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Willard A. Hanna's astute observation above about the institutionalization of corruption in Indonesia was published in August 1971, five years after President Soeharto assumed power. The origins of corruption in Indonesia can be traced to the Dutch colonial period as bribery was rife among the lowly paid personnel of the Dutch East India Company (Day, 1966, pp. 100–103). However, corruption became institutionalized during President Soeharto's 32-year reign as his cronies and family “made an art form of creaming off many of Indonesia's most profitable ventures … while being protected by monopoly regulations and their relationship to the president” (Kingsbury, 1998, p. 202). Raymond Bonner (1988, p. 80) has used the euphemism “the family business” to describe “the corruption surrounding members of the Suharto family,” which was “a public secret” in 1988.

The origins of the SCS can be traced to the civil service established by the English East India Company (EIC) in 1786, when the EIC began its operations in Malaya with the acquisition of Penang as a settlement from the Sultan of Kedah (Tilman, 1964, p. 40; Jones, 1953, p. 7). The EIC used the term “civil service” to distinguish its civilian employees from those working in the military, maritime, and ecclesiastical organizations. There were three types of civil servants then: those who were covenanted, i.e., occupying senior positions requiring a bond of 500 British pounds as security to ensure the performance of their duties; those who were uncovenanted; and extra-covenanted officers who were granted covenants locally because of their exceptional administrative capabilities (Blunt, 1937, pp. 1–2).

Thaksin Shinawatra became the prime minister of Thailand after his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party won 248 of the 500 seats in the 6 January 2001 election. This was the first time that a single political party had won such a mandate in Thai democratic history (Pasuk & Baker, 2009, p. 8). One month earlier, the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) had charged Thaksin with concealing assets worth 4.5 billion baht on three occasions during 1997–1998, accusing him of registering these assets in the names of his housekeeper, maid, driver, security guard, and business colleagues. However, the NCCC's judgment was not upheld by the Constitutional Court, which had acquitted Thaksin on a split 8–7 decision in Thaksin's favor on 3 August 2001 (Pasuk & Baker, 2004, pp. 1, 5). If Thaksin had been found guilty by the Constitutional Court, he would have to resign as prime minister and be prohibited from holding public office for five years.

In late April 1973, Charles P. Sutcliffe, the Commissioner of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force (RHKPF), received confidential information that Chief Superintendent Peter F. Godber, Deputy District Police Commander for Kowloon, was remitting money abroad. This information was transmitted to James J. E. Morrin, the Director of the Anti-Corruption Office (ACO), for investigation. By the end of May 1973, investigations by the ACO officers revealed that Godber had deposited in Hong Kong banks or remitted overseas HK$650,000 (US$128,332) since 1968 (Blair-Kerr, 1973a, pp. 3–4).

In his autobiography, Chen Shui-bian (1999, p. 40) condemned the Koumintang's (KMT's) corruption and praised the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for being free from money politics and corruption. The DPP fought the 1992 Legislative Yuan election campaign effectively on an anticorruption platform and used the same strategy in subsequent elections. If Chen Shui-bian had criticized the KMT for its involvement with “black gold” politics and had won the 2000 presidential election on his anticorruption platform, why was he and his family found guilty of corruption after his second term of office? The short answer is that even though he had promised to curb corruption, President Chen himself had succumbed to corruption after assuming office. In June 2002, Keesing's Contemporary Archives cited a poll in Taiwan that indicated that more respondents had perceived the DPP to be more corrupt than the KMT (Copper, 2006, p. 14).

Singapore is perceived to be the least corrupt country in Asia according to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 1995 to 2010. In 2010, Singapore was ranked joint first with Denmark and New Zealand among 178 countries on the CPI with a score of 9.3. However, this does not mean that corruption does not exist in Singapore, which has its share of corruption scandals too. Indeed, the scandal involving Teh Cheang Wan attracted a great deal of attention because he was the Minister for National Development in Singapore from 1979 to 1986.

It is commonly recognized that the transition to democracy in Korea was associated with economic progress. However, not many scholars have given attention to the role of bureaucracy during the process of democratization, due to the fact that bureaucracy is usually thought of as belonging to politics, not democracy. As a refutation of this general view, first, this chapter argues that bureaucracy has been an important contributor to political modernization. Since the post-1945 period, the ‘ceiling’ strategy, which limits the total number of civil servants, was introduced into the personnel management method and system of checks and balances to limit undue political influence over staffing and to control bureaucratic expansion. Second, through this strategy as policy, the bureaucracy legitimately tried to avoid undemocratic political power by standardized process and allow coordination. The ceiling policy is originally the product of historical context during colonial and authoritarian period, but the bureaucracy utilizes it as the instrument to reduce corruption. The contribution of this chapter is provoking the new insights about democratization from bureaucrat’s perspective which is rarely highlighted.

The authors discuss a large system transformation project they designed and implemented in Slovenia at the start of its independence in the early 1990s. Post-mortem insights are useful for practitioners who embark on similarly broad transformation processes. Design issues are discussed such as structuring the pre-contracting phase to guarantee inclusive stakeholder representation and participation throughout the transformation process and how intervention design needs to allow for experimentation and multi-stakeholder alliance building. Application of action research and action learning in a risk-averse environment typical of central governments helped create a sense of ownership, control, and collective accountability in the partner country.

Compensation refers to “all forms of financial returns and tangible services and benefits employees receive as part of an employment relationship” (Milkovich & Newman, 1999, p. 6). A more specific definition is provided by Edwin B. Flippo, who has defined compensation as “the adequate and equitable remuneration of personnel for their contribution to organization objectives.” He identifies its three components as: basic wage or salary (to attract qualified candidates); variable compensation (to motivate job performance); and supplementary fringe benefits (to retain talented staff) (Flippo, 1984, p. 281). Table 6.1 identifies the functions of these three components of compensation.

Stephanie McPhail's description above of the difficult living conditions of the judges in Mongolia in 1995 underscores their vulnerability to corrupt practices and their negative perception by the public. Judicial salaries during that year were comparable to those of civil servants but lower than those of lawyers in private practice and ranged from US$33 to US$51 per month (Quah, 2003a, p. 43). More importantly, the living conditions of judges were difficult, especially in the countryside, where one-third of the judges did not own an apartment, and were forced to live in their offices. Consequently, McPhail (1995, p. 45) concluded that the “relatively low salaries and mediocre working conditions” of the judges were “an impediment to attracting highly qualified candidates to the profession.”