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Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

The first issue that requires examination is the question of how we got to this point to begin with. The answer to this question, of course, is a function of who “we” happens to be. The lawyers can blame Oliver Wendell Holmes (1897, p. 469), who made “the man of the future … the man of statistics and the master of economics.” The future, it would seem, is now. Legal Realist/Institutionalist lawyer-economists such as Walton Hamilton and Robert Lee Hale, who were economists on law school faculties before that tradition got started at Chicago, had something to do with this too, although neither they nor law-minded economists such as John R. Commons can be given credit or blame for the economic analysis of law – at least not directly.³ The birth of the economic analysis of law is very much a Chicago story – Coase, Becker, and Posner – although we must allow that Guido Calabresi also had more than a bit to do with these things.⁴

Ideology as a mixture of consciously or unconsciously accepted ideas and beliefs provides the underlying support or rationalisation for fundamental features of thought and action in a society. A vigorously promoted contending ideology may at any given time also influence developments. Value judgments, which are likewise not based on the logical rules of observation and verification, may for present purposes be taken as concerned with less comprehensive or less fundamental matters than ideology.

William Baumol is best-known as an academic. He was a prodigious researcher and publisher of texts on microeconomic theory, and a highly regarded educator with roles as head of the Department of Economics at Princeton University, director of the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics and director of the Berkley Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation at New York University. Less well-known were his engagements as a corporate consultant, notably for the telecommunications monopoly AT&T. Baumol’s work as an advisor, expert witness and theorist for AT&T spanned three decades from 1966. His relationship with AT&T arguably forms the context within which we can better understand his work on contestability theory, which he developed with a team of economists working for AT&T’s Bell Telephone Laboratories in the 1970s. Contestability theory was later deployed as a policy tool to justify industry deregulation and even advocate for monopolies and oligopolies on the ground that they were optimally efficient industry structures if potential competitors faced low barriers of entry. Baumol’s intellectual contribution to contestability theory was arguably influenced by the Chicago school and by AT&T’s drive toward the technological integration of telecommunications. Contestability was a rebellion against economic orthodoxies concerning competition and government regulation, and the status quo within AT&T which opposed market competition on the ground that it threatened the technological integration of the Bell system. The outcome was a revolution in industrial organization that would pave the way for the emergence of platform business models incorporating multi-sided and two-sided markets as exemplified by Amazon and Uber.

This is a, somewhat indirect, rejoinder to Boettke (2019, this volume, Chapter 1). Doing Austrian economics is low prestige: Austrian economics does not get published in high-prestige journals and Austrian economists are not employed by top universities. And yet, up until World War II Austrian economics was an important part of the international economics community. The author argues that Austrian economists made several theoretical innovations that could have placed them at the frontier of research in economics, and present a brief counterfactual history of a thriving Austrian economics based on those innovations. However, the actual history of the Austrian School is quite different. A particularly decisive factor that has made Austrian economics a fringe movement was the rejection of formal methods in theory and empirics. The author argues that Austrian economics is basically dying out as a voice in the conversation of modern economists.

There are more scholars teaching and actively engaged in research associated with the Austrian School of Economics now than at any other time in its history. However, there is still something seriously wrong within the Austrian School and changes must be made both individually and collectively. In this piece, the author first discusses scientific progress with an emphasis on the individual behavior that is required to contribute to science, and the horizontal relationships that are required for the spread of ideas within a scientific community. Next, the author discusses the example of the Austrian school from 1950 to today in terms of these horizontal relationships within the profession and, in particular, in comparison with other mainline contributors during the same time period. The author then will address the multiplicity of horizontal relationships that might be explored as alternative discourse communities in the contemporary intellectual landscape. Lastly, the author concludes that the Austrian School of Economics must cultivate an explicit awareness of plausible, intrinsically interesting, and creative research agendas, and must therefore regard their work as a productive input into the ongoing research production of others within the broader community of economists and political economists.

X = multiple interpretations

This paper discusses Frank H. Knight's thought under three major themes, namely subjectivism, interpretation and social economics. Knight's economics starts with a conscious mind construct which is able to infer under partial knowledge. Conscious human action is purposive, forward looking and extends towards other individuals. Rejecting neoclassical positivism, Knight points to the need for economics to reconceptualize itself as an interpretative study, a methodology in the Weberian tradition. Furthermore, his allure for phenomenological economics opens a methodological possibility for the Austrian School of Economics. This paper concludes that Knight's insight earns himself a place in the history of subjectivist economics.

By revisiting the agency theory literature, this paper aims to both incrementally advance historical viewpoints and reveal four prominent influences on agency theory: Weber and Simon, The Great Depression, Cooperation and the Chicago School. This is critical given that understanding the history behind the authors’ major theoretical lenses is fundamental to using these theories to explain various phenomena.

Drawing on a plethora of archival sources and following the influence-mapping approach used by other management history scholars, this manuscript synthesizes historical accounts and archival information to provide a clearer picture of the major historical influences in the formation of agency theory.

We shed light on four areas related to management history that helped propel agency theory. Whereas past scholarship has not recognised them as influencers, we find and show how the industrial revolution, unionization, the stock exchange and other management approaches all played a role in the development of agency theory’s core tenants.

We extend upon the influential people and events that shaped agency theory, thus providing a fuller understanding of the theory’s usefulness. Moreover, we fill in gaps enabling scholars to better understand the context in which the core tenants of agency theory were developed.

To assess not how Samuelson's individual models contributed to human knowledge but the very true foundation on which they rest, namely, sound theory, facts, and philosophy.

This article has placed Samuelson as a philosopher seeking the truth, and as a theoretical contributor to the many sub‐disciplines of economics.

Shows that his truths bear the evidence of reality, and that his theoretical contributions are not different in kind from the logical theorists. Demonstrates how easily one could formulate a Samuelsonian impossibility theorem that places his thought on the level of the mathematical research started by Hilbert and concluded by Kurt Godel.

The literature that has assessed his contributions in this regard is fragmented, and myopically sparse, leaving gaps to be filled in by a paper such as this.