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Outlines the principle of the Dutch auction, whereby the price begins at a high level and decreases by steps until a bid is made. Describes an integrated hardware and software system which uses Internet communications to enable remotely created bidders to participate in real‐time Dutch auctions and which meets the stringent requirement that synchrony be maintained among bidders’ terminals to ensure that each bidder has a fair chance to bid at the current offer price. Defines the principal functions of the system and characterizes its available resources. Illustrates implementation using a prototype design. Pays particular attention to bidder terminal synchronization, bidder authentication, and auction client security. Includes the possibility of a system variant using ISDN interconnect and PC‐based bidders’ terminals.

It is found that one unit root, common trend is shared by the quarterly auction price series of five frequently auctioned types of stamps. The common trends analysis provides specific, stationary linear combinations, or cointegrating portfolios, of the auction price levels. The quarterly returns for the system of cointegrated auction prices can be represented by an error correction model using past returns and cointegrating vectors. There is evidence of a positive relationship between changes in the common trend and leading changes in industrial production

Online auctions on the Internet have become popular. However, the communication techniques currently used in the online auction industry are primarily based on unicast technology. Unicast‐based online auctions suffer from unbearable delay of the communication between the auctioneer and bidders. Recently, multicast is changing the Internet environment, and is penetrating to the online auction field. This study describes a model for multicast‐based online auctions. The laboratory experiments demonstrate that the communication performance of multicast‐based online auctions is significantly better than that of traditional unicast‐based auctions.

This paper aims to demonstrate that Facebook likes affect outcomes in nonprofit settings. Specifically, Facebook likes influence affinity to nonprofits, which, in turn, affects fundraising outcomes.

The authors report three studies that establish that relationship. To examine social contagion, Study 1 – an auction field study – relies on selling artwork created by underprivileged youth. To isolate signaling, Study 2 manipulates the number of total Facebook likes on a page. To isolate commitment escalation, Study 3 manipulates whether a participant clicks a Facebook like.

The results show that Facebook likes increase willingness to contribute in nonprofit settings and that the process goes through affinity, as well as through Facebook impressions and bidding intensity. The total number of Facebook likes has a direct signaling effect and an indirect social contagion effect.

The effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms is limited to nonprofit settings and only applies to short-term effects.

Facebook likes serve as both a quality signal and a commitment mechanism. The magnitude of commitment escalation is larger, and the relationship is moderated by familiarity with the organization. Managers should target Facebook likes at those less familiar with the organization and should prioritize getting a potential donor to leave a like as a step leading to donation, in essence mapping a donor journey from prospective to active, where Facebook likes play an essential role in the journey. In a charity auction setting, the donor journey involves an additional step of bidder intensity.

The approach the authors study is shown effective in nonprofit settings but does not appear to extend to corporate social responsibility more broadly.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first investigation to map Facebook likes to a seller’s journey through signals and commitment, as well as the only investigation to map Facebook likes to charity auctions and show the effectiveness of this in the field.

This paper gives a model of collusion formation and a method of measuring the degree of it among the traders/bidders in the agricultural commodity markets in India. The important assumption is that the bidding is repetitive with a set of common bidders. The theory has been derived based on the behavior of the wholesale market of agricultural commodities in India. The paper is based on full information in the collusion formation. The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

The paper used the standard theory of optimization and the theory of auction and probability statistics.

This is a complete information model of cartel formation. The bidding is repetitive and continues forever in discrete time. Hence bidders behavior is observable. Using the proposed method, if the APMC measures for each market and publishes on a periodic basis, say weekly basis, then it will be easier to break the collusion in the market where relative collision is present. For example, if a farmer has three options to sell in three different markets, then the published data would help them to select the market where the degree of collusion is relatively lower. Moreover, the undesirable loss can be avoided based on the right choice of market. As a result, transaction costs will be optima.

The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual architecture for the development of an auction business‐to‐consumer marketplace where sellers offer available resources and services aiming to maximize their revenue while on‐the‐move travelers bid for them subject to the geographical area they are located in.

Based on previous findings from the literature and aggregate results from a preliminary field survey, core communication requirements, marketplace architecture, and communication workflows are presented.

Findings from the literature and field study exhibit a great potential for the successful use of location sensitive auction applications in tourism sector. Mobile auctions seem attractive for the efficient allocation and pricing of travel resources by abolishing the internet's barriers related to travelers computing requirements; furthermore, location‐based services (LBS) may reduce significantly the communication costs for sellers. The proposed marketplace is beneficial for a number of stakeholders beyond sellers, like auctioneer, mobile communications providers, and LBS providers.

The proposed architecture is in conceptual form and is currently under development. Infrastructure issues (like communication load, required bandwidth and protocol) are being investigated. Future research will focus on the integration of the architecture in an extended multi‐provider environment forming virtual enterprises. The viability and acceptance of the proposed model should be further investigated through an extended detailed market survey.

To the authors' best knowledge it is the first attempt to propose a location‐sensitive auction marketplace for tourism services.

The endowment effect is arguably one of the most robust phenomena documented in economics, behavioral decision theory and consumer research. However, the endowment effect has traditionally been studied as a fairly static phenomenon at the transactional level of analysis.

This paper documents this “contagious” endowment effect using lab experiments and such field data as eBay transactions and discuss the managerial implication of these findings.

This study suggests that the endowment effect is not limited to the level of the specific object, but can manifest itself with the more abstract class of objects to which a specific object happens to belong.

A logical next step would be to examine the boundary conditions – how similar does the subsequent object have to be for the endowment effect to transfer over to it? A related aspect would be whether there are boundary conditions arising from the quality of the endowment.

The effects reported here probably underlie the success of the many types of “bait and switch” schemes that have been used by the more unsavory type of marketer. As such, these findings might have implications for policy in the area of consumer protection.

This paper argues for and presents evidence consistent with the notion that the endowment effect is dynamic and can be transferred from one transaction to another and refer to this generalization of the endowment effect to other, similar products as “contagious endowment.”

E‐auctions have had a big impact on procurement over the past decade. Despite the benefits, there has been well documented resistance to this procurement medium. There is a need to understand factors which influence motivation to use and attitude towards e‐auctions, in order to facilitate practitioners' ability to develop and adapt e‐auctions into an effective procurement tool. This paper seeks to address this issue.

A model of the inter‐relationships between e‐auction drivers is derived from an analysis of the literature. Data from a sample of senior procurement professionals across several industry sectors were collected by online questionnaire and a structural equation model was fitted using PLS.

The study reveals that e‐auction use for procurement is motivated by building relationships with suppliers and not solely as a means of optimising prices of goods and services. Where attitude towards e‐auction use is negative, this is mainly driven by a strategic approach to procurement.

Nowhere in the extant literature has there been a study on the impact of how the organisational role of procurement by the organisation impacts e‐auctions use and attitudes. Furthermore, by distinguishing between motivations for using e‐auctions and attitudes towards them, procurement professionals are found to have a negative attitude to e‐auctions, but at the same time their motivations for using them are significantly linked to building relationships with their suppliers. This suggests that the potential of e‐auctions as a powerful procurement tool is being realised, but as yet has not been fully developed and implemented. The implications are that procurement managers should focus on developing the use of e‐auctions in a more strategic way to maximise both their effectiveness and the investment in them for the longer term.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the July 2007 introduction of a pre‐close call auction on the New Zealand stock market and its effect on share pricing quality and market manipulation.

Market quality was tested using the methodology of Pagano and Schwartz, which is based on changes in market model R²s. Closing price manipulation is detected by comparing mean bid‐ask spread characteristics of the periods before and after the introduction of the pre‐close call auction.

The closing call auction improves the quality of share pricing and reduces the incidence of market manipulation.

The paper confirms the effectiveness of the changes made to the method of closing the market for all firms in the market.

The paper extends knowledge of the effectiveness of closing call‐auctions. It is the first study in a low‐liquidity market and of shares with very low liquidities. Such markets have lower pricing quality and are more vulnerable to market manipulation. The study establishes the effectiveness of closing auctions in this environment.

This paper aims to report work on achieving semantic interoperability in electronic auctions. In particular, it considers the advantages and drawbacks of using hard‐coding and using semantic messages in the communication between the auction system and the participants of the auction.

It is demonstrated that although XML‐documents are commonly used for information exchange they do not provide any means of talking about the semantics (i.e. meaning) data. It is also shown that by expressing exchanged documents by resource description framework (RDF) the semantics of the messages can be captured in the message.

It is recognized that hard‐coding is proven to be a valuable and powerful way for an exchange of structured and persistent business documents (messages). However, if we use hard‐coding in the case of non‐persistent documents and non‐static markets we will encounter problems in deploying new auction policies and extending the system by new participants.

The introduction of the RDF‐technology in message exchange is challenging as it incorporates Semantic web technologies into many parts of the auction system, e.g. on data stores and query languages. The introduction of this technology is also an investment. The investment on new Semantic web technology includes a variety of costs including software, hardware and training costs.

By automating electronic auctions both buyers and sellers can benefit as they can achieve cost reductions and shorten the duration of the auction processes. Also new auction formats can be easily deployed.