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The global economy has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has placed greater responsibility on companies to fulfill their obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) amid the crisis. This chapter investigates the role of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) attributes in improving a firm's CSR in the emerging economy of Jordan and how the COVID-19 pandemic modifies this relationship. Using a Jordanian sample of 655 firm-year observations during the 2014–2021 period, the research results show that older CEOs, well-educated CEOs, CEOs' remuneration, and CEOs' ownership positively correlate with CSR reporting. However, long-tenured CEOs are associated with lower CSR initiatives. The subsample analysis findings also validate the significance of CEO attributes in improving CSR practice during the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the prepandemic period. These findings are beneficial for the regulatory setters to understand better whether CEO attributes are linked to engagement in CSR-related information. This research is among the limited number of studies that have explored how CEO attributes impact CSR reporting for the stakeholder's welfare. Moreover, it uniquely concentrated on contrasting the findings before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The purpose of this study is twofold. First, to investigate whether internal attributes of corporate governance such as board size, board composition, CEO duality, board meetings, blockholders' ownership, managerial ownership, CEO remuneration, and directors' remuneration affect the capital structure (i.e., total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio, and short-term debt ratio) choice of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited during 2009–2014. Second, whether theories relevant to corporate governance developed in western settings provide support to understand the financing behavior of firms in a developing country, Pakistan. In sum, results indicate that corporate governance measures have some role in shaping the financing behavior of firms. It is worth mention that each company is bound to explicitly confirm in annual report regarding compliance with code of corporate governance, but results indicate a different story. For instance, descriptive statistics indicate that five individual larger shareholders on average hold more than 68% shares.

The aim of the study is to examine the influence of remuneration committee (RC) characteristics, namely separation, size, independence, meetings, and female directors, on firm performance (FP) by using return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and earnings per shares (EPS). The study covers all firms being listed in Bahrain Bourse for two years which are 2020 and 2021. The results of the study show that having more directors in RC would significantly increase firm performance “ROE and EPS.” Further, having more females in RC would significantly increase firm performance “ROA.” In addition, having separate RC would significantly decrease firm performance “ROA and EPS.” Moreover, the independence of directors in RC and its frequent meetings has no significant impact on the firm’s performance. The results show that there is a need to re-evaluate the role of the RC and strengthen its effectiveness, as some of the variables examined by this study have an insignificant impact on a firm’s performance. Further, there is a need to allocate additional efforts and policies in developing corporate governance and RCs as well.

This international empirical study analyses the relation between board transparency, CEO monitoring policy and financial performance.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how in recent years the rediscovery that extreme inequality is returning to advanced economies and has become widespread. What is at issue are the causes of this inequality. It is becoming clear that the wider population, particularly in Anglo-American economies have not shared in the growing wealth of the countries concerned, and that the majority of this wealth is being transferred on a continuous and systemic basis to the very rich. Corporate governance and the pursuit of shareholder value it is argued has become a major driver of inequality.

The current statistical evidence produced by leading authorities including the US Federal Reserve, World Economic Forum, Credit Suisse and Oxfam are examined. The policy of shareholder value and the mechanisms by which the distributions from business take place are investigated from a critical perspective.

While the Anglo-American economies are seeing a return to the extremes of inequality last witnessed in the 19th century, the causes of this inequality are changing. In the 19th century great fortunes often were inherited, or derived by entrepreneurs from the ownership and control of productive assets. By the late 20th century as Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) and others have highlighted, the sustained and rapid inflation in top income shares have made a significant contribution to the accelerating rate of income and wealth inequality.

The intensification of inequality in advanced industrial economies, despite the consistent work of Atkinson and others, was largely neglected until the recent research of Picketty which has attracted international attention. It is now acknowledged widely that inequality is a serious issue; however, the contemporary causes of inequality remain largely unexplored.

The significance of inequality, now that it is recognized, demands policy and practical interventions. However, the capacity or even willingness to intervene is lacking. Further analysis of the debilitating consequences of inequality in terms of the efficiency and stability of economies and societies may encourage a more robust approach, yet the resolve to end extreme inequality is not present.

The analysis of inequality has not been neglected and this chapter represents a pioneering effort to relate the shareholder value orientation now dominant in corporate governance to the intensification of inequality.

Purpose – Since risk management is crucial for achieving strategic objectives in a complex and uncertain environment and its effectiveness relies deeply on efforts to create a risk-conscious culture, this study aims at understanding whether risk management can be promoted and reinforced by the use of performance-based monetary incentives given to Board members and top managers.

Methodology/approach – This study is explorative in nature and investigates four case studies based on document analysis and semi-structured interviews with risk managers.

Findings – Results show that some companies have already adopted risk measures in incentive schemes. At the same time all interviewees agree with the usefulness of linking traditional performance-based monetary incentives to risk management objectives in order to improve the effectiveness of the latter and to create a risk-aware culture. However, the difficulty in identifying proper measures has been underlined.

Practical implications – The study confirms the feasibility of linking risk dimensions to reward systems and suggests that firms should move in this direction. The study also outlines and proposes some possible measures to reward managers.

Limitations – This study views risk as measurable and managerially actionable and focuses only on incentives while acknowledging the use of other mechanisms that can contribute to the creation of an informed risk culture. Furthermore, the integration of risk management with other management control systems and accounting instruments has not been analyzed.

Value of the paper – This study addresses firms and their stakeholders’ need to make top managers more accountable for risk in their decision-making.