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The purpose of this study is to analyze the scope and magnitude of Chinese budgetary responses to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

This study analyzes budgetary response in China by means of public reports, news reports and policy documents.

The Chinese responses were comprehensive, flexible and fast. Through the normal authorization process, simplifying procedures of budget allocation and special legislative approval after the surge of COVID-19 cases, China used many budgetary measures to help suffering businesses and households to buffer the economic difficulties caused by the pandemic. It also increased public health spending very quickly so subnational governments could control and prevent the pandemic with the necessary resources. International relief efforts have also been increased. These findings show the unique strength of the Chinese political system, which is very flexible and quick in resource mobilization.

This study offers a quick review of the Chinese budgetary responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. It also highlights some of the future concerns and needs of the Chinese government in domestic and global health areas.

To modernize budgeting system is a challenge issue in many developing countries. To some scholars (Schick, 1998a, 1998b; Ma, 2009a), developing countries must first put into place basic budgetary controls before moving to more advanced models of budgeting. This approach of “basic first,” however, is questioned by others (e.g., Andrew, 2006). Drawing on China's recent budget reforms, this essay reconfirms the validity of the “basics first” approach. In China, budget reform since 1999 has begun to install budgetary controls for state finance, leading to an enhancement of budgeting capacity and financial accountability. However, governments at the same time have begun to be plagued by the unexpected problem of delays in spending and the accumulation of significant underexpenditures. Contrary to what many people may believe, we contend that this somewhat odd problem arises not because the new budgeting system has exercised too much control but rather because the new system is not yet effective in exerting budgetary controls.

This study quantitatively examines the relationship between economic fluctuations and government budget size in the context of China’s fiscal decentralization, drawing inspiration from theoretical predictions of the Keynesian view and empirical studies on other economies.

The panel comprises 31 provinces or equivalents in mainland China, spanning from 1994 to 2019. Diverse estimation strategies including two-way fixed effect regression, the generalized method of moments (GMM) and threshold regressions are, utilized.

The results suggest that under the “tax-assignment system”, neither the central government’s fiscal transfers nor the provincial budgetary revenues or expenditures help reduce economic volatility. Surprisingly, some regression outcomes suggest that government size measures destabilize business cycles.

While the study does not provide supportive evidence for the stabilizing effect of public budgets in Chinese provinces, it promotes a rethinking of the government’s intricate role in macroeconomic stabilization in the context of China’s fiscal decentralization.

This paper investigates the policy changes made towards infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs). The purpose of this study is to empirically identify the policy risks associated with the development of PPPs and to assess their impacts on the projects.

A case study of the policy changes that have been implemented for PPPs in China over the past seven years has been undertaken and is presented in this study. The causal loop diagrams are applied to assess and illustrate the potential impacts of the risks as a result of such changes on PPPs.

A sequence of the policy risks, which relate to PPP risk allocation, contract management and implementation, payment and abatement mechanisms and financing, has been identified. It is also found that the identified risks will generate significant but negative impacts on PPPs, leading to an ineffective project delivery, low revenue, poor service quality and even contract breach.

This research provides the private-sector entities that will embark on PPPs with an insight into managing and controlling policy risks over the project's lifecycle.

PPPs have been critical for infrastructure development worldwide. Nevertheless, they have been a controversy, as many of them were subjected to poor outputs. Consequently, a variety of political mechanisms has been implemented to enhance the governance for PPPs. Policy can bring not only benefits but also risks and, however, policy risks of PPPs with a particular assessment for their potential impacts have received limited attention. Therefore, the study presented in this paper will contribute to the identification and assessment of policy risks within the context of PPPs.

Although the Chinese economy has experienced a strong and rapid growth due to the success of its economic reform, the Chinese central government faces a stern fiscal decline. The fiscal problem has undermined the ability of the central government in completing many crucial governing tasks. By examining the institutional root of the fiscal problem, this paper argues that the fiscal decline is part of the ironic corollary of the decentralization strategy of China’s economic reform which produces a “weak center, strong local” outcome. To fully address the problem, China should undertake major institutional reforms to redefine as well as institutionalize the fiscal roles of different levels of government.

In response to increasing pressures for public sector efficiency and effectiveness, many countries have switched from cash-based governmental accounting to accrual-based approaches. But other countries have rejected this change, suggesting that its costs and benefits may vary with country-specific factors. To gain insights into the desirability and feasibility of changing China’s governmental accounting from the current cash-based system to one based on the accrual approach, we survey 608 Chinese government staff and officials who either prepare or use such reports. These respondents identify a number of specific inadequacies in the current system and express widespread support for converting towards an accrual-based approach. They also assess the severity of potential impediments to change and the most workable arrangement and timetable for such a change.

Sometimes regarded as the best method of prioritizing budgetary expenditures, Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) was introduced into China in the early 1990s and systematically adopted since the recent budgeting reform although it has experienced numerous failures in many countries. This study examines ZBB as practiced in Hubei province in China. In Hubei, although the reformers are intended to create ZBB as a general budgeting framework, eventually, it was a Chinese style Target-Based Budgeting (TBB) rather than ZBB that has been put into place. Interestingly, ZBB has not disappeared but is deliberately applied to budgetary decisions of one type of expenditures under the Chinese style TBB. However, even in the field where ZBB is practiced, its achievements are at best moderate. The Chinese experiment of ZBB presents something new not only for the theory of ZBB but also for the budgeting literature.

Since the late 1970s, Chinese policymakers have implemented many policies to reform their country's administrative systems for the purpose of promoting economic development. In the area of public budgeting and finance, reform policies have been introduced to improve China's taxation system, budgeting system and intergovernmental fiscal relations. The implementation of these policies has resulted in many changes and improvement to China's society and has also created new challenges to China's future development. This symposium introduction provides a brief review of the development of reform policies and a summary of five articles that examine China's revenue system, public expenditure structure, budgeting control, incentive policy, and education finance.

This paper examines public budgeting in the first 30 years of China under central economic planning and one-party system. The research question is whether budgeting operates as it does under market economy in a democratic system. Analysis of historical documents finds that as a subordinate to central economic planning, budgeting was not able to play its functions. Though China was successful in employing all fiscal and monetary means to channel resources into targeted policy areas, budgeting was not effectively used as an administrative instrument. In the 30 years examined, the country seemed to be searching in vain for a workable budgeting system so as to avoid repeated financial frustrations.