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The chapter presents an overview of major currency and international capital market movements after World War II, showing that the movements brought about by US investments in the fifties and sixties that created the offshore Eurodollar bear resemblance to what is now taking place between the United States as the world's investor and China. International money is created in a triangular process of long and short lending intermediated by short borrowing. The imbalances often recorded on US current account are to some extent counterbalanced by the huge returns accruing to businesses of the west. This follows the “dark matter” theory but with the twist that real value is extracted through foreign direct investment in line with the rationale of Eurodollar flows. However, threats are also created in this way. Rather than in superficial notions of instability in currency markets, the high returns on capital abroad have been instrumental both in the deindustrialization of the west and the maintenance of a high rate of consumption through the financialization of the housing market. The eventual overdrive precipitated the crisis starting in 2007, but the dollar relationship with China continues unabatedly.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has provoked considerable debate. Initial expressions of CSR can be traced back to the seventeenth century. However, the ideal of socially responsible business was most evident after the depression of the 1930s and the post-war period in the 1950s. CSR was, by then, mainly influenced by values of philanthropy and principles of the welfare state, and mostly centred on corporations’ charitable donations which provided social welfare for materially deprived families and individuals. In the 1980s, there was a marked shift to the neoliberal ideals of profit maximisation and free regulation in corporate activities and this fed through into CSR practices. We argue that these conflicting ideals of CSR create divergent discourses where corporations on the one hand proclaim a lack of self-interest and a duty of care towards host societies, and on the other hand legitimise corporation’s self-interested preoccupation with profit. Divergent care versus profit discourses influence how legislators, CSR experts, corporations and NGOs understand and practise CSR in host societies. In this chapter, we examine how welfare and neoliberal ideologies contribute to divergent discourses of duty of care and profit, and how these discourses influence corporations’ decision-making about their social responsibility. The chapter concludes by proposing alternative ways for rethinking political and economic relationships between communities and corporations, in order to move beyond the limits of the current discourses of duty of care and profit.

This chapter attempts to assess the impact that the current Covid-19 pandemic can exert on the globalization process. The pandemic crisis, which fully unfolded worldwide in March 2020, had dramatic consequences for the world population, some of which are of economic character. As some of the global value chains and international trade and investment relationships were destabilized or suspended, a legitimate question arises as to the possible progress of the globalization process. The authors commence with a multidimensional concept of globalization and its critical evaluation. Subsequently, three possible scenarios of pandemic-induced development are identified and explored: disrupted globalization, de-globalization, and finally rebalanced globalization. The discussion of these scenarios also includes implications for economic policy.

With the debt crisis that has been impacting many countries in the Global South since 2015, its spectacular acceleration following the collateral effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ever-increasing weight of “new” creditors (China, Gulf countries, and private creditors), the old debate for the creation of an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism under the aegis of the United Nations has resurfaced. Although such a mechanism could constitute a real advance compared to the current situation, it remains very hypothetical, both because of its limits and because of the complexity of the process to be undertaken in view of the adoption of an international treaty endorsing its creation. Above all, it ignores the sovereignty of states and the right to self-determination of peoples. Other solutions exist, which are less complicated, less expensive, and not at all less legitimate, among which the establishment of a moratorium with interest freeze and the creation of an audit committee with citizen participation aiming at canceling or repudiating the illegitimate debts with regard to international law and national legal provisions.

In August, 1971 the Bretton Woods system of international monetary relations ended, “not with a bang but a whimper”. The so‐called Nixon measures signalled a change of arrangements and attitudes which put the world on notice that the United States was no longer prepared to fill the key role in that system. From that moment forward, makeshift arrangements have provided an uneasy interregnum, while the Committee of Twenty distill from the experience of the past and the wisdom of the present the essence of a new system.

There have been three essays in international monetary reform during the past 40 years. The first was unique in that, at Bretton Woods in 1944, representatives of two nations dominated the planning of a world monetary system which was, in essence, to endure for twenty‐five years. The uniqueness of this lay in the clean start made possible by the vacuum left by the war — an opportunity certainly not to be repeated. The fact that the Bretton Woods system prevailed, with modification and adaptation, for almost as long as the international gold standard testifies to the fact that its planning was not ill done.

A number of recent papers have raised serious questions about the validity of the German dominance hypothesis, using Granger (temporal) causality tests. If Germany dominates within the European Monetary System, then German monetary policy, measured by either money stocks or interest rates should Granger (temporally) cause other EMS countries’ monetary policies, but not vice versa. Empirical evidence leads analysts to conclude that the German dominance hypothesis is invalid, or at a minimum, in need of significant reformulation. Explores similar Granger causality tests, using the recent cointegration and error‐correction modelling strategy, for the US and a group of developing countries during the Bretton Woods period, where conventional wisdom suggests that US policy dominated. Finds significant evidence of two‐way causality between the US money stock and the money stocks of a large number of developing countries. These findings raise a serious questions about the interpretation and/or appropriateness of the Granger causality test for investigating policy dominance hypotheses.

The international linkages between money stocks (and inflation rates) has received much attention. Focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Fixed rate systems require credible commitments to the rules of the game by the central banks involved. Credible commitment can be achieved through cooperative (symmetric) or coercive (asymmetric) regimes. Did the USA (Germany) dominate other developed (European) countries during the Bretton Woods (European Monetary) system? Examines the linkages, if any, between the USA (German) money stock and money stocks in other developed (European) countries, using the cointegration and error‐correction methodology. Finds evidence that USA (German) money stock did affect other (European) countries′ money stocks during fixed exchange rates. Finds, also, reverse causality which raises serious questions about either the dominance of the USA (Germany) within the Bretton Woods (European Monetary) system, or the usefulness of causality tests is answering such questions.

The experience of the 1990s renewed economists’ interest in the role of credit in macroeconomic fluctuations. The locus classicus of the credit-boom view of economic cycles is the expansion of the 1920s and the Great Depression. In this paper we ask how well quantitative measures of the credit boom phenomenon can explain the uneven expansion of the 1920s and the slump of the 1930s. We complement this macroeconomic analysis with three sectoral studies that shed further light on the explanatory power of the credit boom interpretation: the property market, consumer durables industries, and high-tech sectors. We conclude that the credit boom view provides a useful perspective on both the boom of the 1920s and the subsequent slump. In particular, it directs attention to the role played by the structure of the financial sector and the interaction of finance and innovation. The credit boom and its ultimate impact were especially pronounced where the organization and history of the financial sector led intermediaries to compete aggressively in providing credit. And the impact on financial markets and the economy was particularly evident in countries that saw the development of new network technologies with commercial potential that in practice took considerable time to be realized. In addition, the structure and management of the monetary regime mattered importantly. The procyclical character of the foreign exchange component of global international reserves and the failure of domestic monetary authorities to use stable policy rules to guide the more discretionary approach to monetary management that replaced the more rigid rules-based gold standard of the earlier era are key for explaining the developments in credit markets that helped to set the stage for the Great Depression.