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We tested for evidence of stock price bubbles in the Malaysian stock market from 1978 to 2004. Four different tests were used namely excess volatility tests, unit root/co-integration tests, duration dependence tests, and the intrinsic bubbles model. All four tests indicate that during the sample period, there was evidence of stock price bubbles. All tests results conform to the theoretical literature on asset price bubbles except for the results on the intrinsic bubbles model, which concludes that Malaysian investors under react to information on dividends. We find this result hardly surprising as anecdotal evidence does indicate that Malaysian investors place more importance on capital gains as compared to dividends. Although we do not go into a debate on whether authorities should be prick the bubble to stem its negative effects, we argue that transparent information dissemination will ensure that the stock market becomes more efficient in pricing stocks.

Speculative bubbles have been occurring periodically in local or global real-estate markets and are considered a potential cause of economic crises. In this context, the detection of explosive behaviors in the financial market and the implementation of early warning diagnosis tests are of critical importance. The recent increase in Brazilian housing prices has risen concerns that the Brazilian economy may have a speculative housing bubble. In the present chapter, we employ a recently proposed recursive unit root test in order to identify possible speculative bubbles in data from the Brazilian residential real-estate market. The empirical results show evidence for speculative price bubbles both in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the two main Brazilian cities.

This chapter presents several approaches for identifying and dating the speculative bubble on real estate market. Using the real estate price index (IPAI), statistical and structural approaches were combined in order to detect the existence of a bubble on the Moroccan real estate market. The results obtained affirm that the Moroccan real estate market experienced a speculative bubble during the period 2006–2008 explained mainly by the boom of credit during the same period. The use of the Markov switching model affirmed that the speculative bubble on Morocco is cyclic and consequently corroborates the critic formulated by Evans (1991) concerning the traditional approaches for the detection of financial bubbles. Thus, the analysis of the series of the bubble, extracted using the Kalman filter, affirms the existence of two regimes, namely an explosive regime and a normal regime. The first regime describes the periods of explosion of the bubble and lasts for about 9 quarters, while the second, lasting for 14 quarters, describes the periods of return to the average cycle.

Expectations play a crucial role in finance, macroeconomics, monetary economics, and fiscal policy. In the last decade a rapidly increasing number of laboratory experiments have been performed to study individual expectation formation, the interactions of individual forecasting rules, and the aggregate macro behavior they co-create. The aim of this article is to provide a comprehensive literature survey on laboratory experiments on expectations in macroeconomics and finance. In particular, we discuss the extent to which expectations are rational or may be described by simple forecasting heuristics, at the individual as well as the aggregate level.

This article identifies the institutional factors behind both the emergence of a highly vulnerable financial system and the housing bubble that devastated it. The underlying premise is that the financial crisis was a market failure embedded in and caused by an institutional one. The failing institutions were academic, political and regulatory. The article shows how these institutions were fatally undermined, suggesting limits to the rationalization of finance capitalism. The perspective on financial crisis developed here recognizes the pressing need for reform of the financial markets, and also recommends institutional reforms as critical protections against future system failure.

In this paper we investigate the relationship between loose monetary policy, low inflation, and easy bank credit and house price booms.

Using a panel of 11 OECD countries from 1920 to 2011 we estimate a panel VAR in order to identify loose monetary policy shocks, low inflation shocks, bank credit shocks, and house price shocks.

We show that during boom periods there is a heightened impact of all three “policy” shocks with the bank credit shock playing an important role. However, when we look at individual house price boom episodes the cause of the price boom is not so clear. The evidence suggests that the house price boom that occurred in the United States during the 1990s and 2000s was not due to easy bank credit.

Shocks from the shadow banking system are not separately identified. These are incorporated into the fourth “catch-all” shock.

Our evidence on housing price booms that expansionary monetary policy is a significant trigger buttresses the case for central banks following stable monetary policies based on well understood and credible rules.

This paper uses historical evidence to evaluate the relative importance of three main causes of house price booms. Our results bring into question the commonly held view that loose bank credit was to blame for the U.S. house price bubble of the later 1990s.

Norway is a small nation state on the northernmost coastline of Western Europe, integrated in the Western world economy. For centuries Norway's integration in the world economy had been based on exports of raw materials such as fish and timber, as well as shipping services. In the early 20th century, furnace-based metals (made possible by cheap hydropower) were added to this export basket. Just as the world economy entered an increasingly unstable phase in 1970s, another natural resource was discovered in Norway: petroleum – that is, oil and natural gas from the North Sea. This chapter analyses the challenges and possibilities inherent in the Norwegian strategy of developing an oil economy in a world economic situation influenced by new and stronger forms of international integration through the four decades between 1970 and 2010.

This chapter examines the roles and challenges for the Irish economy in the aftermath of the collapse of the Celtic Tiger and the onset of the 2008 economic crisis. Specifically, it does review the role that Government, the Central Bank of Ireland, and the Financial Regulator had before, during and after the collapse of both the Irish banking system and property market. This chapter explains the drivers behind the growth of the Celtic Tiger and the sources of leverage that amplified the severity of the subsequent collapse. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the changes that have since been made and provides a review of the lessons that can be obtained from the collapse.

The results presented in this chapter are based on analysis of secondary sources and a literature review to determine conceptual and theoretical frameworks for identifying the specific issues that the Irish economy endured since the 2008 economic crisis and the red flags and signals that were either missed or ignored.

Combined with the subprime collapse of 2007 and the international sovereign debt crisis evident since 2008, Ireland and the actions of its regulators and policy makers undoubtedly generated not only a catalyst to financial ruin, but also an incubator to aid its severity. The precise drivers that created the Celtic Tiger remained unchanged and played a significant role in the subsequent collapse. Banks were leveraged towards the Irish property market and the role of leverage in financial markets created mispricing, to which the basic principles of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) failed. This miscalculation of risk was severe and destructive for the real economy. The reward for this error was a place in history as an ‘I’ in the derogatory term ‘PIIGS’.

This chapter could be used as teaching material for undergraduate and masters programmes in economics and finance. It provides a response to further understand the behaviour of the Irish economy during the development of the Celtic Tiger and the subsequent financial collapse that enveloped the Irish state.

This chapter discusses the role of leverage throughout a financial system and the necessity for financial monitors to promote an environment of sustainability and financial endurance; that which can survive an international financial crisis event.

Rapid stock market growth without real economic back-up has led to the 2015 Chinese Stock Market Crash with thousands of stocks hitting the down limit simultaneously multiple times. The authors provide a detailed analysis of structural breaks in heavy-tailedness and asymmetry properties of returns in Chinese A-share markets due to the crash using recently proposed robust approaches to tail index inference. The empirical analysis points out to heavy-tailedness properties often implying possibly infinite second moments and also focuses on gain/loss asymmetry in the tails of daily returns on individual stocks. The authors further present an analysis of the main determinants of heavy-tailedness in Chinese financial markets. It points out to liquidity and company size as being the most important factors affecting the returns’ heavy-tailedness properties. At the same time, the authors do not observe statistically significant differences in tail indices of the returns on A-shares and the coefficients on factors affecting them in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods.