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The purpose of this paper is to identify both the problems and their solutions in the corporate governance systems of Korean business groups (chaebols) in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.

This is a conceptual paper and includes suggestions for improving international governance systems.

In this paper, the author focuses on how chaebols should be restructured to improve the Korean economy. In order to figure out how they should be restructured, the author explains the positives and negatives of their current structure and how these can be modified/eliminated to make stronger corporate governance.

The paper provides conceptual insights into systems and laws, which can be used to improve the corporate governance of business groups.

The objective of this paper is to determine whether international entry‐order strategies by Korean chaebols affect the exit of their foreign subsidiaries.

The sample consists of a set of 61 parent firms and their 500 foreign subsidiaries. The sample includes 27 Korean business groups, called chaebols, and spans 51 markets, during the period from 1999 to 2004. The study employs resource‐ and knowledge‐based views, and is based on the Cox's proportional hazard model.

This study leads to two main findings: in the context of Korean business groups, latecomers in international markets have greater survival rates than pioneers do because latecomers have stronger resource commitments; and, nonetheless, if chaebol pioneers have greater competitive advantages than chaebol latecomers, the pioneers' subsidiaries have better survival rates than do those of latecomers.

The analysis advances order‐of‐entry research by exploring the international order‐of‐entry strategies of chaebol multinationals and their impact on international exit and the interrelationship between the order‐of‐entry and core competencies of chaebol multinationals.

The chaebols in Korea contained some problems. One is that they have represented a disturbing concentration of market power. There is no evidence of the big firms colluding; for the most part they compete fiercely. But, taken together, the four biggest chaebols, Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo and LG, employ only 3 per cent of the workforce while accounting for almost a third of the total sales of all South Korean companies. These four groups alone handle nearly 60 per cent of total exports. The concentration of ownership is tighter still, the families that founded the top 30 chaebols still own perhaps 60 per cent of their combined equity. The formation of chaebol and its developing process will be reviewed and some points of their systematic problems will be summarized in this paper. Adjustment cost and equity on the reform of chaebol also will be discussed. It is natural to argue that the productive efficiency engaged in super size enterprise group should be one of the objectives which inflict large costs on the economy. It can be suggested that more reform would be efficient in choosing a new system. Professional management seems to be one of the practically efficient outcomes. As a efficient policy, it will withstand future policy challenges better than the status quo. In terms of economic efficiency and equity as well, professional management systems which clean out illegal behaviour consistently may represent an optimal mix as long as they are under the present system.

This paper aims to discuss the profiles of Korean chaebols involved in global electronics

The research was conducted among 132 of their Korean suppliers, with linked in‐depth interviews with chaebol managers. From an initial set of literature‐based variables, factor analysis is used to generate six chaebol characteristics, which are then correlated with four chaebol‐supplier relationship outcomes.

“Decision making” and “social exchange”, in particular, are found to correlate positively with all four chaebol‐supplier relationship outcome measures, relationship satisfaction, performance, cooperation and conflict resolution. “Partnership” is associated positively with three of these outcomes, and “strategy‐longevity” with relationship satisfaction. The chaebols' “structure‐control” and “leadership” are not found to be predictors of successful relationship outcomes as measured in this study. A combination of higher quality, lower cost products with linkages to a foundation of decision making, social exchange, partnership and strategy‐longevity appears to be a potent mix for global players.

The paper provides the underpinnings of the marketing strategy and component strategy profiles of a number of major Korean multinationals in the belief that they would inform western relationship marketing strategies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how Korean conglomerates (chaebol) have rapidly ascended to international prominence. The success of Korean chaebol firms seems to be associated with internal market transactions. Just as Japanese keiretsu firms succeeded by utilizing a bank‐centred financing system, Korean chaebol firms devised an internal financing system such as payment guarantees and collateral provisions in a restrictive regulatory environment.

This study examines the effects of such internal market transactions on the technical efficiency of chaebol firms using a stochastic frontier function for a panel data set of 1,675 firms from 1992 to 1998.

The study has found that chaebol firms have achieved a net gain in technical efficiency by utilizing internal market transactions as a way of mitigating liquidity constraints. Thus, the chaebol's role as an internal capital provider has given Korean conglomerates a competitive advantage in product pricing and capital financing, which is the main source of the success of Korean chaebol firms.

What is new in the paper is that the positive effects of the Korean chaebol on the Korean economy have outweighed the negative effects of the chaebol. The paper has provided empirical evidence that the chaebol played a major role in transforming the Korean economy from an agricultural economy to an IT‐led economy. The main value of the paper may be found in its attempt to analyze the technical efficiency of Korean large business groups using a stochastic frontier production approach. The paper will appeal to readers who are interested in the driving forces of rapid economic growth in a developing economy.

Places Korean chaebols (i.e. family‐owned conglomerates) in the context of organizational theory, characterizes them as leveraged controlling minority structure firms and discusses the behavioural consequences of this. Examines their long term performance in terms of diversification/changinb business environment, aggressive investment drive and the effects of management by one man. Considers the necessary conditions for efficient corporate governance and relates them to various Korean reforms, e.g. to protect minority shareholders. Summarizes the findings of the study and briefly considers their implications.

In recent years, many of South Korea's most prominent organizations have been involved in large‐scale frauds. These frauds have had a devastating impact on South Korean society and resulted in unnecessary suffering and high levels of unemployment for the middle class. With the aim of understanding the causes of these scandals, this paper takes an in‐depth look at the chaebol organization.

The paper takes a conceptual approach by first examining chaebols in greater detail. The paper then examines classical fraud theory, including the fraud triangle. The paper then examines chaebol organizations through the lens of the fraud triangle. By doing so, it is possible to understand why chaebols, in particular, are susceptible to fraud and corruption.

The paper provides evidence to suggest that chaebol organizations have inherent fraud risks. In order to minimize these fraud risks, chaebol organizations must address these issues.

This paper fulfills an important area of research by providing basic information about the relationship between chaebol organizations and fraud.

This paper explores how gender-related issues are communicated in Korean family-run conglomerates (chaebols) and the roles of women within these businesses. It also addresses to what extent the communication of chaebols about female employment and career development reflects the perception of gender representation in these organisations.

By paying attention to gendered discourse in Korean chaebols, this paper examines what is said and written about gender issues in glottographic statements (texts) and non-glottographic statements (charts and other visuals) of annual reports (ARs) published by five chaebols since 2010. The paper uses a Foucauldian framework to develop the archive of statements made within these ARs.

Although there is an increase in female-employee ratios, ARs show that number of women at the board or senior management level continue to be small. ARs tend to provide numbers related to female employment and retention in their non-glottographic statements, yet these numbers occasionally differ from and frequently are not explained by glottographic statements. The strategies used by chaebols to improve career prospects for their female staff are only vaguely described and rarely evaluated.

This paper looks beyond the existing discourse analysis on “talk and text” by also investigating claims made through graphic and linear/pictorial elements and their interplay with text. This approach opens new understandings of how gendered discourses are constructed and how they (unintentionally) fail to resolve issues and perceptions related to female employment and career development in Korea.

This study explores family firms' ex ante conflict management strategies to preserve their socioemotional wealth (SEW) under predictable conflict through the succession process. Specifically, the authors examine how family firms leverage the insurance-like benefits of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to mitigate the threat of foreseeable family feuds among the sons of firms' family heads.

The authors focus on the charitable donations pledged by Korean family business groups (chaebols). Using the data of 62 chaebols with generalized least squares (GLS) models, the authors analyze 711 observations from 2005 to 2017.

The authors find a positive relationship between the number of sons of a family firm's head and the firm's CSR activities such as spending on charitable donations. Furthermore, the number of daughters of heads in executive positions strengthens such a positive relationship, whereas the number of business and political marriage ties weakens this relationship.

Family heads of family businesses may leverage CSR activities and marriage ties to elite families interchangeably to ward off negative impacts from foreseeable family feuds and preserve their SEW. Thus, a policy-based incentive for CSR that encourages more family heads to use CSR as insurance would serve the public interest.

The authors contribute to the family business literature by suggesting that CSR activities can be used by family firms as an instrument to mitigate foreseeable damage to the SEW caused by family feuds. The authors also shed new light on CSR research by finding that marriage ties to elite families may reduce the strategic value of CSR activities.

This paper aims to explore the effect of social ties on the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm performance in Korea.

Social ties were measured from firm disclosures of 318 Korean firms from 2012 to 2015. Propensity score matching and regression analysis were used to investigate the moderating effects of social ties on the relationship between CSR and firm performance.

The result shows that social ties have more negative moderating effects on the relationship between CSR and firm performance in Chaebol firms than in non-Chaebol firms.

Firms need to enhance the monitoring of social ties within board members to assure the proper oversight of CSR.

This paper contributes to the CSR literature by providing empirical evidence of the negative aspects of social ties on the relationship between CSR and firm performance in Korea.