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The information of pledging stocks for liquidity by controlling shareholders of publicly traded firms in Taiwan has been required to disclose since 1998. A common perception by market practitioners in Taiwan is that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of expropriation of firms. This study first examines the determinants of the tendency that controlling shareholders of firms in Taiwan pledge their stocks to financial institutions for liquidity and then evaluates how stock pledging by controlling shareholders affects their firms' accounting and financial performances. Determinants of firm attributes, market conditions, and corporate governance are identified. The tendency of stock pledging by controlling shareholders has a negative effect on accounting and financial performances. The negative effect on firm performance is reduced when the firm has a higher level of working capital. These findings indicate that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of weak corporate governance when the firm has lower liquidity. These findings may provide insights to the equity markets of the other countries in which public firms have more concentrated ownerships.

We investigate institutional investors’ trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities for the period 1992–2001. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts, and insurance companies as passive institutions. We analyze the trading behavior of active and passive institutions surrounding merger announcements and their eventual resolution. Our results indicate that active institutions significantly increase their holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher announcement period abnormal return and this increase is more pronounced for stock mergers than cash mergers. Active institutions display preference for stock proposals at the merger announcement on the basis of their prior beliefs and this is explained by the “overreaction phenomenon.” However, they update their beliefs between announcement and final resolution as more information arrives into the market. Finally, active institutions appear to correct their overreaction behavior by displaying their greater preference for cash proposals as compared to stock proposals at the quarter of eventual outcome. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and utilize the information released at the announcement in rebalancing their portfolios at the final resolution.

Using 3,994 observations of Chinese listed firms from 1995 to 2001, we find a significantly positive correlation between state ownership and cash dividend payment, and a significantly positive relation between private ownership and stock dividend payment. In particular, we find that the relation between dividend payment level and ownership structure is nonlinear. The higher the proportion of state ownership, the higher the cash dividend rate. The higher the proportion of private ownership, the higher the stock dividend rate. We conclude that the managers of Chinese listed companies are likely to cater for the preference of different shareholders.

This paper explores dividend announcements based on information hypothesis. We explore in particular whether or not information signaling theory existed in Taiwan. We also explore the free cash flow hypothesis. In order to eliminate affecting factors, we target companies with irregular dividends as research samples, just like those with specially designated dividends (SDD). We examine whether or not those proceeds may be deemed as future earnings prospection. In this paper we study mainly dividend announcements made during stockholder’s meetings of the companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) or R.O.C. Over-the-Counter Securities Exchange (ROSE). We apply event study as means of analyzing abnormal returns of the companies. In addition we use the GARCH model with traditional ordinary least square to estimate the market model. The results indicate that SDDs are considered positive signals by the national exchange, TSE. In addition, we also show that the first-time SDD does transmit a positive signal to the market regarding the firm’s future cash flow, and that the SDD of no payment in the previous three years is negative. Furthermore, we prove that low Q firms have greater market reaction than high Q firms in announcement period. The free cash flow hypothesis and firm size effects could not be verified in Taiwan.

In a world of asymmetric information between managers and investors, the choice of the payment method is a key issue in mergers and acquisitions. Previous literature shows that contingent methods of payment other than stocks (e.g. contingent value rights, earnouts or convertible securities), even if they do not solve the information asymmetry problems, can mitigate their consequences. In this chapter, I examine the motivations and the effects of the inclusion of a contingent payment method the use of which has not been studied yet, the warrant. I show that this consideration is used mainly when information asymmetry problems are severe and that it can be used to solve the information problems.

Agency problems are more severe for multinational corporations (MNCs) and multinational enterprises compared to their domestic counterparts. As companies develop diversified operations, their managers face more challenges. An incentive compensation structure has been designed to align the benefits of managers with those of shareholders. Additionally, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become increasingly crucial for companies. MNCs must gain the trust of more investors to improve their corporate reputation and financial performance. CSR enables MNCs with a high sense of social responsibility to expand their investor base, reduce perceived risks, and decrease information asymmetry. Our empirical findings reveal that Taiwanese MNCs can enhance their performance by implementing cash-based compensation and pursuing CSR activities.

We propose a novel method of forecasting the level of informed trading at merger announcements. Informed traders typically take advantage of their knowledge of the forthcoming merger by trading heavily at announcement. They trade on positive volume or informed buys for cash mergers and negative volume or informed sells for stock mergers. In response, market makers set wider spreads and raise prices for informed buys and lower prices for informed sells. As liquidity traders trade on these prices, our vector autoregressive framework establishes the link between informed trading and liquidity trading through price changes. As long as the link holds, informed trading may be detected by measuring levels of liquidity trading. We observe the link during the −1 to +1 period for cash mergers and −1 to +5 period for stock mergers.

Though cross-border acquisitions have grown dramatically in value and frequency in the last ten years, little is known about returns to acquirers or their method-of-payment choice. This paper studies returns to U.S. bidders and their method-of-payment choice for acquisitions of foreign targets. Results indicate that bidder returns are higher for cash offers, for offers to private and subsidiary targets, if there is high insider ownership, and if there is high exchange rate variation. The method-of-payment choice for these bidders is linked to the target country’s legal regime and accounting standards, insider ownership, target type, and value uncertainty.

Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) limits tax deductibility of executive compensation to $1 million per covered executive, with an exception for performance-based compensation. Both stock options and annual bonuses can qualify as performance-based, but they vary in the difficulty of qualification and the degree of additional compensation risk that qualification imposes on the executive. Most stock-option grants easily qualify with little change in risk, but qualification increases the risk associated with annual bonus compensation relative to what it was prior. The results of this study show that the propensity to issue stock options has increased for affected executives as a percentage of total compensation. Additional analysis suggests that this increase in stock-option compensation is substituting for lower increases in salary for affected executives, but not for annual cash bonuses. In fact, the results suggest that bonus compensation is also increasing as a percentage of total compensation. In summary, the results indicate that firms and their executives are acting in a way consistent with the incentives provided by section 162(m).

The flexibility of managers to respond to risk and uncertainty inherent in business decisions is clearly of value. This value has historically been recognized in an ad hoc manner in the absence of a methodology for more rigorous assessment of value. The application of real option methodology represents a more objective mechanism that allows managers to hedge against adverse effects and exploit upside potential. Of particular interest to managers in the merger and acquisition (M&A) process is the value of such flexibility related to the particular terms of a transaction. Typically, stock for stock transactions take more time to complete as compared to cash given the time lapse between announcement and completion. Over this period, if stock prices are volatile, stock for stock exchanges may result in adverse selection through the dilution of shareholder wealth of an acquiring firm or a target firm.

The paper develops a real option collar model that may be employed by managers to measure the market price risk involved to their shareholders in offering or accepting stock. We further discuss accounting issues related to this contingency pricing effect. Using an acquisition example from U.S. banking industry we illustrate how the collar arrangement may be used to hedge market price risk through flexibility to renegotiate the deal by exercising managerial options.