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The purpose of this paper is to analyze manufacturers' production decisions and governments' low-carbon policies in the context of influencer spillover effects.

This paper investigates the impact of the social influencer spillover effect on manufacturers' production decisions when they collaborate with intermediary platforms to sell products through marketplace or reseller modes. Game theory and static numerical comparison are used to analyze our models.

Firstly, under low-carbon policies, the spillover effect does not always benefit manufacturer profits and changes non-monotonically with an increasing spillover effect. Secondly, in cases where there are both a carbon emission constraint and a spillover effect present, if either the manufacturer or intermediary platform holds a strong position, then marketplace mode benefits manufacturer profits. Thirdly, regardless of business mode used when environmental damage coefficient is high for products; government should implement cap-and-trade regulation to optimize social welfare while reducing manufacturers’ carbon emissions.

This study offers theoretical and practical research support to assist manufacturers in optimizing production decisions for compliance with carbon emission limits, enhancing profits through the development of effective influencer marketing strategies, and providing strategies to mitigate carbon emissions and enhance social welfare while sustaining manufacturing activities.

This paper addresses the limitations of prior research by examining how the social influencer spillover effect influences manufacturers' business mode choices under government low-carbon policies and analyzing the social welfare of different carbon emission restrictions when such spillovers occur. Our findings provide valuable insights for manufacturers in selecting optimal marketing strategies and business modes and decision-makers in implementing effective regulations.

Promoting electric vehicles (EVs) is an effective way to achieve carbon neutrality. If EVs are widely adopted, this will undoubtedly be good for the environment. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of network externalities and subsidy on the strategies of manufacturer under a carbon neutrality constraint.

In this paper, the authors propose a game-theoretic framework in an EVs supply chain consisting of a government, a manufacturer and a group of consumers. The authors examine two subsidy options and explain the choice of optimal strategies for government and manufacturer.

First, the authors find that the both network externalities of charging stations and government subsidy can promote the EV market. Second, under a relaxed carbon neutrality constraint, even if the government’s purchase subsidy investment is larger than the carbon emission reduction technology subsidy investment, the purchase subsidy policy is still optimal. Third, under a strict carbon neutrality constraint, when the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction and the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction technology are larger, social welfare will instead decrease with the increase of the effectiveness of emission reduction technology and then, the manufacturer’s investment in carbon emission reduction technology is lower. In the extended model, the authors find the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction technology can also promote the EV market and social welfare (or consumer surplus) is the same whatever the subsidy strategy.

The network externalities of charging stations and the subsidy effect of the government have a superimposition effect on the promotion of EVs. When the network effect of charging stations is relatively strong, government can withdraw from the subsidized market. When the network effect of charging stations is relatively weak, government can intervene appropriately.

Comparing previous studies, this study reveals the impact of government intervention, network effects and carbon neutrality constraints on the EV supply chain. From a sustainability perspective, these insights are compelling for both EV manufacturers and policymakers.

The importance of carbon reduction has become a global consensus, and more and more countries are implementing the cap-and-trade mechanism, including China. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal carbon emission allowances (CEA) purchasing decisions of supply chain members under the cap-and-trade mechanism in China.

An evolutionary game model is established to analyze the CEA purchase strategy choices of suppliers and manufacturers in the supply chain. The influence of the key parameters on the evolutionary game results is analyzed by numerical simulations.

The supply chain system always evolves towards neither supplier nor manufacturer purchasing CEA or both purchasing CEA. Illegal production behavior and excessive CEA costs are key factors that hinder parties from purchasing CEA. High revenue from purchasing CEA for production, high supply chain losses and high governmental penalties can promote parties to purchase CEA.

The results help supply chain members make better CEA purchasing decisions and also benefit the development of China’s carbon trading market and environmental protection.

The purpose of the study is to investigate the financing channels and carbon emission abatement preferences of supply chain members, and further examine the optimal contract design of the retailer.

This paper develops a low-carbon supply chain composed of one retailer and one manufacturer, in which the retailer provides trade credit to the manufacturer. Considering the cap-and-trade regulation, the manufacturer with uncertain yield makes decision on whether to invest in emission abatement. There are bank loan and trade credit to finance production for the manufacturer and green credit to finance emission abatement investment. Meanwhile, the retailer may provide the manufacturer with three kinds of contracts to improve emission abatement efficiency, namely, revenue sharing, cost sharing or both sharing.

The results show that the retailer prefers to offer financing service at lower interest rate, but trade (and green) credit financing is always optimal for manufacturer and supply chain. The investment in emission abatement is value-added to all players. The sharing contracts offered by the retailer at lower sharing ratios can realize Pareto improvement of the system regardless of the financing scheme. However, comparing with the revenue or cost sharing contract, the existence of optimal sharing ratios makes the both sharing contract more favorable to the retailer.

The findings provide guidance for the emission-dependent manufacturer in financing and emission abatement decisions, as well as recommendations for the retailer to offer loan service and sharing contract.

This paper integrates green credit into bank loan or trade credit to analyze the financing decision of the manufacturer with uncertain yield and further considers the influence of three kinds of sharing contracts introduced by the retailer on improving operational performance.

The authors target the interrelationships between non-fungible tokens (NFTs), decentralized finance (DeFi) and carbon allowances (CA) markets during 2021–2023. The recent shift of crypto and DeFi miners from China (the People's Republic of China, PRC) green hydro energy to dirty fuel energies elsewhere induces investments in carbon offsetting instruments; this is a backdrop to the authors’ investigation.

The quantile vector autoregression (VAR) approach is employed to examine extreme-quantile-connectedness and spillovers among the NFT Index (NFTI), DeFi Pulse Index (DPI), KraneShares Global Carbon Strategy ETF price (KRBN) and the Solactive Carbon Emission Allowances Rolling Futures Total Return Index (SOLCARBT).

At bull markets, DPI is the only consistent net shock transmitter as NFTI transmits innovations only at the most extreme quantile. At bear markets, KRBN and SOLCARBT are net shock transmitters, while NFTI is the only consistent net shock receiver. The receiver-transmitter roles change as a function of the market conditions. The increases in the relative tail dependence correspond to the stress events, which make systemic connectedness augment, turning market-specific idiosyncratic considerations less relevant.

The shift of digital asset miners from the PRC has resulted in excessive fuel energy consumption and aggravated environmental consequences regarding NFTs and DeFi mining. Although there exist numerous studies dedicated to CA trading and its role in carbon print reduction, the direct nexus between NFT, DeFi and CA has never been addressed in the literature. The originality of the authors’ research consists in bridging this void. Results are valuable for portfolio managers in bull and bear markets, as the authors show that connectedness is more intense under such conditions.

This paper aims to refine the mechanisms affecting the two-way technology spillover and carbon transfer interactions between supply chain enterprises, and to guide their reduction of carbon emissions.

This study formulates a supplier-led Stackelberg game model to explore the effects of the interactions between two-way technology spillover effects and carbon transfers in decentralized and centralized decision-making scenarios. The optimized Shapley value is introduced to coordinate across the supply chain and determine the overall profits lost in the decentralized scenario.

Emission reductions by the low-carbon manufacturer are negatively correlated with the carbon transfers. Vertical technology spillovers promote carbon reduction, whereas horizontal technology spillovers inhibit it. The vertical technology spillovers amplify the negative effects of the carbon transfers, whereas the horizontal technology spillovers alleviate these negative effects. When the vertical technology spillover effect is strong or the horizontal technology spillover effect is weak in the centralized scenario, the carbon reduction is negatively correlated with the carbon transfers. Conversely, when the vertical technology spillover effect is weak or the horizontal technology spillover effect is strong, the enterprise’s carbon reduction is positively correlated with the carbon transfers. An optimized Shapley value can coordinate the supply chain.

This study examines the effects of carbon transfers on enterprises from a micro-perspective and distinguishes between vertical and horizontal technology spillovers to explore how carbon transfers and different types of technology spillovers affect enterprises’ decisions to reduce carbon emissions.

This paper aims to introduce a novel structure for the physical internet (PI)–enabled sustainable supplier selection and inventory management problem under uncertain environments.

To address hybrid uncertainty both in the objective function and constraints, a novel interactive hybrid multi-objective optimization solution approach combining Me-based fuzzy possibilistic programming and interval programming approaches is tailored.

Various numerical experiments are introduced to validate the feasibility of the established model and the proposed solution method.

Due to its interconnectedness, the PI has the opportunity to support firms in addressing sustainability challenges and reducing initial impact. The sustainable supplier selection and inventory management have become critical operational challenges in PI-enabled supply chain problems. This is the first attempt on this issue, which uses the presented novel interactive possibilistic programming method.

Collaborative emission reduction among supply chain members has emerged as a new trend to achieve climate neutrality goals and meet consumers’ low-carbon preferences. However, carbon information asymmetry and consumer mistrust represent significant obstacles. This paper investigates the value of blockchain technology (BCT) in solving the above issues.

A low-carbon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer is examined. This study discusses three scenarios: non-adoption BCT, adoption BCT without sharing the supplier’s carbon emission reduction (CER) information and adoption BCT with sharing the supplier’s CER information. We analyze the optimal decisions of the supplier and the manufacturer through the Stackelberg game, identify the conditions in which the supplier and manufacturer adopt BCT and share information from the perspectives of economic and environmental performance.

The results show that adopting BCT benefits supply chain members, even if they do not share CER information through BCT. Furthermore, when the supplier’s CER efficiency is low, the manufacturer prefers that the supplier share this information. Counterintuitively, the supplier will only share CER information through BCT when the CER efficiencies of both the supplier and manufacturer are comparable. This diverges from the findings of existing studies, as the CER investments of the supplier and the manufacturer in this study are interdependent. In addition, despite the high energy consumption associated with BCT, the supplier and manufacturer embrace its adoption and share CER information for the sake of environmental benefits.

The firms in low-carbon supply chains can adopt BCT to improve consumers’ trust. Furthermore, if the CER efficiencies of the firms are low, they should share CER information through BCT. Nonetheless, a lower unit usage cost of BCT is the precondition.

This paper makes the first move to discuss BCT adoption and BCT-supported information sharing for collaborative emission reduction in supply chains while considering the transparency and high consumption of BCT.

The coal-fired power plants have been confronted with new operation challenge since the unified carbon trading market was launched in China. To make the optimal decision for the carbon emissions and power production has already been an important subject for the plants. Most of the previous studies only considered the market prices of electricity and coal to optimize the generation plan. However, with the opening of the carbon trading market, carbon emission has become a restrictive factor for power generation. By introducing the carbon-reduction target in the production decision, this study aims to achieve both the environmental and economic benefits for the coal-fired power plants to positively deal with the operational pressure.

A dynamic optimization approach with both long- and short-term decisions was proposed in this study to control the carbon emissions and power production. First, the operation rules of carbon, electricity and coal markets are analyzed, and a two-step decision-making algorithm for annual and weekly production is presented. Second, a production profit model based on engineering constraints is established, and a greedy heuristics algorithm is applied in the Gurobi solver to obtain the amounts of weekly carbon emission, power generation and coal purchasing. Finally, an example analysis is carried out with five generators of a coal-fired power plant for illustration.

The results show that the joint information of the multiple markets of carbon, electricity and coal determines the real profitability of power production, which can assist the plants to optimize their production and increase the profits. The case analyses demonstrate that the carbon emission is reduced by 2.89% according to the authors’ method, while the annual profit is improved by 1.55%.

As an important power producer and high carbon emitter, coal-fired power plants should actively participate in the carbon market. Rather than trade blindly at the end of the agreement period, they should deeply associate the prices of carbon, electricity and coal together and realize optimal management of carbon emission and production decision efficiently.

This paper offers an effective method for the coal-fired power plant, which is struggling to survive, to manage its carbon emission and power production optimally.

This paper considers carbon abatement in a competitive supply chain that is composed of a manufacturer and two retailers under vertical shareholding. The authors emphasize the equilibrium decision problem of stakeholders under vertical shareholding and different power structures.

A game-theoretic approach was used to probe the influence of power structure and retailer competition on manufacturers' carbon abatement under vertical shareholding. The carbon abatement decisions, environmental imp4cacts (EIs) and social welfare (SW) of different scenarios under vertical shareholding are obtained.

The findings show that manufacturers are preferable to carbon abatement and capture optimal profits when shareholding is above a threshold under the retailer power equilibrium, but they may exert a worse negative impact on the environment. The dominant position of the held retailer is not always favorable to capturing the optimal SW and mitigating EIs. In addition, under the combined effect of competition level and shareholding, retailer power equilibrium scenarios are more favorable to improving SW and reducing EIs.

This paper inspects the combined influence of retailer competition and power structure on manufacturers' carbon abatement. Distinguishing from previous literature, the authors also consider the impact of vertical shareholding and consumer preferences. In addition, the authors analyze the SW and EIs in different scenarios.