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The purpose of this paper is to compare two corruption scandals in Singapore to illustrate how its government has dealt with these scandals and to discuss the implications for its anti-corruption strategy.

This paper analyses the Teh Cheang Wan and Edwin Yeo scandals by relying on published official and press reports.

Both scandals resulted in adverse consequences for the offenders. Teh committed suicide on 14 December 1986 before he could be prosecuted for his bribery offences. Yeo was found guilty of criminal breach of trust and forgery and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. The Commission of Inquiry found that the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) was thorough in its investigations which confirmed that only Teh and no other minister or public official were implicated in the bribery offences. The Independent Review Panel appointed by the Prime Minister's Office to review the CPIB's internal controls following Yeo's offences recommended improvements to strengthen the CPIB's financial procedures and audit system. Singapore has succeeded in minimising corruption because its government did not cover-up the scandals but punished the guilty offenders and introduced measures to prevent their recurrence.

This paper will be useful for scholars, policymakers and anti-corruption practitioners interested in Singapore's anti-corruption strategy and how its government handles corruption scandals.

The purpose of this paper is to make recommendations to address the four limitations of Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB).

The paper begins by attributing Singapore’s reputation as the least corrupt Asian country to the CPIB’s four strengths: its independence from the police; its adequate staffing and funding; its adoption of the total approach to enforcement; and its impartial enforcement of the anti-corruption laws. It then proceeds to identify the CPIB’s limitations and provides four suggestions to address these limitations.

The sentencing of Edwin Yeo, a senior CPIB officer, to ten years’ imprisonment on 20 February 2014 for misappropriating US$1.76 million for nearly four years reveals that there were weaknesses in the CPIB’s internal controls and procurement procedures in spite of its effectiveness in curbing corruption. This paper recommends that the CPIB addresses its four limitations by strengthening its internal controls and procurement procedures; enhancing public trust and confidence by further improving its outreach to the population; improving the external oversight of its activities; and developing its in-house research capabilities.

This paper will be useful for those scholars, policy-makers, and anti-corruption practitioners who are interested in how the CPIB can further enhance its effectiveness even though Singapore is perceived as the least corrupt Asian country.

The purpose of this paper is to explain Singapore’s success in combating corruption and to identify the lessons for policy makers concerned with enhancing the anti-corruption measures in their countries.

The paper provides a brief literature review and analysis of Singapore’s policy context before explaining Singapore’s success in combating corruption and identifying the lessons for policy makers to enhance the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures in their countries.

Singapore’s success in combating corruption can be attributed to the political will of the People’s Action Party government and the effectiveness of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in investigating all corruption cases and enforcing the anti-corruption laws impartially, without fear or favour. Extrapolating from Singapore’s success, policy makers in other countries can learn these lessons: the critical importance of political will; addressing the causes of corruption and learning from past mistakes; establishing and supporting an independent anti-corruption agency with adequate resources; enforcing the anti-corruption laws impartially but not selectively against the government’s political opponents; and combating corruption is a marathon requiring perseverance and sustained effort.

Scholars, policy makers and anti-corruption practitioners will be interested in learning how Singapore has succeeded in combating corruption as well as the relevant lessons for policy makers.

This paper analyses the role of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime minister from June 1959 to November 1990, in minimising corruption by implementing a zero-tolerance policy toward corruption in Singapore.

This paper is based on the analysis of Lee’s beliefs and the policies he introduced to curb corruption in Singapore.

Lee’s disdain for corruption and his beliefs in meritocracy and the importance of good leadership shaped his commitment to a zero-tolerance policy against corruption, which was enforced impartially and sustained in Singapore for the past 62 years.

This analysis of how Lee transformed Singapore into one of the least corrupt countries in the world would be of interest to policy-makers, practitioners and scholars concerned with minimising corruption in their own countries.

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore has succeeded in curbing the problem of police corruption and to identify the six lessons which other Asian countries can learn from Singapore's experience.

The paper analyzes the causes of police corruption in Singapore during the British colonial period and describes the measures adopted by the People's Action Party government after assuming office in June 1959 to curb police corruption. The effectiveness of these measures is assessed by referring to Singapore's perceived extent of corruption according to three international indicators and the reported cases of police corruption from 1965 to 2011.

The Singapore Police Force has succeeded in minimizing police corruption by improving salaries and working conditions, cooperating with the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, enhancing its recruitment and selection procedures, providing training and values education for its members, and adopting administrative measures to reduce the opportunities for corruption. Other Asian countries afflicted with rampant police corruption can learn six lessons from Singapore's success.

This paper will be of interest to those policy makers, scholars, and anti-corruption practitioners, who are interested in learning how Singapore has succeeded in curbing police corruption.

Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime minister, who governed the country from 1959 to 1990, passed away on 23 March 2015 at the age of 91. The purpose of this paper is to assess his legacy of good governance in Singapore.

The changes in Singapore’s policy context during 1959-2014 are described first before analyzing Lee’s legacy of good governance in Singapore by examining his books and major speeches.

Lee Kuan Yew’s commitment to meritocracy, empowerment of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau to curb corruption effectively, reliance on competitive salaries to attract the “best and brightest” citizens to join the civil service, and maintenance of the rule of law, constitute his legacy of good governance in Singapore.

This paper will be useful to policy-makers, scholars and readers who are interested in learning about Lee Kuan Yew’s contribution to good governance in Singapore.

The purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to ascertain the levels of effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in China, Japan, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan; second, to explain why some of these ACAs are more effective than others; and third, to suggest some policy recommendations for addressing their limitations.

This paper relies on three well-known international indicators to assess the perceived extent of corruption in the five countries. Similarly, their quality of governance is assessed by their total percentile rank on the World Bank’s six governance indicators in 2013.

Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau is effective because of its government’s political will and favorable policy context. The Philippines and Taiwan rely on ineffective multiple ACAs, which are inadequately staffed and funded, and compete with each other for limited resources. China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is ineffective because corrupt party members are disciplined and not prosecuted, and the political leaders use corruption as a weapon against their opponents. Japan’s weak political will is reflected in its reluctance to address its structural corruption. This paper concludes with policy recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of the ACAs in the five countries.

The comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the ACAs in the five Asian countries and the policy recommendations for addressing their limitations will be of interest to policy makers, scholars and anti-corruption practitioners.

In recognition of corruption as a major obstacle to the development processes of poor countries, the search for effective strategies in combating the phenomenon in developing countries has become a major preoccupation of the international donor community, particularly since the early 1990s. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of “political will” in combating corruption in Hong Kong, Singapore and Ghana with the view to drawing significant lessons for all developing and transition countries in their anticorruption crusades.

The findings in this paper are based on an extensive review of relevant literature and personal experiences in Ghana.

This paper concludes that controlling corruption in a sustained manner requires a consistent demonstration of genuine commitment on the part of the top political elite towards the eradication of the menace. Where the commitment of the top political leadership to the goal of eradicating corruption in a country is weak, as has been the case in Ghana, governments are only likely to engage in “zero tolerance for corruption” talk but continue to play a “tolerant corruption” game. Anticorruption reforms, in this regard, are bound to fail.

The paper highlights a number of lessons from the successful anticorruption crusades of Singapore and Hong Kong that are significant for Ghana and other developing countries in their fight against corruption. These include the need for anticorruption reform initiatives to be participatory and inclusive of all stakeholders including public and private sectors as well as civil society; the need to provide adequate budgets and staff for specialized anticorruption agencies and grant them independence in the execution of their mandates; and the need to establish effective mechanisms for: providing positive incentives for those who comply with anticorruption laws; and exposing and sanctioning compromised individuals and institutions.

Whilst studies on the role of political will in combating corruption in developing countries abound, most of these have either not provided in‐depth country experiences or relied on single country cases. One major departure of this paper from extant literature is its cross‐country comparative nature.

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Botswana, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, New Zealand, Rwanda and Singapore have succeeded in combating corruption and identify the lessons for policy makers in other countries.

The five countries are compared to identify the reasons for their success in combating corruption and the lessons that can be learnt by policy makers elsewhere.

Political will of the five governments is critical because combating corruption effectively requires them to provide the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) with the necessary powers, budget, personnel and independence to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. New Zealand has succeeded in curbing corruption without an ACA because it relies on other institutions to maintain its good governance. Singapore’s rejection of the ineffective British colonial government’s method of using the police to curb corruption and its reliance on a single ACA was emulated by Hong Kong, Botswana and Rwanda. However, having a single ACA does not guarantee success unless it has the powers, budget, personnel and independence to perform its functions impartially as a watchdog instead of an attack dog against the government’s political opponents. As combating corruption remains a work in progress in the five countries, their policy makers must sustain their effective ACAs to meet the rising threat of private sector corruption.

The paper will be useful to scholars and policy makers concerned with improving the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in those countries where corruption is rampant.

This purpose of this paper is to discuss the relationship between political independence and operational impartiality in regard to the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). Against this background of western orthodoxy, it asks whether a non-western country with high levels of corruption (Vietnam being an example) can find another pathway in its efforts to effectively combat corruption.

An exercise in qualitative conceptual clarification and theoretical speculation, drawing upon practical examples.

It is argued that it is important to distinguish between de jure and de facto political independence, and that neither can be fully understood unless they are considered in relationship to other key values, particularly operational impartiality, public accountability, and systemic legitimacy, and in the context of bureaucratic politics. There is little coherent theoretical knowledge available about the relationships among these variables. Such values are central to western notions of “good government” but are much less institutionalised in non-western jurisdictions with high levels of corruption. The question is raised: can such countries, Vietnam being one example, develop effective anti-corruption strategies which because of the nature of their own political system, cannot depend on political independence for its ACAs?

Attention is drawn to some conceptual and putatively theoretical issues relating to the effectiveness of ACAs, and which have received little explicit attention in the relevant academic literature.