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Recent high profile U.S. corporate collapses have their counterparts in other international markets, such as Australia. The corporate governance failures that led to major corporate collapses in both countries are strikingly similar, despite differences in their respective corporate governance systems. In this paper, I present an examination of the corporate governance failures that led to the demise of three prominent Australian firms in 2001 and illustrate that the corporate governance failures are not limited to the existing corporate governance system in the United States. I will also outline the various corporate governance reforms that were established to restore investor confidence.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between law and ethics in accounting. The primary arguments of the chapter are that law and ethics have between intertwined historically, that concepts of morality and ethics have permeated law and that laws are based on ethical and religious principles. As a result, it is important for accounting students and practicing accountants to understand the close relationship between law and ethics. The chapter defines the meaning of “legal” and “ethical,” and draws distinctions between these concepts. It also discusses historical relationships between law, morality and ethics in major religious traditions. The concepts of ethics expressed in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and how these concepts influenced the development of law and ethics in Western philosophy are then discussed. In particular, the ethical principles of independence, integrity and objectivity as embodied in the Code of Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) are recognizable in Aristotle’s premise, that moral virtue is situated at the mean between deficiency and excess and that ethics is oriented toward practical implementation of the good life through human rationality. The final section of the chapter discusses the application of law and ethics to accounting and in particular to the detection of management fraud.

The retreat of the state has been a feature of the modern global landscape since the Reaganite era of the 1980s but it seems to be gathering pace at the present. Thus one admired concept that is having a new lease of life is that of privatisation. The main idea that is benevolent is to reduce the costs of the state and authorise people to do their own jobs. But there have been deviations in reality. We have always heard of government officials getting the responsibility of the so-called privatised jobs in a formal auction and in this way earning money. Another sort of not really good governance relates to authorising manufacturers in some countries to test the quality of their own and their rivals products. In order to outflank the legal burdens the manufacturers install a laboratory mostly near or even inside their own territories with a separate name and they put their own workers there to handle the job. So the result is at best not very reliable, especially for the rivals who find their products rejected. Social responsibility deals with customer issues as one of the main stakeholders. And privatisation in this form is predicated in corruption and as such is opposed to social responsibility.

This paper takes position against the spread of the free-market logic in the domain of accountancy, where free market is often viewed as undeniably benefiting society and users of financial statements. A key moment that paved the way for the growing influence of the free-market logic in accountancy resides in the elimination of institutional ethics rules prohibiting direct and uninvited solicitation of clients, which occurred in the 1970s. Importantly, it was (some would say quite naïvely) assumed that auditors would be able to maintain their independence from auditees in a surrounding climate emphasizing market competition and individualism. However, research indicates that before the collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen, a number of auditors were significantly concerned about auditor independence being undermined in actual practice. Yet, their concerns were kept largely in the dark. It took the billion-equity collapse of Enron and the powerful imagery related to the shredding of documents by its external auditor Arthur Andersen, as well as the collapse of WorldCom a few months afterwards, to bring to light the undermining of auditor independence in the public arena and to create a momentum in favour of reforming authoritative regimes of auditor independence, therefore constraining to some extent the influence of the free-market logic in accountancy. My main argument is that these collapses could perhaps have been avoided if auditors’ dissenting and negative points of view on auditor independence had been voiced, heard, and appropriately taken into account by accounting organizations and regulatory bodies. Accordingly, it is recommended that channels be established for practising auditors to communicate concerns that emerge from their daily experiences and which cast doubt on the conceptual foundations of financial auditing. Establishing such mechanisms may help to guard against the excesses of the free-market logic; the latter definitely should not reign unchallenged.

The need for independent audit goes back to the agency theory, the theory of delegation of power and the issue of trust. Stakeholders delegate power to management to manage the business on their behalf, yet they face the risk of information asymmetry and management motivations to commit fraud. The main aim of having an independent auditor was therefore to reduce the risk of information asymmetry and fraudulent behaviour by management. Auditors are required by the International Auditing Standards to detect material fraud and error, and they are expected to have a duty of care for stakeholders. However, recently independent auditors, whether conducting private or public audit, have been scrutinised for failing to detect material fraud. There have been a lot of discussions in the literature about the role of private auditors in detecting fraud, but very little discussions about the role of public auditors in detecting fraud. This chapter will outline the difference between private audit and public audit; explain the legal liability of public auditors in relation to fraud detection; the role of public auditors in detecting fraud; and will critically review the root causes for auditors’ failure to detect fraud.