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In this study, the authors examined demand-side credit in rural China with the aims of understanding attribute preferences and the willingness of farmers to pay for credit.

The authors implemented an in-the-field discrete choice experiment (DCE) using a D-optimal block (6 × 9 × 3) design applied to 420 farm households across five Chinese provinces (Shandong, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Jiangsu and Henan) in the summer and fall of 2018. The DCE included six attributes including the interest rate, term of loan, type of loan, type of repayment, type of institution and mobile banking services.

Conditional and mixed logit results indicated a downward sloping credit demand curve with variable elasticity across regions. Provincial willingness-to-pay (WTP) indicators suggested that farmers were willing to pay a premium for long-term ( 0.03–0.687%) and low collateral credit loans ( 0.79–2.93%). Also, four of five provinces indicated a preference for loan amortization rather than lump-sum payment. Interestingly, in comparison to the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), only farmers in Shandong, Sichuan and Shaanxi indicated a preference for rural credit cooperatives (RCCs)/banks and the Postal Savings Bank of China (PSBC). Another quite surprising result was bank services, in our case, access to mobile banking did not appear to induce WTP for agricultural credit. While conditional and mixed logit regression coefficients were similar (and therefore robust), the authors found that there was substantial heterogeneity across attribute preferences on term of loan, type of loan and amortization. Preferences for type of lender and mobile banking were generally homogenous. This result alone suggested that lenders should consider offering a suite of credit products with different attributes in order to maximize the potential pool of borrowers. While there were some differences across provinces, farmers appeared to be indifferent to lenders, and it did not appear that offering banking services such as mobile banking had any bearing on credit decisions.

This paper presents a first step in using in-the-field choice experiments to better understand rural finance in China. Although the sample size satisfies conventional levels of significance and rank conditions, the authors caution against attributing results to China as a whole. Different provinces have different institutional structures and agricultural growing conditions and economies and these effects may differentially affect WTP for credit. Although by all indications farmers were aware of credit, not all farmers, in fact a minority, actually borrowed from a financial institution. This is not unusual in China, but for these farmers, the DCE was posed as hypothetical. Likewise, the study’s design was based on a generic credit product typical of rural China, and the authors caution against making inferences about other products with different attributes and risk structures.

This study is motivated by the rapidly changing dynamic in China's agricultural economy. With specific reference to new laws and regulations about the transfer of land use rights (LURs), China's agricultural economy is undergoing significant and rapid change which will require better understanding by policy makers, lenders and practitioners of the changing credit needs of farmers, including the new and emerging class of commercial farmers.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the authors believe that the result provided in this paper present the first use of in-the-field DCE and are the first to be reported in either the English or Chinese literature on rural credit product design.

Based on a survey of 897 farm households, the purpose of this paper is to build a framework using cluster analysis to explain how farmers make decisions on joining group guarantee, and analyzes factors influencing their decisions using multinomial and binary Logit regressions.

The approach of combining cluster analysis with Logit regression is an innovative approach to survey assessment. In addition, by design the authors have identified the four mutually exclusive groups of borrowers combining Group Guarantee membership and actual formal borrowing.

An extremely important observation according to the data is that most farmers appear to be part of group guarantees only because they have to in order to get access to formal credit products. 87.21 percent of the people who belong to groups and utilize the formal credit products belong to this category because their lenders have made participation in groups compulsory for access to credit. This may ration farmers’ willingness to even apply for credit. It also indicates a preference on the part of older and more risk-averse respondents to avoid participation in group guarantees. Out of financial characteristics the total loan holdings appears to be the only significant indicator of participation in group guarantees. Furthermore the results indicate that informal and formal credit appear to be replaceable for farmers.

The survey is confined only to the counties investigated. China is very diverse in its agricultural economies and many RCCs operate under different guidance and rules from those investigated here. Hence, while the authors can claim that the results are indicative, the authors cannot claim that they will hold generally.

Based on group guarantee loan mechanism and survey data analysis of 897 farm households, this paper analyzes influencing factors affecting farmers’ participation in group guarantees from microcosmic level, so as to provide some reference to further perfect micro credit operation mode and mechanism.

The results indicate that the Group Guarantee mechanism, while beneficial to some, may not hold global appeal for Chinese farmers. In the future RCCs may want to consider alternative approaches to loan security than placing the burden of guarantee on farmers’ family and friends.

The approach of combining cluster analysis with Logit regression is an innovative approach to survey assessment. In addition, by design the authors have identified the four mutually exclusive groups of borrowers combining Group Guarantee membership and actual formal borrowing.