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Mandatory auditor firm rotation (mandatory rotation) has been a controversial issue in the United States for many decades. Mandatory rotation has been considered at various times as a means of improving auditor independence. For example, in the United States, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has considered mandatory rotation as a solution to the independence problem (PCAOB, 2011) and the European Parliament approved legislation that will require mandatory rotation in the near future (Council of European Union, 2014). The concept of implementing a mandatory rotation policy has been encouraged by some constituents of audited financial statements and rejected by other constituents of audited financial statements. Although there are apparent pros and cons of such a policy, the developmental process of such a policy in this country has not necessarily been an open-democratic, objective process. Universal mandatory rotation may or may not be the ideal solution; however, an open-democratic, objective process is needed to facilitate the development of a solution that considers the needs of all major stakeholders of audited financial statements – not simply accounting firms and public companies, but also investors. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine key issues relating to mandatory rotation and to encourage and stimulate future research and ongoing dialogue regarding this issue, in spite of efforts by certain constituents to silence the issue. This paper provides an overview of the various reasons, including practical, theoretical, political, and self-motivated reasons, why a mandatory rotation policy has not been implemented in the United States in order to address the potential conflict of interest between the auditor and client. This paper will also discuss how some deliberations of mandatory rotation have been flawed. The paper concludes with a summary of key issues along with two approaches for regulators, policy makers, and academics to consider as ways to improve the process and address auditor independence. The authors are not advocating for any specific solution; however, we are advocating for a more objective, unified approach and for the dialogue regarding auditor rotation to continue.

Prior research suggests that perceived levels of a subordinate auditor’s competence affects audit reviewers’ judgments. We extend this line of research by investigating the effects of perceived client competence (hereafter, ClientComp) and its interaction with subordinate auditor’s competence (hereafter, AuditorComp) on audit reviewers’ judgments. Using data from highly experienced CPA audit managers, senior managers, and partners, we find a significant main effect for AuditorComp, but not for ClientComp. We also find that when AuditorComp is high, levels of ClientComp do not affect audit reviewers’ judgments. However, we cannot support the hypothesis that when AuditorComp is low ClientComp will significantly affect audit reviewers’ judgments. These mixed results suggest that in the post-SOX (2002) era regulatory environment, audit reviewers may be exercising heightened professional skepticism about ClientComp whenever they consider clients’ assertions.

Independence is the cornerstone of the auditing profession. Even so, it is often assumed that acquiescing to the audit client when a disagreement occurs is more beneficial to the auditor-client relationship than asserting one’s independence (e.g., see Wang & Tuttle, 2009). We look more closely at the issue in the context of auditor-client management disagreements as recalled by experienced auditors.

We find that for most disagreements in which the auditor did not make any concession at all, the auditor-client relationship was either unaffected or strengthened. We find that a client’s use of pressure tactics did not appear to influence whether or not the auditor made a concession, but that a client’s use of pressure tactics, was associated with damage to the auditor-client relationship. The importance of the issue causing a disagreement was positively associated with the likelihood of the auditor staying with his/her initial position.

Over the last decade, many published papers lament auditors’ shift from professionalism to commercialism and call for increasing auditors’ commitment to the public interest (see, e.g., Bailey, 2008; Fogarty & Rigsby, 2010; Lampe & Garcia, 2013; Wyatt, 2004; Zeff, 2003a, 2003b). At the same time, suggesting effective methodologies for improving auditors’ commitment to the public interest is particularly challenging because issues arising in the audit context are complex, and often involve tradeoffs between multiple stakeholders (e.g., Gaa, 1992; Massey & Thorne, 2006). An understanding of auditors ethical characterizations across separate phases of the audit process is needed so that methodologies can be devised to improve auditors’ commitment to the public interest. Thus, in this paper we interviewed 24 auditors and asked them to describe critical ethical incidents that they have encountered throughout the various phases of the audit process. Our results not only document the tension underlying the shift between professionalism and commercialism in auditing suggested by others, but also show that ethical conflicts are found in each phase of the audit and there are cross-phase differences in the auditors’ ethical characterizations. Limitations of the findings are also discussed as are suggestions for future research.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) altered the relationship between auditors and their clients by requiring an external audit of companies’ internal controls. Regulatory guidance is interpreted and applied by external auditors to comply with SOX. The purpose of this paper is to apply service operations management theories and techniques to the internal control audit process to better understand the role regulatory guidance plays in audit services. We discuss service operations management theories that apply to the production of audit services and employ the operations management technique of simulation to examine the effects of a historical relationship between the client and the auditor, information sharing between the client and the auditor, and the auditor’s perceived risk of the client on the internal control audit process. The application of service operations management theories and the simulation results illustrate that risk and information sharing are key factors for the audit process. The results suggest the updated Public Company Accounting Oversight Board guidance from Auditing Standard 2 to Auditing Standard 5 appropriately increased audit effectiveness by encouraging risk-based judgments and information sharing. This paper merges accounting and service operations management research to examine the effects of regulatory guidance on the internal control audit process. The paper uses simulation to illustrate the importance of interpreting regulatory guidance and the specific effects of risk and information sharing on the internal control audit process.

Currently, there is no formal recommended structure, particularly regarding the client’s ethics, for determining whether an external auditor should continue the business relationship with an audit client. This statement is not meant as a criticism, but rather as the backdrop for proposing that (1) a structure is needed that will assist auditors in evaluating client ethics and (2) such a structure should be institutionalized as an integral part of the continuance decision. Auditors will never be able to guarantee that a client is ethical – even those clients with detailed codes of ethics – but auditors could benefit from a more comprehensive and established process to assess a client’s commitment to ethical behavior. This paper begins by discussing some of the psychological aspects of the audit client continuance decision. Then, reviews existing, professional guidance related to evaluating client ethics. This is followed by the authors’ baseline model and client ethics evaluation checklist designed to assist external auditors in institutionalizing the evaluation of client ethics as part of the continuance decision.

Prior research finds evidence that audit quality is positively associated with the joint purchase of tax nonaudit services (NAS) and concludes that jointly provided tax services result in audit-related knowledge spillovers that lead to improved audit quality. We extend this line of research. We examine the relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements and determine whether this relation differs when the auditor is a small or large accounting firm. We also examine whether the Securities Exchange Commission’s restrictions on certain tax consulting practices (SEC, 2006) altered this relation. Specifically, we measure whether the probability of financial statement restatements varies with (1) variation in accounting firm size (measured as PCAOB annually inspected firms versus PCAOB triennially inspected firms), and (2) the joint provision of audit and tax services. We find a negative relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements which is consistent with prior research. We also find that this relation is significantly more negative when the auditor is a small accounting firm. Finally, we find that the lower probability of a restatement associated with the joint provision of audit and tax services persists regardless of auditor size after the SEC-imposed restrictions on certain tax consulting services in 2006. Our study provides evidence that accounting firms, and particularly small accounting firms, benefit from knowledge spillovers when jointly providing audit and tax services and these benefits lead to improved audit quality. Prior research concludes that large auditors provide higher audit quality and that the provision of tax services improves audit quality. Our results provide evidence that audit quality improvements are greater for small auditors and their clients. This improvement narrows that audit quality gap between large and small auditors. We do not find evidence that the SEC’s restrictions on certain tax consulting services altered the relation between audit quality and tax services.