasing interest among scientists on the linkage between population health and climate and environmental factors, as well as health impacts of climate change and climate variability. Numerous studies have been done and substantial results achieved, but mostly in the developed countries, and not much quantitative evidence or assessment of the impacts at national and local levels has been provided for developing countries.

Chapter Seven turns to what will be characterised as operational risks/uncertainties. The associated concept of strategic risks/uncertainties introduced in Chapter Six, is somewhat arbitrary as many risks and uncertainties fit into both categories. Further, a precise demarcation is not practically possible. Nevertheless, for purposes of introduction it is a helpful distinction.

Although it might be an overstatement, here operational risks/uncertainties do seem to offer greater opportunities for quantifiable measurement. This is simply because many operational functions are repetitive, offer numerous contexts where data can be gathered, and observations can lead to useful predictions of future outcomes. Supplementing individual organisation observations with sector-wide data is more possible as well. This is not to say that human factors do not matter, they most certainly do. Subjectivity also matters; but it remains the case that operational activity does present the better chance for measurement.

As with Chapters Five and Six, alternative perspectives are presented, and the complex adaptive systems idea reappears in relation to the processes by which operational risks/uncertainties are assessed and analysed.

This paper seeks to explain the “great continuity” in Spanish American development: the fact that territories in the region have maintained their relative levels of social development since precolonial times. It tests competing explanations associated with neo-modernization theory, geographic perspectives, and institutional approaches emphasizing property rights versus ethnicity. The paper uses comparative-historical methods to evaluate competing explanations. These methods include cross-case matching and within-case process tracing. The paper finds that patrimonial institutions of ethnic stratification are a fundamental cause of social development and the great continuity in Spanish America. These institutions help explain why areas with a dense indigenous population tend to have low levels of social development, whereas areas with a sparse indigenous population tend to have high levels of social development. This paper suggests that the institutions of ethnic stratification may be more important than the institutions of private property as a cause of development. Scholars of development need to focus more attention on the ways in which ethnic institutions shape identities and create collective groups.

This paper compares grain prices between Cairo and Europe during medieval times. Prices were higher and more volatile in Cairo than in Europe. Over time, price levels declined in large parts of Europe but not in Cairo.

No price integration can be seen between the European Mediterranean region and Cairo. In north-western Europe, a cluster of urban centers showing similar price movements had emerged in the fourteenth century, at the latest. The Mediterranean area was not integrated into this network. Price integration in north-western Europe may have contributed to the economic advancement of this region in late medieval and early modern times.

Climatic fluctuations (in temperature as well as in the water level of the Nile) affected Cairo grain prices. In Europe, on the other hand, short-term temperature variation did not have an appreciable impact on prices. Western European price integration cannot, it seems, be explained by the existence of a common climatic factor. Early European economic development was facilitated by a robust environment.

Climate change will affect tourism at several temporal and spatial levels. This chapter focuses on the quantification of effects and the development of strategies to reduce extremes and frequencies as well as thresholds in tourism areas. Knowledge about possibilities for mitigation and adaptation of current and expected climate conditions requires interdisciplinary approaches and solutions. Several examples are presented, including the effects of trees against climate change and extreme events (heat waves), behavior adaptations, urban and regional planning measures, bioclimatic conditions in the Mediterranean and human–biometeorological conditions under climate change conditions, and user-friendly computer tools for the quantification of urban bioclimate conditions.

Two worldwide trends in recent decades are commonly noted and sometimes linked in discussing disasters. First, the reported global cost of natural disasters has risen significantly, with a 14-fold increase between the 1950s and 1990s (Munich Re, 1999). During the 1990s, major natural catastrophes are reported to have resulted in economic losses averaging an estimated US$ 54 billion per annum (in 1999 prices) (ibid). Record losses of some US$ 198 billion were recorded in 1995, the year of the Kobe earthquake – equivalent to 0.7 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) (ibid).

Global climate can be defined as the average of all the regional trends of weather over a long time period (National Science Foundation [NSF], 2009). The researchers all over the world have concluded that the Earth's climate is changing as a whole. There are basically two factors that have impacts on the climate, the natural (climatic and environmental variability) and the anthropogenic (infrastructure development and land use land cover change). The causes of past changes are believed to be related to changes in ocean currents, solar activity, volcanic eruptions, and other natural factors (ISDR, 2008). But in recent times, human activities have accelerated this rate of climate change (IPCC, 2007; Sperling & Szekely, 2005; ISDR, 2008). As the developmental activities increase, the amount of emission of greenhouse gasses and aerosols increases, which, in turn, leads to global warming and snow melting, thus increasing the sea level and the frequency and intensity of cyclones, floods, droughts, and many other disasters (IPCC, 2001).

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to project the global emergence of megacities through the 21st century using population scenarios consistent with the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Methodology – A dynamic urban growth model is developed based on a scale-independent theory of growing networks taking into consideration the geographical and climatic suitability of the location of cities. The model is able to generate a series of megacity projections consistent with an experimental city size distribution based on a national urban population scenario consistent with Zipf's law. The model is applied to population projections for 45,316 cities around the world using three population scenarios from SRES.

Findings – All of the projections indicate that a large number of megacities will be generated in developing regions towards 2100, although the range is wide and depends on the population assumed in the scenarios. Some results indicate an extreme population concentration in megacities; this might be undesirable for national security, quality of life, and sustainable development. Transport policies affect urban growth and national land development through changes in mobility and accessibility across the nation.

Implications – The results presented in this chapter could serve to stimulate discussions on urban and national transport policies and planning, particularly in China.