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The ongoing debate about the effects of bonuses on managers’ performance and the role of reward systems in organizations has still not led to a unanimous conclusion among academics and practitioners. Those in favor of bonuses state that applying bonuses and putting emphasis on monetary rewards increases productivity and organizational performance, while those against bonuses claim that use of bonuses and monetary rewards leads to counterproductive results. A key question often overlooked in the discussion is: How important is handing out bonuses for an organization to become and stay successful for a longer period of time? This paper seeks to address these issues.

This paper describes the results of research into the characteristics of “high performance organizations” (HPOs) and the role of bonuses and reward systems in creating and maintaining HPOs.

The research results show that use of bonuses or implementation of certain types of reward systems have neither a positive nor a negative effect on organizational performance. This may be explained by the fact that reward systems are a hygiene factor for an organization. If an organization does not have an appropriate reward system (whether or not including bonuses), it will run into trouble with its employees and have difficulty improving its performance. If it does – a situation which employees expect and consider to be normal – it can start working on becoming an HPO.

The results of this study further the discussion about the role of bonuses.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.

In many countries that allow unsolicited proposals (USPs) for public–private partnership (PPP) projects, incentives are awarded to the initial proponent of the USP projects during the tendering process as rewards for initially making a proposal. Because of such a reward system, including the bonus system, USPs are commonly known to involve fewer tender participants. This paper aims to investigate the empirical relationship between the number of tender participants and the institutional factors of PPPs. Specifically, two institutional factors are examined: the use of USPs and the bonus system for initial USP proponents.

The ordinary least squares (OLS) and Poisson regression analysis is used in this study to analyze PPP data in South Korea.

This paper demonstrated that USP projects have fewer bidders participating in tenders than solicited projects. Meanwhile, the analysis showed that the bonus system as another component of the institutional framework did not account for the number of bidders in tendering. In the analysis by three different facility types (“Roads,” “Environmental facilities” and “Other” types) of whether the bonus system discouraged participation in the bidding, the authors found heterogeneous responses among the types. For “Roads” and “Other” types of projects, the existence of the bonus system reduced the number of bidders for USP projects, while for “Environmental facilities,” there was no negative relationship between bonus points and the number of bidders. In the analysis of whether there were fewer bidders when no bonus points were awarded, there was no statistically significant difference in the number of bidders for “Roads” and “Environmental facilities.”

This study shows the possibility that other institutional factors apart from bonus points affect competition. The characteristic factors of USPs can affect the decision to participate in the tender from the perspective of potential bidders.

Recent studies on USPs have mainly focused on the strategies that ensure the effective management of USPs for PPP implementation. However, quantitative effects of USPs on the tendering process have not yet been addressed. The quantitative effect refers to something that may be estimated by quantity or that relates to the describing or measuring of quantity, such as the present attempt to account for the number of bidders.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review and critique of what we already know about pay systems in Chinese state‐owned enterprises, to identify the gaps in the literature and to stimulate more research in this area.

The paper first describes the policy issues at the macro‐level (government policies) in order to put micro‐level pay practices in a pertinent context. Then the paper provides a detailed review and critique on current empirical studies on pay practices in Chinese enterprises, their antecedents and consequences. Finally, the paper identifies potential research questions and provides some directions for future research.

The paper concludes from the extensive review of the current literature that the following research areas merit attention: Why do some firms pay their employees more than other firms? Why do we observe different types of internal pay structures among firms? What are the consequences of these different structures? Why is the link between pay and performance weak in some firms but strong in others? Under what conditions pay‐for‐performance enhances firm performance?

The paper is one of the most comprehensive reviews of the literature on compensation practices of Chinese companies.

DEVALUATION is not a soft option, an easy escape route from our afflictions. Neither is it a source of pride to citizens of a land of whom a famous American wrote last century: ‘The strength of England lies in the omnipotence of her industry’. The reasons for it are complex and in part international in origin, but the stark fact is that events drove the country ineluctably towards a crisis from which devaluation was the only way out.

MILLIONS of pounds have been recklessly thrown away by the naive Government on useless so‐called defence contracts. The greatest loss has been sustained by the aircraft industry and anyone who has had any experience at all of that industry will find nothing remarkable in such a statement.

This case study, of an intervention in a region of the Israeli water supply company, demonstrates that the application of well known management techniques such as MBO, performance appraisal and bonus schemes, affect not only the technical but also the cultural and political subsystems of the organisation. These subsystems should be thoroughly assessed beforehand, with the prognosis of the possible effects of the change strategy on all of them.

The core of this paper is a reproduction of a study published in 1911 by Clark and Wyatt entitled “Scientific management as applied to women’s work”. The paper is significant because it provides a very early eyewitness “warts‐and‐all” account of scientific management as applied to women’s labor. It is also of interest because Frederick Taylor both read the work and corresponded with one of the authors. Hence it provides a rare insight into Taylor’s ideas regarding gender relations and the place of women in industry.

DESPITE assurances from the Union most concerned that “every endeavour will be made to keep Montague Burton workers in employment” it seems inevitable that the massive redundancies announced a month ago will take place. Nor does it seems possible that these unfortunate people will readily find employment elsewhere — certainly not in the towns where they are living and working now. In every sense, it will mean a major upheaval for most of them.