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Due to the fact that studies on central bank communication in emerging countries are still scarce and there are few studies related to the influence that central bank’s perspectives about the state of the economy have on inflation expectations in emerging economies, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature in the following aspects: it proposes an indicator of the central bank’s perception of inflation based on the minutes of the COPOM meetings, and, it analyzes the influence of central bank communication on expert inflation expectations through such indicator.

Due to the fact that the perception of the Central Bank of Brazil is not directly observable, it is measured through the fuzzy set theory by an indicator that captures the informational content of the minutes of the COPOM meetings. The empirical analysis uses ordinary least squares, the generalized method of moments and vector-autoregressive through impulse-response analysis.

The findings suggest that the expectations of financial market experts react according to the content of the information provided by the central bank, i.e., announcements cause deterioration of expectations in times of instability, and reduce inflation expectations when inflation is controlled. The results also support the idea that the credibility of inflation targeting plays a key role in determining inflation expectations.

This paper suggests a new approach on studies about central bank communication. The focus here is not on the effect of the announcements in terms of future monetary policy, but on the perception of the central bank in terms of inflation. This central bank’s perception reflects the optimistic or pessimistic view about the economic outlook and risk of inflation and this perception is considered by experts of financial markets.

For Brazil, there are no studies about the influence of communication through the minutes of the Brazilian Monetary Policy Committee meetings on inflation expectations. The authors develop an indicator in order to measure central bank’s perception of inflation based on the minutes of COPOM meetings.

This paper aims to contribute to the analysis concerning how inflation forecasts from different economic agents (professional forecasters and consumers) lead to varying levels of central bank credibility and how it affects the monetary policy interest rate and its expectations.

Based on the Brazilian economy data from June 2007 to May 2022, the authors provide evidence that is useful for search mechanisms that improve the conduct of monetary policy through the management of inflation expectations. The authors perform several ordinary least squares and generalized method of moments regressions inspired by the Taylor rule principle. In brief, the benchmark model considers that the monetary policy interest rate and its expectations respond to departures of inflation expectations to the target (a proxy for central bank credibility) and the level of economic activity.

The main result of the analysis is that inflation expectations from professional forecasters and consumers imply different perceptions of central bank credibility that affect the monetary policy interest rate and expectations for horizons until one year ahead.

The novelty that the authors bring from the analysis is that the authors calculate central bank credibility by taking into account the “public beliefs” of different economic agents. Furthermore, the authors analyze the effect of central bank credibility from professional forecasters and consumers on the monetary policy interest rate and its expectations.

This paper analyzes the potential presence of time-varying asymmetries in the preference parameters of the Central Bank of Brazil during the inflation targeting regime.

Given the econometric issues inherent to classical time-varying parameter (TVP) regressions, a Bayesian estimation procedure is implemented in order to provide more robust parameter estimates. A stochastic volatility specification is also included to take into account the potential presence of conditional heteroskedasticity.

The obtained results show that the reduced form and structural parameters were not constant during the period considered. Moreover, the subsequent analysis of the preference parameters provided evidences of short periods in which asymmetry was an important feature to the conduction of monetary policy in Brazil. Yet, during most of the sample period, the loss function was considered to be symmetrical.

This paper aims to contribute to the rather scarce monetary debate on time-varying central bank preferences. The study of Lopes and Aragón (2014) is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the only study for Brazil considering specifically TVPs. The authors applied Kalman filter estimation to data from 2000:M1 to 2011:M12. Despite the similar structure of TVPs, the present paper extends the latter study by controlling for stochastic volatility. Ignoring conditional heteroskedasticity might lead to spurious movements in time-varying variables and inaccurate inference (Hamilton, 2010). Thus, the stochastic volatility specification is included to take this issue into account. The authors follow the theoretical scheme put forward by Surico (2007) and Aragón and Portugal (2010), in which the economy is modeled from a New Keynesian perspective and the central bank loss function is assumed to be asymmetric regarding the responses to inflation and output deviations from their targets. On the empirical side, the authors propose a TVP univariate regression with stochastic volatility for the Brazilian reduced-form reaction function, following closely the Bayesian econometric procedure developed by Nakajima (2011). Given the nonlinear non-Gaussian nature of the TVP regression with stochastic volatility, the choice of a nonlinear Bayesian approach using the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method is justified due to the intractability of the associated likelihood function (Primiceri, 2005). Finally, based on the theoretical model specification, the authors intend to recover the central bank preference parameters as to further evaluate the degree of asymmetry and its potential time-variation under the inflation targeting regime.

Studies about the determinants of the clarity of central bank communication are still scarce. To the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies regarding emerging economies. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature in the following aspects: to analyze the determinants of the clarity of the central bank communication in an inflation targeting emerging economy; observe the influence of inflation volatility over the clarity; and observe the effect of the monetary policy signaling over the clarity.

The work uses readability indexes to measure the clarity of central bank communication. The empirical analysis uses ordinary least squares and the Generalized Method of Moments with one- and two-step estimations.

The findings suggest the inflation volatility reduces the clarity of central bank communication. Moreover, the monetary policy signaling also affects the clarity, but the effect depends on the direction of the signal.

This paper observes the determinants of the clarity considering an emerging economy environment. The clarity of central bank communications is an important tool to access transparency. Hence, the analysis of what determines the clarity of central bank communication is a debate about the level of transparency accessed by the central bank.

There are no studies about the determinants of the clarity of central bank communication in emerging economies. Moreover, the novelty are the effects of inflation volatility and monetary policy signaling over the clarity.

The purpose of this paper is to make an analysis of the Brazilian experience after the adoption of inflation targeting concerning the effects caused by the new practices of transparency and communication in the monetary policy.

Changes in the financial market's expectations due to monetary policy actions are analyzed based on methodologies proposed by Cook and Hahn and Kuttner. Daily data from transactions in the interbank deposit futures market of the Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange (BMF&BOVESPA) are used for the period July 1999‐January 2009. Two sub‐periods are also considered: the “maturation period” – the first phase of the effects caused by an increase in central bank transparency; and the “wisdom period” – the second phase in the financial market's perception regarding an environment with more transparency.

The findings are in consonance with the idea that an increase in central bank transparency and communication improves the efficiency of expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rate and the anticipation of changes in the interest rate target.

This study offers some new insights into how central bank communication improves the efficiency of the monetary policy for developing countries, which have adopted inflation targeting.

This paper aims to study a monetary policy problem, where concerns with price stability and with the impact of interest rates on public debt are simultaneously addressed.

The problem is analytically approached under a new Keynesian monetary policy framework to which a budget constraint is added and, subsequently, the model's implications are empirically illustrated by characterizing Brazilian policies.

The findings denote the existence of a trade‐off between inflation target and public debt stability. Therefore the determination of an inflation target cannot neglect this trade‐off. Furthermore, the empirical analysis from the Brazilian case shows that the Central Bank of Brazil takes into consideration public debt when determining the interest rate.

The determination of the interest rate in an inflation targeting regime must consider the public debt stability.

This paper makes a contribution on the theme of consistency between monetary policy and fiscal equilibrium.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss more efficient mechanisms of regulation in the financial system.

The authors developed a theoretical two-period model of financial flows (FFs) that considers households, banks, and a social planner.

It is important to highlight that different from other studies that do not distinguish between financial crisis and financial instability, the authors assume financial instability does not mean crisis, but represents a deviation in the behavior of the aggregate financial intermediation and in the financial operations of each bank from the equilibrium.

The practical implication of the model is the proposition of an efficient policy for financial stability based on forward-looking financial regulations.

An important result is that bank failures occur when banks do not maintain sufficient resources to support the liquidity constraint from the interbank market. Another result is that the central bank reacts, via exchange of reserves with the market, to financial instability. This behavior on the part of the central bank is inefficient because the banks will assume that in the case of failure they will be “saved;” thus it creates an adverse incentive (moral hazard) that can amplify the risk over the entire financial system.

The originality of the model is the proposition of an efficient policy for financial stability based on a forward-looking financial regulation. In this strategy the regulator acts in advance (ex ante) to minimize the mismatch of FFs in relation to the flow balance. This manner of acting is a counterpoint to the financial regulation based on capital requirement.

This work analyzes, through social-environmental reports, whether banks with higher transparency in social-environmental policies better safeguard financial stability in Brazil.

The analysis is carried out through a panel database analysis of the 42 largest Brazilian banks, representing 98% of the Brazilian financial system. Seeking to avoid spurious results, we followed rigorous methodological standards. Hence, we conducted an empirical analysis using a dynamic panel data model, we used the difference generalized method of moments (D-GMM) and the system generalized method of moments (S-GMM).

The results show that the higher the transparency of social-environmental policies, the lower the chance of possible stress on the financial stability of Brazilian banks. In sum, this study builds evidence that disclosing risks related to policies about sustainability can enhance financial stability. It is essential to highlight that social-environmental transparency does not have as direct objective financial stability.

The manuscript submitted represents an original work that analyzes whether banks with higher transparency in social-environmental policies better safeguard financial stability. Some countries, such as Brazil, have their potential for sustainable policies spotlighted due to their green territory and diverse natural ecosystems. Besides having green potential, Brazil is a developing country with a well-developed financial system. These characteristics make Brazil one of the best laboratories for studying the relationship between transparency in social-environmental policies and financial stability.

The purpose of this paper is to see if a difference exists between the impact of the subprime crisis on countries with more transparency and more regulated finance than on others. A further objective is to explain the success of the Brazilian case in avoiding the financial crisis and to show empirical evidence for the presence of market discipline.

The paper offers a regulation and transparency index (RTI) based on 37 countries. Considering RTI and stock market index of developed economies, BRICs economies, and developing economies, cross‐country estimations are made. Furthermore, the analysis for market discipline in the Brazilian case is based on GMM panels, taking into account market discipline through subordinated debt holders (debentures).

The results indicate that a higher degree of regulation and transparency is related to a higher return and a lower volatility in the stock market during the subprime crisis. Moreover, one of the main reasons for the apparent success of the Brazilian case in facing the crisis is the combination of a strong regulation of the financial system and the presence of market discipline.

Transparency of information by the banking sector is relevant for the regulation of the financial system.

The paper presents new insights for the literature on financial regulation and transparency of information in the search for a framework capable of avoiding financial crisis.